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I. LEGISLATION AND POLICY DEVELOPMENTS 
Competition policy helping make markets work more fairly  
The EU remains the largest economic and trading area in the world, with more than half a 
billion consumers and 20 million companies forming its strongest lever – the internal market. 
The on-going process of improving and expanding the functioning of the single market goes 
hand in hand with developing competition policy. In essence, competition policy ensures that 
companies can compete on equal terms all across Europe.  
But competition policy also has another dimension – the social side – as referred to in the 
State of the Union speech 2016
1
. Enforcement of competition policy can contribute towards a 
fairer economy and promote markets so that businesses and consumers can get a fair share of 
the benefits of growth. Taken together, competition policy actions in the antitrust area, under 
the merger control and State aid control can make a real difference helping make markets 
work more fairly, for example, they stimulate innovation, prevent abuses from dominant 
players, contribute towards a connected Digital Single Market, a deeper and fairer internal 
market, an integrated and climate-friendly Energy Union, support competition-friendly 
regulation and foster a global competition culture.  
Antitrust and cartels 
 
Articles 101, 102 and 106 TFEU  
According to Article 101 TFEU, anti-competitive agreements are prohibited as incompatible with the internal 
market. Article 101 TFEU prohibits agreements with an anti-competitive object or effects where companies 
coordinate their behaviour instead of competing independently. Even if a horizontal or a vertical agreement 
could be viewed as restrictive (for example by combining the production of two competing companies) it might 
be allowed under Article 101(3) TFEU if it ultimately fosters competition (for example by promoting technical 
progress or by improving distribution).  
Article 102 TFEU prohibits abuse of a dominant position. It is not in itself illegal for an undertaking to be in a 
dominant position or to acquire such a position. Dominant undertakings, as any other undertaking in the market, 
are entitled to compete on the merits. However, Article 102 TFEU prohibits the abusive behaviour by dominant 
undertakings which prevents new entry or squeezes competitors out of the market. Such practices hamper 
competition and negatively affect incentives for innovation and growth, as well as consumer welfare.  
Finally, Article 106 TFEU prevents Member States from enacting or maintaining in force any measures contrary 
to the Treaty rules regarding public undertakings and undertakings to which Member States grant special or 
exclusive rights (privileged undertakings). 
1. Guidance in antitrust and cartel proceedings 
In 2016, in order to further increase transparency of antitrust proceedings and to offer 
guidance to parties and practitioners, the Commission continued its work to facilitate access 
to file. It also developped the so far limited practice of cooperation in antitrust proceedings 
and actively engaged in work on the interaction of competition policy, personal data and big 
data. 
The right to have access to the Commission's file is a central element of the rights of defence. 
The preparation of non-confidential versions of all documents on file for the purpose of 
granting access implies a significant burden on parties, third parties and the Commission. One 
                                                            
1 State of the Union speech 2016 available at http://ec.europa.eu/priorities/state-union-2016_en  
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way to reduce this burden for all involved could be an increased use of the so-called 
"voluntary confidentiality rings". In 2016, the Commission continued to develop its practice 
of providing access to file through voluntary "negotiated disclosure" – also known as 
"confidentiality rings" – as set out in paragraph 96 of the Commission Notice on Best 
Practices for the Conduct of Proceedings Concerning Articles 101 and 102 TFEU
2
. The 
Commission used confidentiality rings in several cases in 2016, which allowed for more 
efficient access to file for undertakings subject to investigation, third parties and the 
Commission.  
Furthermore, in non-cartel antitrust cases leading to a prohibition decision, there is no 
structured framework (comparable to settlements and leniency in cartels) to reward 
cooperation by the parties. Although rewards for cooperation by means of fines reduction are 
possible within the existing legal framework, there have so far been little incentives for the 
parties to cooperate in non-cartel antitrust prohibition decisions. There may be room, 
however, for the Commission to reward genuine and meaningful cooperation by parties 
through acknowledgment of the infringement, disclosure of evidence and/or the proposal of 
remedies. The possible level of fines reduction depends on the extent and timing of the 
cooperation in the specific case and the resulting benefits in terms of efficient procedure and 
effective enforcement. The first example of such a cooperation in 2016 was the ARA case
3
. 
In 2016, the Commission also continued to actively work on the interaction of competition 
policy, personal data, and big data from both the antitrust angle and the merger control angle. 
The Commissioner set out some key issues in three speeches, including on the competition 
concerns and benefits of data sharing
4
. The interaction of competition policy and data was 
also discussed several times with the national competition authorities in the European 
Competition Network. As noted in the press release accompanying the Microsoft / LinkedIn 
merger clearance decision
5
, "Privacy related concerns as such do not fall within the scope of 
EU competition law, but can be taken into account in the competition assessment to the extent 
that consumers see it as a significant factor of quality, and the merging parties compete with 
each other on this factor". In this instance, the Commission concluded that data privacy was 
an important parameter of competition between professional social networks on the market, 
which could have been negatively affected by the transaction"
6
. Finally, the Commission 
continues to actively monitor markets in this area, both from an antitrust perspective and from 
a merger control perspective. 
                                                            
2 Commission notice on Best Practices for the Conduct of Proceedings Concerning Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, 
OJ C 308, 20.10.2011, p. 6, paragraph 96. 
3 For further details of the case see Section II.1 on Energy and Environment at p. 39.  
4 For further information see https://ec.europa.eu/commission/2014-2019/vestager/announcements/competition-
big-data-world_en;  
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/2014-2019/vestager/announcements/making-data-work-us_en and 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/2014-2019/vestager/announcements/big-data-and-competition_en  
5 Case M.8124 Microsoft / LinkedIn, Commission decision of 6 December 2016 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=2_M_8124  
6 For further information see IP/16/4284 of 6 December 2016 available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-16-4284_en.htm  
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2. Significant judgments by the EU Courts in antitrust and cartels 
Article 101 TFEU 
Reverse payments in patent settlements 
In its judgments handed down on 8 September
7
 the General Court ruled for the first time on 
pay-for-delay agreements in the pharmaceutical sector. The General Court basically upheld 
the Commission's Lundbeck decision. It considered that Lundbeck and the generic 
undertakings concerned were potential competitors at the time the agreements at issue were 
concluded. It recalled that, in order to establish that an agreement restricts potential 
competition, it must be shown that, if the agreement had not been concluded, the competitors 
would have had real concrete possibilities of entering that market. The General Court 
considered that the Commission carried out a careful examination, as regards each of the 
generic undertakings concerned, of the real concrete possibilities they had of entering the 
market, relying on objective evidence such as the investments already made, the steps taken in 
order to obtain a marketing authorisation and the supply contracts concluded with suppliers of 
active pharmaceutical ingredients.  
The General Court also confirmed that the Commission was entitled to conclude that the 
agreements at issue constituted a restriction of competition by object. The General Court 
found that in the agreements, a reverse payment was combined with an exclusion of generic 
competitors from the market or a limitation of the incentives to seek market entry. The reverse 
payments bought off competition. The General Court held there was uncertainty on patent law 
questions. Replacing that uncertainty in relation to whether or not the generic undertakings 
were infringing and to the validity of the applicants’ patents with the certainty that the generic 
undertakings would not enter the market during the term of the agreements at issue 
constitutes, as such, a restriction on competition by object, when that result is obtained 
through a reverse payment. The General Court took the view that Lundbeck did not 
demonstrate that the restrictions set out in the agreements at issue were objectively necessary 
in order to protect its intellectual property rights. The General Court also confirmed that 
generic undertakings were exerting competitive pressure on Lundbeck. That competitive 
pressure was eliminated for the term of the agreements at issue, which constitutes, by itself, a 
restriction of competition by object. In conclusion, the General Court considered the 
agreements at issue were comparable to market exclusion agreements. The General Court 
made clear that the exclusion of competitors from the market constituted an extreme form of 
market sharing and of limitation of production. 
Infringements "by effects" in two-sided markets 
In the Groupement des Cartes Bancaires
8
 (CB) judgment of 2016, the General Court 
confirmed the Commission's finding that the fees adopted by CB had the effect of restricting 
                                                            
7 Cases T-472/13H Lundbeck A/S and Lundbeck Ltd v Commission, EU:T:2016:449; T-460/13 Sun 
Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd, formerly Ranbaxy Laboratories Ltd and Ranbaxy (United Kingdom) Ltd v 
Commission, EU:T:2016:453; T-467/13 Arrow Group ApS and Arrow Generics Ltd v Commission, 
EU:T:2016:450; T-469/13 Generics (United Kingdom) Ltd v Commission, EU:T:2016:454; T-470/13 Merck 
KGaA v Commission, EU:T:2016:452; T-471/13,Xellia Pharmaceuticals ApS and Alpharma, LLC, formerly 
Zoetis Products LLC v Commission, EU:T:2016:460. 
8 Case T-491/07 RENV CB v Commission, judgment of the General Court of 30 June 2016, EU:T:2016:379. The 
case was sent back to the General Court for the examination of the Commission's effects analysis after the Court 
of Justice held in 2014 (in case C-67/13P Groupement des Cartes Bancaires (CB) v Commission, judgment of 
the Court of 11 September 2014) that the General Court erred in law when accepting that the measures 
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competition in the French payment card issuing market, notably by discouraging the issuing 
of CB cards, increasing their price, preserving the revenues of the funding members of CB, 
and limiting technical development of the CB card system.  
The judgment of the General Court follows the case law of the Court of Justice in the 
MasterCard judgment of 2014 concerning the analysis of "by effect" infringements in two-
sided markets. In particular, concerning the implementation of Articles 101(1) and 101(3) 
TFEU in two-sided markets, the General Court stated that the analysis of the possible anti-
competitive effects of a conduct must be made taking into consideration the legal and 
economic context in which the conduct takes place; in the case of two-sided markets, this 
means that one must also consider the interactions between the two-sides of the system. 
However, the balancing test of pro and anti-competitive effects must be made in the 
framework of Article 101(3) TFEU. Concerning the analysis of anticompetitive effects in 
two-sided markets, the General Court also confirmed that one of the sides may be considered 
as the relevant market for the purposes of analysing possible anti-competitive effects of a 
given behaviour and that the fact that there are interactions between the two-sides is an 
element of the context to be considered when analysing the effects. Concerning the analysis 
of the alternative framework of assessment, the General Court confirmed that this analysis 
must be made within the same market in which the Commission has identified 
anticompetitive effect. 
Reciprocal obligations not to compete 
In its Telefónica and Portugal Telecom judgments
9
 the General Court confirmed the 
Commission's finding that the clause concluded by Telefónica and Portugal Telecom not to 
compete with each other on the Iberian telecommunications markets, constituted a restriction 
of competition by object. The General Court confirmed that the Commission was not obliged 
to undertake a detailed analysis of the structure of the market concerned and of the potential 
competition between the companies on these markets before finding such an infringement. 
The General Court nevertheless required the Commission to recalculate the value of sales and 
therefore the amount of the fines, on the basis of the sales of Telefónica and Portugal Telecom 
directly or indirectly linked to the infringement. In order to determine the value of the 
companies’ sales to be taken into consideration for the calculation of the amount of the fines, 
the General Court asked the Commission to examine the arguments of Portugal Telecom and 
Telefónica in their replies to the statement of objections seeking to establish that there was no 
possibility of competition between them with regard to certain services.  
Restriction by object 
In its judgments in the Smart card chips case
10
 the General Court confirmed that an exchange 
of information on current and future prices as well as on capacities is in view of the market 
characteristics capable of influencing directly the commercial strategy of competitors and 
therefore an infringement by object. The same applies to the information to a competitor not 
to compete in respect of a product at a certain price because this information reduces the 
uncertainty which should exist between competitors. 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
introduced by CB were to be seen as restrictions of competition by object. The Court of Justice referred the case 
back to the General Court to determine whether the measures nonetheless had an anticompetitive effect. 
9 Cases T-216/13 Telefónica v Commission and T-208/13 Portugal Telecom v Commission, judgments of the 
General Court of 28 June 2016, EU:T:2016:369 and EU:T:2016:368. 
10 Cases T-758/14 Infineon v Commission and T-762/14 Philips v Commission, judgments of the General Court 
of 15 December 2016, EU:T:2016:737 and EU:T:2016:738. 
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Fines and inability to pay  
On 29 February, the General Court handed down six judgments
11
 in the Freight Forwarding 
case confirming in nearly all respects the cartel decision adopted against that international 
cartel in this sector of services. The cartel involved 15 undertakings, with each of them 
participating in at least one of four distinct cartels in the sector of international air freight 
forwarding services. The judgments upheld the Commission's fining methodology and its 
application of the 2006 Fining Guidelines. In particular, the General Court confirmed that 
even if cartel participants agree only on a certain price component of the overall price paid by 
the customers (in this case surcharges imposed on customers), this does not prevent the 
Commission from calculating the fine on the basis of the complete turnover generated by the 
sales of the final product or service containing this cartelised component.  
On 7 September, the Court of Justice handed down the last judgment
12
 against the UK based 
undertaking Pilkington in the Carglass case. The Court of Justice confirmed that the 
Commission was entitled, for the purpose of calculating the fine, to take into account the sales 
made during the infringement period on the basis of contracts concluded prior to that period. 
The overall plan of the cartel was to allocate all supplies of automotive glass between the 
cartel participants, with respect to both existing supply contracts and new contracts. It follows 
that all the sales of car glass had to be regarded as coming within the scope of the cartel and 
could be taken into account for the purposes of determining the fine, including those made 
pursuant to contracts that pre-dated the infringement period. 
To calculate the legal maximum of 10% of the total turnover set out by Article 23 of 
Regulation 1/2003, the Commission took the average exchange rate EUR/GBP of the year 
preceding the adoption of the decision. The Court of Justice backed the choice made by the 
Commission as it corresponded to the period relevant for the calculation of the legal 
maximum and as it best met the requirement of predictability. 
Finally, the Court of Justice confirmed the General Court's findings that the fact that the 
applicant's activities were less diversified compared with the other groups involved in the 
infringement was not capable of justifying a reduction of the fine. Also, the possible 
difference in proportion of the fine in relation to the total turnover of the undertaking(s) 
concerned is not a sufficient justification for departing from the standard methodology as set 
out by the Fining Guidelines. 
In a judgment of 20 January, in the Power Transformers case
13
, the Court of Justice 
confirmed the application of point 18 of the 2006 Fining Guidelines, which provides for a 
method of attributing value of sales to such parties which had due to a market sharing 
arrangement no sales in the EEA. The Court of Justice stated that the objective of point 18 
was to reflect in the most appropriate way possible the weight and economic power of the 
cartelists in order to ensure that the fine has a sufficient deterrent effect. Therefore, the 
Commission was right not to limit the determination of the market shares to the territories 
affected by the cartel, but to use the worldwide market shares to calculate each party's share in 
the value of sales generated in the EEA.  
                                                            
11 Cases T-251/12 EGL and Others v Commission; T-254/12 Kühne + Nagel International and Others v 
Commission; T-265/12 Schenker Ltd v Commission; T-264/12 UTi Worldwide Inc. and Others v Commission; T-
267/12 Deutsche Bahn AG and Others v Commission; and T-270/12 Panalpina World Transport (Holding) Ltd 
and Others v Commission, judgments of the General Court of 29 February 2016, EU:T:2016:114, 
EU:T:2016:113, EU:T:2016:111, EU:T:2016:112, EU:T:2016:110 and EU:T:2016:109. 
12 Case C-101/15P Pilkington et al. v Commission, judgment of the Court of 7 September 2016, EU:C:2016:631.  
13 Case C-373/14P Toshiba Corporation v Commission, judgment of the Court of 20 January 2016, EU: C: 
2015:427.  
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In a judgment of 14 July, in the Marine Hoses case
14
, the General Court confirmed the 
increase in the fine imposed by the Commission for the aggravating circumstance of cartel 
leadership and found that the 'coordination' of the cartel has been managed by two cartelists, 
upholding the Commission's assumption that there can be two leaders operating at the same 
time. 
In a further judgment in the Pre-stressing Steel case of 2 June
15
, the General Court dismissed 
a number of appeals lodged by a Spanish group of companies, including the appeals against 
the rejection of the pre-decision and post-decision "inability to pay" (ITP) requests. In its 
judgment, the General Court confirmed that, when assessing the undertaking's ability to pay 
the fine, the financial situation of the shareholders could be taken into account even if these 
shareholders were not liable for the infringement. Moreover, the General Court considered as 
inadmissible appeals against the rejection of the post-decision ITP requests because those 
requests did not demonstrate that the financial situation of these companies had changed 
significantly since the Commission decision of 30 June 2010 which rejected the initial ITP 
requests. A number of judgments and orders
16
 of the Court of Justice in the Pre-stressing 
Steel case rejected the parties' appeals and thereby confirmed the Commission decision.  
Application of 2006 Leniency Notice 
In judgments
17
 in the Freight Forwarding case the General Court confirmed the scope of the 
immunity decision. The General Court did not consider it too broad although it has covered 
all surcharges covered in the Commission decision, some of which were not explicitly 
mentioned by the immunity applicant in its application. The General Court found that 
pursuant to 2006 Leniency Notice, it is not required that the materials submitted by the 
immunity applicant constitute evidence pertaining specifically to the infringements identified 
by the Commission in its final decision. Instead, it is sufficient that the materials provided 
enable the Commission to carry out a targeted inspection in connection with a behaviour 
which covers the infringement(s) that the Commission finds to exist in its final decision. 
A preliminary ruling
18
 by the Court of Justice on 2 January provided some clarifications about 
the legal status of summary application before national competition authorities. The model 
leniency programme of the European Competition Network (ECN) foresees that companies 
which make a leniency application with the Commission can make simplified applications to 
national competition authorities (called "summary application") to secure their leniency rank 
with the national competition authorities as well, in case the Commission will not deal with 
the case. The Court of Justice found that the ECN model leniency programme was not binding 
on the national competition authorities and stated that there was no legal link between an 
immunity application submitted to the Commission and the summary application submitted to 
                                                            
14 Case T-146/09 RENV Parker Hannifin Manufacturing and Parker-Hannifin v Commission, judgment of the 
General Court of 14 July 2016, EU: T: 2016: 411.  
15 Cases T-426/10 to 429/10 and T-438/12 to 441/12 Global Steel Wire, Moreda-Riviere Trefilerías SA and 
Others v Commission, judgment of the General Court of 2 June 2016, EU: T: 2016:335.  
16 Cases C-490/15 P Ori Martin v Commission and C-505/15 P Siderurgica Latina Martin SpA (SLM) v 
Commission, judgment of the Court of 14 September 2016, EU:C:2016:678; C-510/15 P Fapricela v 
Commission, order of the Court of 7 July 2016, EU:C:2016:547; C-514/15 P Hit Groep BV v Commission, order 
of the Court of 7 July 2016, EU:C:2016:57; C-519/15 P Trafilerie Meridonali v Commission, judgment of the 
Court of 14 September 2016, EU:C:2016:682; C-523/15 P Westfälische Drahtindustrie and Others v 
Commission, order of the Court of 7 July 2016, EU:C:2016:541. 
17 Cases T-265/12 Schenker Ltd. v Commission and T-267/12 Deutsche Bahn AG and Others v Commission, 
judgments of the General Court of 29 February 2016, EU: T: 2016:111 and EU: T: 2016:110.  
18 Case C-428/14 DHL Express (Italy) and DHL Global Forwarding (Italy) SpA v Autorita Garante della 
Cocorrenza e del mercato, judgment of the Court of 20 January 2016, EU:C:2016:587.  
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a national competition authority. Therefore, the national competition authority was not 
obliged to interpret the summary application in the light of the application submitted to the 
Commission. Further, the effective application of Article 101 TFEU did not preclude that a 
national leniency programme allows the acceptance of a summary application submitted by an 
undertaking which had not submitted an application for full immunity before the 
Commission.  
Level of reasoning 
On 13 December, the General Court annulled the fine imposed on one of the parties in the 
Envelopes
19
 settlement case after having found that the recitals concerning discretionary 
reductions granted in view of inter alia the parties' mono-product character were not 
sufficiently reasoned to allow the parties and the court to verify the respect of the equal 
treatment principle. The General Court underlined that the duty to state reasons must be 
complied with all the more rigorously when the Commission uses its discretion to depart from 
its Fining Guidelines. Although this was the first review by the General Court of a settlement 
decision, the level of reasoning in the concerned recitals fully mirrored the reasoning used in 
other decisions where such mono-product reductions have been granted, including decisions 
adopted under the normal procedure. The annulment was therefore not due to a more 
streamlined reasoning of a settlement decision.  
Use of evidence 
In its judgment of 8 September in the Shrimps
20
 case, the General Court confirmed that 
wiretaps found during an inspection are admissible as evidence in cartel cases, irrespective of 
whether those wiretaps were made legally or not. What counts is that the Commission has 
obtained the wiretaps lawfully and that the parties had received all opportunities to defend 
themselves against the gathering and usage of this information. As in the case of any other 
type of document, once admissible, the wiretaps can be used as evidence if their content is 
credible. The General Court underlined in this respect that the Commission's case was not 
built exclusively on the wiretaps, but was also supported and corroborated by other evidence. 
In the Smart card chips case, the authenticity of a series of e-mails written at the time of the 
infringement was questioned by a party. In its judgment of 15 December 2016
21
 the General 
Court underlined that the only relevant criterion of assessing the probative value of evidence 
is its credibility. When making this assessment, the General Court accepted the assessment 
made by the Commission, which consisted in the first place in an examination of the 
credibility of the Leniency applicant having submitted such documents and, secondly in the 
examination of the individual contested documents. In this respect, the Court noted that no 
expert report by the parties concluded that the e-mail was not authentic and that its content 
was confirmed by a body of evidence resulting also from other documents or statements.  
                                                            
19 Case T-95/15 Printeos and Others v Commission, judgment of the General Court of 13 December 
2016,:EU:T:2016:722. 
20 Case T-54/14 Goldfish BV and Others v Commission, judgment of the General Court of 8 September 2016, 
EU:T:2016:455. 
21 Case T-758/14 Infineon v Commission, judgment of the General Court of 15 December 2016, EU:T:2016:737. 
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Article 106 TFEU  
Definition of abusive practice 
On 30 June, the Court of Justice in its order
22 
in Slovenská pošta rejected an application for 
annulment brought against a judgment
23 
of the General Court concerning the application of 
Article 106(1) TFEU in conjunction with Article 102 TFEU.  
The Court of Justice dismissed all the pleas of the applicants. Most importantly the Court of 
Justice confirmed that an abusive practice contrary to Article 106(1) TFEU existed where a 
Member State granted to an undertaking an exclusive right to carry on certain activities and 
creates a situation in which that undertaking was manifestly not in a position to satisfy the 
demand prevailing on the market for activities of that kind. In this context the Court of Justice 
held that the case-law covered all cases of manifest inability to satisfy demand for certain 
activities, and not only those where the inability was "structural". 
As regards the establishment of facts by the Commission and the General Court and the 
probative value of evidence the Court of Justice held that there is no rule or principle of EU 
law that precluded the Commission or the General Court from relying on a single piece of 
evidence in order to establish the relevant facts. The Court of Justice also held that the 
assessment of the probative value of the evidence concerned and the question whether it 
definitely attested to the existence of the fact alleged formed part of the assessment of the 
evidence and of the facts which fell, in principle, outside the jurisdiction of the Court of 
Justice, except where the evidence has been distorted. 
State measures with an anticompetitive consequence 
Also in relation to Article 106 TFEU, by judgments of 15 December, the General Court 
upheld the Commission's decisions of 2008 and 2009 in the Greek Lignite case
24
 following a 
referral by the Court of Justice
25
. The General Court confirmed that Greece had infringed 
Article 106 TFEU in conjunction with Article 102 TFEU by granting the Greek energy 
incumbent PPC/DEI privileged access to lignite and thereby maintained or reinforced PPC's 
dominant position on the wholesale electricity market in Greece. These judgments therefore 
confirm that the Commission is entitled to tackle Member States' interventions when they 
might lead to companies distorting competition.  
Proportionality of commitments  
In the Morningstar judgment
26
 the General Court upheld the Commission´s commitments 
decision in the Reuters Instrument Codes case
27 
which intended to address the concerns that 
Thomson Reuters had abused its dominant position in the market for consolidated real-time 
datafeeds.  
                                                            
22 Case C-293/15 P Slovenská pošta a.s. v Commission, order of the Court of 30 June 2016, EU:C:2016:511.  
23 Case T-556/08 Slovenská pošta a.s. v Commission, judgment of the General Court of 25 March 2015, 
EU:T:2015:189. 
24 Case AT.38700 Greek Lignite. For further information see 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=1_38700  
25 Cases T-169/08 RENV and T-421/09 RENV - Dimosia Epicheirisi Ilektrismou AE (DEI) v Commission, 
judgments of the General Court of 15 December 2016,:EU:T:2016:733 and EU:T:2016:748.  
26 Case T-76/14 Morningstar Inc. v Commission, judgment of the General Court of 15 September 2016, 
EU:T:2016:481. 
27 Case AT.39654 Reuters Instrument Codes, Commission decision of 20 December 2012 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/index.cfm?fuseaction=dsp_result  
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The General Court dismissed the application by Morningstar, a competitor of Thomson 
Reuters, as unfounded and confirmed that the review of the lawfulness of a decision making 
commitments binding must be assessed in the light of the Commission’s concerns and not on 
the basis of the demands put forward by competitors. The General Court found that the 
Commission is not obliged to show that the commitments accepted were the most favourable 
to competition (compared to other alternatives). Moreover, the General Court found that the 
appropriateness of commitments is a prospective assessment and it is not possible to refute the 
adequacy of commitments because of lack of actual effect on the market. Of importance was 
rather whether at the point in time at which the Commission adopted its decision, the 
commitments were in themselves sufficient to remove the previously identified competition 
concerns. 
Procedural issues 
In a series of judgments in the Cement case
28
, the Court of Justice ruled on the appeals 
brought by four cement producers against the judgments by the General Court concerning the 
Commission's request for information decisions adopted pursuant to Article 18(3) of 
Regulation 1/2003.  
The Court of Justice annulled the Commission decisions and held that the General Court erred 
in law in finding that the decisions were adequately reasoned. The Court of Justice recalled 
that the requirement to state reasons must be assessed in light of all the circumstances of the 
case. In the case at hand, the Court of Justice found that the statement of reasons was not 
sufficient considering that the decisions were adopted at a time when the Commission already 
had information that would have allowed it to present more precisely the suspicions of 
infringement weighing on the companies involved. 
3. The fight against cartels remains a top priority 
Cartels are secret agreements between sellers or buyers of the same product or service. They 
are made with the objective of fixing prices, limiting output or allocating clients and 
suppliers. Cartels harm the consumers at all levels of the value chain and the economy as a 
whole. Cartelists charge inflated prices, limit the choice of the consumers and block 
innovation. Only undistorted competition guarantees that scarce resources are used in the 
most efficient way. The Commission's action to stop hard core cartels prevents companies 
from continuing to profit from illegal overcharges and thereby contributes to fair and 
balanced business relationships. The significant sanctions imposed by the Commission deter 
companies from entering into cartels or from remaining in cartels, sending a clear signal that 
operating a cartel will ultimately not pay off.  
The Commission's strong enforcement record against hard core cartels continued in 2016. As 
in preceding years, the Commission adopted cartel decisions in important sectors for 
innovation and investment, such as the financial markets and the automotive industry. The 
settlement procedure remains an efficient tool regularly used by the Commission in its fight 
against cartels. Settlement can also apply to sanction large cartels covering important products 
as shown by the trucks settlement decision.  
                                                            
28 Cases C-247/14P Heidelberg Cement v Commission; C-248/14P Schwenk Zement v Commission; C-267/14P 
Buzzi Unicem v Commission and C-268/14P Italmobiliare v Commission, judgments of the Court of 10 March 
2016, EU:C:2016:149, EU:C:2016:150, EU:C:2016:151 and EU:C:2016:152. 
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The Trucks case 
On 19 July, the Commission imposed a total fine of EUR 2.93 billion on five European truck producers for 
coordinating the gross pricing of heavy and medium trucks in the EEA between 1997 and 2011. DAF, Daimler, 
Iveco, MAN, Volvo/Renault had admitted their involvement in the cartel, which allowed the Commission to 
settle the case with them. MAN benefited from immunity under the Commission's 2006 Leniency Notice for 
revealing the existence of the cartel to the Commission. Volvo/Renault, Daimler and Iveco benefitted from fine 
reductions. Since all five undertakings agreed to settle the case with the Commission, their fines were further 
reduced by 10%. A sixth undertaking chose not to settle the case and the proceedings continue against it under 
the normal procedure.  
The cartel concerned the sales of new trucks weighing between 6 and 16 tonnes ("medium trucks") and trucks 
weighing more than 16 tonnes ("heavy trucks") both as rigid trucks as well as tractor trucks. The case does not 
concern aftersales, other services and warranties for trucks, the sale of used trucks or any other goods or services. 
The parties colluded on pricing and gross price increases in the EEA for trucks and on the timing and the passing 
on of costs for the introduction of emission technologies for medium and heavy trucks required by EURO 3 to 6 
standards. The addressees' headquarters were directly involved in the discussion of prices, price increases and 
the introduction of new emission standards until 2004. From at least August 2002 onwards, discussions took 
place via German subsidiaries which, to varying degrees, reported to their Headquarters. The exchange was 
operated both on a multilateral and on a bilateral level. The infringement lasted from 17 January 1997 until 18 
January 2011. 
The Commission adopted two further settlement decisions against all participants in the 
cartels on 27 January concerning Alternators and Starters
29
 and on 12 December concerning 
Rechargeable Batteries
30
. This brings the total number of settlement decisions adopted since 
2010 to 22 and during the same period, around 57% of the total amount of the fines imposed 
by the Commission was via settlement decisions. 
The Commission also completed its investigation in three "hybrid" cases. In "hybrid" cases, 
decisions are adopted both under the ordinary and under the settlement procedure in the same 
case. In these cases, all but a limited number of parties (generally one) were willing to settle 
and the Commission decided to adopt a settlement decision for the ones willing to settle 
which represented a large majority. For the parties which did not wish to follow the settlement 
route, the Commission subsequently adopted the decision under the normal procedure.  
On 6 April, the Commission fined Riberebro EUR 5.19 million for participating in the canned 
Mushrooms cartel
31
. The Commission fined three other producers of canned mushrooms for 
their participation in the same cartel by its settlement decision of 25 June 2014. These 
companies had admitted their involvement in the collusive arrangements in the mushrooms 
sector, which allowed the Commission to settle the case with them. Riberebro chose not to 
settle the case and proceedings continued against it under the normal procedure.  
On 25 May, the Commission completed its investigation in the Steel Abrasives cartel case by 
adopting an ordinary decision against Pometon S.p.A and imposing a fine of EUR 6.2 
million
32
. In April 2014, the Commission imposed fines on four producers that decided to 
settle the case with the Commission. 
                                                            
29 Case AT.40028 Alternators and Starters, Commission decision of 27 January 2016 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=1_40028 For further information see 
IP/16/173 of 27 January 2016 available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-173_en.htm  
30 Case AT.39904 Rechargeable Batteries. For further information see IP/16/4356 of 12 December 2016 
available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-4356_en.htm  
31 Case AT.39965 Mushroom. For further information see IP/16/1261 of 6 April 2016 available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-1261_en.htm  
32 Case AT.39792 Steel abrasives, Commission decision of 25 May 2016 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=1_39792  
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The EIRD case
33 
On 7 December, the Commission fined Crédit Agricole, HSBC and JPMorgan Chase a total of EUR 485 million 
for participating in a cartel in Euro Interest Rate Derivatives (EIRD). These three banks chose not to settle this 
cartel case with the Commission, unlike Barclays, Deutsche Bank, RBS and Société Générale, with whom the 
Commission reached a settlement concerning the same cartel in December 2013. Since then, the investigation 
has continued under the Commission's standard cartel procedure. 
Interest rate derivatives are financial products such as forward rate agreements, interest rate swaps or interest rate 
options, which are used by companies to manage the risk of interest rate fluctuations or for speculation. They 
derive their value from the level of a benchmark interest rate, such as the Euro Interbank Offered Rate 
(EURIBOR) and/or the Euro Over-Night Index Average (EONIA) for euro interest rate derivatives. The 
EURIBOR benchmark interest rate is meant to reflect the cost of interbank lending in euros and is based on 
individual quotes submitted daily by a panel of banks to a calculation agent. 
The Commission's investigation found that there was a cartel in place between September 2005 and May 2008, 
involving a total of seven banks over varying time periods. It covered the whole European Economic Area 
(EEA). The participating traders of the banks were in regular contact through corporate chat-rooms or instant 
messaging services. The traders' aim was to distort the normal course of pricing components for euro interest rate 
derivatives. They did this by telling each other their desired or intended EURIBOR submissions and by 
exchanging sensitive information on their trading positions or on their trading or pricing strategies. This means 
that the seven banks colluded instead of competing with each other on the euro derivatives market. This market 
is very important not only to banks but also to many companies in the Single Market, which use euro interest 
rate derivatives to hedge their financing risk.  
This decision marks the end of several investigations the Commission carried out into cartels set up by major 
international banks to manipulate the trading of derivatives. Over the past three years, the Commission has taken 
six decisions on cartels imposing fines of just above EUR 2 billion. In addition to this case, cartels concerning 
derivatives linked to the Japanese Yen and the Swiss Franc were also sanctioned. The common goal of all these 
decisions is to make sure that financial markets are competitive to the benefit of European consumers and 
businesses. By their adoption, a clear message was sent that banks, like all companies, have to respect EU 
competition rules. 
Ordinary procedures remain significant because not all investigations may be eligible for 
settlement discussions. Relevant factors include the number of parties, the proportion of 
leniency applicants in relation to the total number of parties, the degree of contestation, 
conflicting positions between the parties and the existence of novel features or aggravating 
circumstances in the investigated practices. When the right circumstances are not met, the 
Commission will apply the ordinary procedure.  
The Commission remains committed to pursuing all cartels across all sectors where it has 
sufficient evidence of an infringement detected through its leniency programme or its ex 
officio action (more information on the cartel decisions is available in the sectoral overview).  
The Commission's cartel enforcement record remains strong and effective, with six decisions, 
fines totalling approximately EUR 3.73 billion and solid work for enforcement in future 
years. 
                                                            
33 Case AT.39914 EIRD. For further information see IP/16/4304 of 7 December 2016 available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-4304_en.htm  
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Case name Adoption 
date 
Fine imposed 
EUR 
Undertakings 
concerned  
Prohibition 
Procedure 
Rechargeable batteries 12/12/2016 165 841 000 3 Settlement 
Euro Interest Rate 
Derivatives (EIRD) 
07/12/2016 484 456 000 3 Hybrid* 
Trucks 19/07/2016 2 926 499 000 5 Settlement 
Steel abrasives 25/05/2016 6 197 000 1 Hybrid** 
Canned mushrooms 06/04/2016 5 194 000 1 Hybrid*** 
Alternators and Starters 27/01/2016 137 789 000 3 Settlement 
*normal procedure part of a hybrid case with a settlement decision in: December 2013(*), 
April 2014(**) and June 2014(***). 
Antitrust and cartel output:  
 
4. Continuing close cooperation within the European Competition Network (ECN) 
and with national courts  
The national competition authorities (NCAs) play a key role in applying the EU competition 
rules alongside the Commission. Action by NCAs accounts for 85% of public enforcement of 
the EU antitrust rules. This is a significant contribution to make sure that markets work well 
and fairly for the benefit of consumers and businesses and to drive economic growth.  
However, there is room for improvement. NCAs often lack the means and instruments they 
need to be truly effective enforcers. If NCAs cannot realise their full potential, this weakens 
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The 2014 Commission Communication on Ten Years of Regulation 1/2003
34
 identified a 
number of areas of action to make enforcement by the NCAs more effective. In particular, 
action should be taken to guarantee that NCAs: (i) have the right tools to detect and sanction 
violations of the EU antitrust rules; (ii) have effective leniency programmes that encourage 
companies to come forward, possibly in several jurisdictions, with evidence of illegal cartels; 
and (iii) have adequate resources and are sufficiently independent when enforcing EU 
competition law. 
Support for empowering NCAs to become more effective enforcers 
Building on the Communication on Ten Years of Regulation 1/2003, the Commission launched a public 
consultation in November 2015 on empowering the NCAs to be more effective enforcers35. The public 
consultation ended on 12 February 2016. 181 replies were submitted by a wide variety of stakeholders. 
Approximately 75% of stakeholders consider that the effectiveness of the NCAs could be improved and 80% 
thought that action should be taken to ensure that NCAs have the means and instruments they need.  
A Public Hearing was co-organised with the European Parliament on 19 April 2016 to gather further views. 
There was overall support for empowering NCAs to be more effective enforcers. The Commission is working 
towards an EU legislative initiative to address this, with the aim of adopting a proposal in the first half of 201736. 
Cooperation with national courts 
In addition to its cooperation with NCAs in the context of the ECN, the Commission also 
continued its cooperation with national courts (NCs) under Article 15 of Regulation 1/2003. 
The Commission helps NCAs to enforce the EU competition rules in an effective and 
coherent manner by providing case-related information or an opinion on matters of substance 
or by intervening as amicus curiae in proceedings pending before the NCs. 
The Commission publishes its opinions and amicus curiae observations on its website 
(http://ec.europa.eu/competition/court/overview_en.html) as soon as it receives approval from 
the courts concerned. 
Merger control 
 
EU merger control  
The purpose of EU merger control is to ensure that market structures remain competitive while facilitating 
smooth restructuring of the industry. This applies not only to EU-based companies, but also to any company 
active on the EU markets. Industry restructuring is an important way of fostering efficient allocation of 
production assets. However, there are also situations where industry consolidation can give rise to harmful 
effects on competition, taking into account the merging companies' degree of market power and other market 
features. EU merger control ensures that changes in the market structure which lead to harmful effects on 
competition do not occur.  
The substantive test for assessing mergers under the current legal framework seeks to obtain 
fairer results by protecting all aspects of competition, including innovation. As a result, EU 
merger control protects market structures, in which companies compete not only on price, but 
                                                            
34 Communication from the Commission of 9 July 2014, Ten Years Of Antitrust Enforcement Under Regulation 
1/2003: Achievements And Future Perspectives, COM/2014/0453 available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ 
antitrust/legislation/antitrust_enforcement_10_years_en.pdf 
35 For further information see IP/15/5998 of 4 November 2015 available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-15-5998_en.htm  
36 Commission Work Programme 2017 Annex 1: New Initiatives, p.3 item 6 under Implementation of the Single 
Market Strategy available at http://ec.europa.eu/atwork/pdf/cwp_2017_annex_i_en.pdf  
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also on innovation in order to attract customers. The Commission's enforcement practice in 
recent years, for example, in the pharmaceutical
37
 and energy
38
 sectors, shows that it 
considers innovation and investments as important aspects of competition. The Commission 
will continue to assess the effects on innovation in the ongoing investigation in the agro-
chemical sector concerning the proposed merger between Dow and DuPont
39
, among others.  
By protecting all these aspects of competition, EU merger control contributes to the 
achievement of fairer market structures and a level playing field. Those transactions which 
may bring unfair results by distorting the parameters for competition are subject to close 
scrutiny by the Commission, which is committed to protect consumers by requesting the 
necessary commitments or, if necessary, by prohibiting the transaction. For example, the 
merger between Hutchison and O2
40
, which was ultimately blocked to protect British mobile 
consumers and prevent unfair results. 
In order to ensure such fairness, EU merger control also takes into account efficiencies 
brought about by mergers which bring positive effects on innovation and other aspects, 
provided they are verifiable, merger-specific and likely to be passed on to consumers.  
As highlighted in previous reports on competition policy, the Commission continuously 
evaluates the substantive and procedural rules that make up the legal framework in force for 
merger control. In this context, the Commission regularly assesses concerns and suggestions 
for further improvement voiced by industry representatives and other stakeholders, evaluates 
the need for reform and policy changes in specific areas which give rise to new debates and 
checks that its policies and enforcement practices do not unduly create red-tape for companies 
and thereby hamper innovation and investment. If necessary, policy changes are proposed 
(see point 1 below).  
1. Evaluation of selected procedural and jurisdictional aspects of EU mergers 
In 2016, the Commission launched a public consultation in the context of an ongoing 
evaluation of selected procedural and jurisdictional aspects of EU merger control. This 
ongoing evaluation builds notably upon the results of the 2014 public consultation on the 
White Paper "Towards more effective EU merger control". 
The White Paper "Towards more effective EU merger control" 
In the White Paper "Towards more effective EU merger control" adopted in July 2014
41
, the 
Commission made some concrete proposals to improve the Merger Regulation in a few areas. 
Those mainly concerned the possible extension of the EU Merger Regulation to minority 
shareholdings, the streamlining of the referral system and additional simplification.  
The feedback received on the topics of referrals and further simplification was broadly 
supportive of the Commission's proposals. On the other hand, respondents to the 2014 public 
                                                            
37 Case M.7275 Novartis / GlaxoSmithKline oncology business available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/index.cfm?fuseaction=dsp_result  
38 Case M.7477 Halliburton / Baker Hughes available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/index.cfm?fuseaction=dsp_result  
39 Case M.7932 Dow / DuPont available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/index.cfm?fuseaction=dsp_result  
40 M.7612 Hutchison 3G UK / Telefonica UK, Commission decision of 11 May 2016. For further information see 
IP/16/1704 available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-1704_en.htm  
41 White Paper Towards more effective EU merger control, COM(2014) 449 final available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2014_merger_control/mergers_white_paper_en.pdf  
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consultation on the White Paper generally expressed doubts about the proportionality of the 
White Paper's proposals as regards minority shareholdings, in view notably of the perceived 
limited scope of the problem identified.  
Following this public consultation, the Commission commissioned a study to obtain 
additional information on the topic of minority shareholdings from the point of view of both 
competition and corporate law and practice in different jurisdictions. The results of this study 
were published on DG Competition's website in October
42
. 
Evaluation of procedural and jurisdictional aspects of EU merger control 
Meanwhile, a debate has emerged on the effectiveness of the turnover-based jurisdictional 
thresholds in EU merger control when it comes to some high-valued transactions involving 
target companies with limited or no turnover, which may have significant competitive effects 
in the EEA but fall outside the scope of application of the EU Merger Regulation. This debate 
concerned in particular the digital economy, where Facebook's acquisition of WhatsApp has 
been a catalyst for this discussion. However, this concern may also be relevant in other 
sectors, such as pharmaceuticals. 
Against this background, the ongoing evaluation of selected procedural and jurisdictional 
aspects of EU merger control, launched in 2016, focusses on whether the current purely 
turnover-based thresholds of the Merger Regulation allow capturing all transactions which 
can potentially have an impact on the internal market and, if not, on the possibility to 
introduce complementary jurisdictional thresholds, based for instance on the transaction 
value.  
In addition, the evaluation seeks to explore the potential for further simplification of EU 
merger control, going beyond the suggestions made in the White Paper. Moreover, the 
evaluation covers a possible streamlining of the referral system, building on the proposals put 
forward in the 2014 White Paper. Finally, a number of technical aspects of merger procedures 
will also be reviewed. 
The public consultation closed in January 2017. The outcome of the planned evaluation will 
inform the type of follow-up and, in particular, any decision concerning possible subsequent 
proposals for legislative changes.  
2. Recent enforcement trends 
The substantial growth in merger activity in 2015 and 2016 is reflected in the significant 
increase in the number of merger notifications received by the Commission. The number of 
notified mergers in particular in 2016, increased significantly compared with the previous 
seven years: overall, 362 transactions were notified in 2016, whereas the average number of 
notifications received in the period 2009-2015 was 291 per year
43
. Among these notifications, 
the Commission has received 29 reasoned pre-notification submissions by the notifying 
parties to request the referral of a case from the Commission to a Member State or from a 
Member State to the Commission. In eight cases, the Commission opened in-depth 
investigations (second phase). These cases concerned various industry sectors, including agro-
                                                            
42 See, the Report Support study for impact assessment concerning the review of Merger Regulation regarding 
minority shareholdings, prepared by Spark Legal Network and Queen Mary University of London, 2016 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/reports/KD0416839ENN.pdf 
43 The total number of notifications received in 2016 is 9% higher than in 2015 and 19% higher than in 2014.  
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chemicals, telecoms, railway equipment systems, provision of oil exploration services, space 
and satellites, cement and construction materials, financial services and car components. 
In 2016, the Commission took 355 final decisions in merger cases
44
. The number of 27 
interventions in 2016 was significantly higher compared with the average of the last six years, 
which amounted to around 16 interventions per year
45
. In 2016, 19 mergers were cleared 
subject to commitments in first phase and six in the second phase. In one case, the parties 
abandoned a transaction during the in-depth investigation
46
. Moreover, the Commission 
adopted a prohibition decision in one case
47
.  
The adoption of the simplification package in December 2013 has been followed by a 
significant increase in the number of cases reviewed under the simplified procedure: the 
number of cases dealt with under the simplified procedure increased by 10%: from 59% over 
the period 2004-2013 to around 69% of all notified transactions in 2016. 
The Commission has also looked at its methodology in defining geographic markets and in 
taking into account competitive pressure from imports in its assessment of mergers. Market 
definition is a tool to identify effective alternative sources of supply for customers of the 
merging companies, and to calculate market shares as a meaningful starting point for an 
analysis of competitive forces. It is only the initial step of its analysis, however. In its 
competitive assessment, apart from examining, inter alia, barriers to entry and expansion of 
rivals and the expected price increase caused by the transaction, the Commission also 
considers the competitive pressure of imports.  
The Commission held discussions with the EU national competition authorities, the United 
States antitrust agencies and legal and economic experts. It also asked two leading 
competition economists to evaluate the Commission’s approach to geographic market 
definition on the basis of a sample of recent merger decisions. The study
48 
largely supported 
the Commission's approach to geographic market definition and did not recommend that the 
Commission revise its basic methodology in this matter. It concluded that the Commission’s 
approach was very much in line with that of all leading competition agencies in the EU and 
world-wide, with internationally recognised standards and with academic literature on the 
topic. 
                                                            
44 For the purposes of this report, decisions based on Articles 6(1)(a), 6(1)b, 6(1)b in combination with 6(2), 
8(1), 8(2) and 8(3) of the Merger Regulation are considered as final decisions. 
45 Commission interventions in merger cases include prohibition decisions and mergers cleared subject to 
commitments, as well as withdrawals during second phase in-depth investigation. 
46 Case M.7477 Halliburton / Baker Hughes, Statement by Commissioner Vestager on announcement by 
Halliburton and Hughes to withdraw from proposed merger of 2 May 2016 available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_STATEMENT-16-1642_en.htm 
47 Case M.7612 Hutchison 3G UK / Telefonica UK, Commission decision of 11 May 2016. For further 
information see IP/16/1704 available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-1704_en.htm 
48 Amelia Fletcher and Bruce Lyons, Geographic Market Definition in European Commission Merger Control, A 
Study for DG Competition, January 2016 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/reports/study_gmd.pdf 
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Merger decisions: 
 
State aid control 
 
State aid control is an integral part of EU competition policy and a necessary safeguard to preserve effective 
competition and free trade in the single market. 
The Treaty establishes the principle that State aid which distorts or threatens to distort competition is prohibited 
in so far as it affects trade between Member States (Article 107(1) TFEU). However, State aid, which contributes 
to well-defined objectives of common interest without unduly distorting competition between undertakings and 
trade between Member States, may be considered compatible with the internal market (under Article 107(3) 
TFEU).  
The objectives of the Commission's control of State aid are to ensure that aid is growth-enhancing, efficient and 
effective, and better targeted in times of budgetary constraints that aid does not restrict competition but addresses 
market failures for the benefit of society as a whole. In addition to this, the Commission acts to prevent and 
recover State aid which is incompatible with the Single market. 
1. Uptake of the State Aid Modernisation  
One of the cornerstones of the State Aid Modernisation reform is the new General Block 
Exemption Regulation (GBER)
49
, which simplifies aid granting procedures for Member 
States by authorising without prior notification a wide range of measures fulfilling EU 
objectives in the common interest. For the aid categories covered by the GBER, only cases 
with the biggest potential to distort competition in the single market will still face ex ante 
assessment (notification). As a result of the reform, a significantly larger number of smaller 
                                                            
49 Commission Regulation (EU) No 651/2014 of 17 June 2014 declaring certain categories of aid compatible 
with the internal market in application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (TFEU), OJ L 187, 26.6.2014, p.1. 
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and unproblematic measures are exempted from prior notification, notably aid granted to 
tackle local needs.  
 
Member States have already made extensive use of the possibilities offered by the 
comprehensive modernisation of State aid rules. Notably, a surge in aid excluded from prior 
Commission scrutiny indicates an important reduction of red tape. Based on the State Aid 
Scoreboard
50
, more than 96% of new measures, for which expenditure was reported for the 
first time in 2015, were covered by the GBER, which entails an increase of about 24 
percentage points compared to 2013. Three quarters of all measures for which expenditure 
was reported (i.e. not only new measures), took the form of block exempted measures in 
2015. On average, total spending on GBER measures in the EU represented about 40% of 
total expenditure in 2015, i.e. an increase of about 5 percentage points compared to 2014.  
On top of a broadening of categories already covered by the previous GBER, the new rules of 
the State Aid Modernisation reform introduced new categories of aid into the GBER, namely 
aid to innovation clusters and aid to process and organisational innovation, aid schemes to 
make good the damage caused by natural disasters, social aid for transport residents of remote 
regions, aid for broadband infrastructure, aid for culture and heritage conservation, including 
aid schemes for audio-visual works, aid for sport and multifunctional recreational 
infrastructures, as well as investment aid for local infrastructure. 
                                                            
50 The 2016 State Aid Scoreboard comprises aid expenditure made by Member States before 31 December 2015 
and which falls under the scope of Article 107(1) TFEU. The data is based on the annual reporting by Member 
States pursuant to Article 6(1) of Commission Regulation (EC) 794/2004 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/scoreboard/index_en.html  
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To a large extent, the reported increase in expenditure on GBER measures did already reflect 
the impact of the new Regulation in 2015. That year, total GBER spending for aid to culture 
and heritage conservation almost tripled, while it doubled for broadband and local 
infrastructure and significant increases were also recorded for aid to compensate damages 
caused by natural disasters (+53%), for training aid (+41%), for environmental protection and 
energy savings (+35%), for employment aid (+32%) and for SMEs (+19%). 
State aid enforcement (Commission decisions, monitoring and Member States' Evaluation Plans) 2007-2016 
 
Partnership with Member States 
To facilitate the implementation of SAM, the Commission supports Member States in various 
ways and has started a closer cooperation with them.  
Collaboration with Member States takes multiple forms. The Working Group on SAM 
implementation (SAM WG) is a forum for Member States to exchange best practices on their 
systems for State aid control, creating an effective network for the informal discussion of 
State aid issues among Member States and with the Commission. Other dedicated working 
groups or workshops have dealt with specific aspects of SAM implementation, in particular 
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the new requirements for transparency and evaluation or the implementation of the energy and 
environment guidelines. Once a year, the SAM WG reports to a High Level Forum (HLF) 
which in turn provides guidance on the future work of the Partnership.  
The SAM WG met three times in 2016, under a United Kingdom Chair, and addressed several 
policy and compliance issues related to SAM implementation. It reported on its conclusions 
and recommendations to the HLF held on 3 June 2016, in Brussels. On this occasion it was 
agreed to further strengthen the partnership.  
In 2016, the Commission also launched Bilateral Partnerships with certain Member States in 
order to address existing compliance problems and challenges in these Member States. The 
Bilateral Partnerships aim to build a structured bilateral dialogue between the Commission 
and the Member State concerned to allow identifying and addressing the obstacles that still 
hinder compliance with the State aid rules. In 2016, the Commission has agreed on practical 
work programmes on State aid with Italy, Bulgaria and Romania and work is on-going with a 
view to deepening cooperation with other Member States that could, in time, also lead to 
structured Bilateral Partnerships with these Member States. 
Transparency 
The new transparency provisions of SAM are in force since 1 July 2016 and require Member 
States to publish information about the beneficiaries of aid awards above EUR 500 000
51
. 
Member States have six months starting from the date of granting to provide the required aid 
awards' data, which is longer for awards in the form of fiscal aid. The Commission services 
facilitated compliance with this requirement by developing, in cooperation with Member 
States, the Transparency Award Module (TAM) – a new informatics tool for submission and 
publication of data required under the transparency provisions. The TAM is operational since 
1 July and the submitted data is automatically available online
52
.  
In addition, since February, the annual expenditure figures at scheme level as reported by 
Member States are published in the online case register of DG Competition
53
, hence 
increasing overall transparency of State aid.  
Finally, a Eurobarometer Survey about citizens' perceptions of transparency and awareness of 
State aid
54
 was carried out in June. Some 27 818 EU citizens were asked about their 
awareness of State aid and the perceived ease of finding relevant information, as well as about 
their attitudes towards transparency of State aid. The results show that in all Member States, 
citizens do not feel well-informed about State aid and consider it difficult to find relevant 
information. Over 80% of respondents consider that EU citizens should have full access to 
information about State aid. In addition, the majority of Europeans consider transparency 
beneficial for public accountability and the good management of public funds, and as relevant 
for companies as for citizens.  
                                                            
51 For further information see the Competition Policy Brief 4/2016 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/cpb/2016/2016_004_en.pdf  
52 For further information see the Transparency Award Module (TAM) available at 
https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/competition/transparency/public/search/chooseLanguage  
53 The Commission's State aid case search tool open to the general public available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/  
54 For further information see the Special Eurobarometer 448 on the European Union Open Data Portal available 
at https://data.europa.eu/euodp/en/data/dataset/S2135_85_3_448_ENG  
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Evaluation 
Evaluation of aid schemes is a new requirement introduced by SAM. The aim is to gather the 
necessary evidence to better identify impacts, both positive and negative, of the aid and 
inform future policy-making by Member States and the Commission.  
Since 1 July 2014, evaluation is required for large GBER schemes in certain aid categories
55 
as well as for a selection of notified schemes under the new generation of State aid 
guidelines
56
.  
By the end of 2016, the Commission had approved evaluation plans covering 28 State aid 
schemes submitted by 12 Member States
57
, most of these decisions concerned either large 
regional or R&D&I aid schemes under the GBER or notified broadband schemes. These 
schemes account, in total, for about EUR 36 billion of annual State aid budget. 
The Commission services have accompanied the implementation of this new requirement by 
publishing policy briefs
58 
and by organising dedicated workshops with Member States' 
representatives and evaluation experts
59
.  
Aid for research, development and innovation 
While one of the headline targets of the Europe 2020 Strategy
60
 is for R&D&I investments in 
the EU to reach 3% of EU GDP, R&D spending in the EU has been lagging behind major 
global competitors, mainly due to lower levels of private investment.  
The State aid rules for R&D&I help to ensure that public funding goes to research projects 
that would not have happened otherwise due to market failures, i.e. projects that truly go 
beyond the state of the art and which bring innovative products and services to the market and 
ultimately to consumers. The rules, using flexible and simple criteria for assessing the 
compatibility of State aid, facilitate the implementation of support for R&D projects by 
Member States.  
In 2016, the Commission ensured that aid schemes and individual measures notified under the 
R&D&I rules were well targeted to projects enabling ground-breaking research and 
innovation activities. Its State aid control activities covered a variety of sectors including the 
automotive, aeronautic, railways and microelectronic sectors. 
In one case
61
, following an in-depth investigation into a Spanish plan to finance the full 
investment costs for the construction of a test centre for high-speed trains, the Commission 
                                                            
55 Schemes with an average annual State aid budget above EUR 150 million in the fields of regional aid, aid for 
SMEs and access to finance, aid for research and development and innovation, energy and environmental aid and 
aid for broadband infrastructures. 
56 Evaluation might apply to notified aid schemes with large budgets, containing novel characteristics or when 
significant market, technology or regulatory changes are foreseen.  
57 The Czech Republic, Germany, Spain, France, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, Austria, Poland, Portugal, Finland 
and the United Kingdom.  
58 For further information see the Competition Policy Briefs 7/2014 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/cpb/2014/007_en.pdf and 3/2016 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/cpb/2016/2016_003_en.pdf 
59 The most recent workshop was organised with the BRUEGEL think tank on 30 May 2016 available at 
http://bruegel.org/events/state-aid-evaluation-two-years-of-implementation.  
60 Communication of 3 March 2010 from the Commission, Europe 2020 A Strategy For Smart, Sustainable And 
Inclusive Growth, COM(2010) 2020 final available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid= 
1427303331326&uri=CELEX:52010DC2020  
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concluded that the project was not in line with EU State aid rules because it did not meet a 
genuine objective of common interest due to the absence of market demand for the type of 
R&D&I services to be provided by the test centre. This conclusion was underpinned by the 
fact that, despite the public funding allocated to this project, no private investor showed an 
interest in participating in the funding and that the project was expected to generate losses 
throughout its entire period of operation.  
In another case
62
, the Commission found that public support granted by Lithuania to two 
Science and Technology Parks acting as innovation intermediaries and supporting innovation 
efforts by SMEs incubated within their facilities did not constitute State aid at the level of the 
parks, while accepting the Member State's commitments to maintain the support passed on by 
the parks to the incubated SMEs in line with the de minimis aid rules.  
Aid to risk finance  
SMEs across the EU remain heavily dependent on traditional bank lending, which is still 
limited by banks' refinancing capacity, risk appetite and capital adequacy. The financial crisis 
has exacerbated the problem with approximately one third of SMEs being unable to receive 
the necessary finance in recent years. Given the pivotal importance of SMEs and midcaps for 
the whole EU economy, the situation has a significant negative impact on growth and job 
creation. The new rules aim to offer better incentives for private sector investors - including 
institutional ones – to increase their funding activities in the critical area of SME and midcaps 
financing. The rules also mirror other EU initiatives designed to promote wider use of 
financial instruments in the context of new support programmes such as Horizon 2020 or 
COSME (the Programme for the Competitiveness of Enterprise and SMEs)
63
. 
The current Risk Finance Guidelines
64
 and the corresponding parts of the GBER, provide the 
framework for seamless support for new ventures from their creation to their development 
into global players. The aim is to help new ventures to get past the critical stages where 
private financing is either unavailable or not available in the necessary amount or form. 
Aid measures encouraging investment and innovation 
In 2016, under the new Risk Finance Guidelines, the Commission dealt with several notified schemes aimed at 
encouraging investment in innovative SMEs and midcaps. In particular, it approved one scheme in Italy granting 
fiscal incentives for investments in innovative start-ups, a German scheme providing grants for risk capital 
investments as well as the evaluation plan presented by France in connection with a risk finance scheme 
providing for fiscal advantages to physical persons investing in early stage SMEs. In all these cases, the 
Commission took the view that the measures at issue covered a real gap in the market, and worked together with 
the Member States on solutions to limit the impact on competition in the single market. In particular, the 
Commission considered that the risks inherent to the activities of these young firms and innovative companies 
(i.e. products/technologies not yet proven to be economically viable) and the lack of financial guarantees limited 
their capacity to access funding and that the aid was necessary to stimulate investment that would not have been 
provided by the market unprompted. 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
61 Case SA.37185 (2015/C) Aid to ADIF, Commission decision of 25 July 2016 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_37185  
62 Case SA.41540 (2015/N) Aid to public legal persons – science and technology parks (STPs), Commission 
decision of 29 September 2016 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_41540  
63 For an overview on the EU programme for the Competitiveness of Enterprises and Small and Medium-sized 
Enterprises available at http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/initiatives/cosme/index_en.htm  
64 Communication from the Commission, Guidelines on State aid to promote risk finance investments, OJ C 19, 
22.1.2014, p. 4 available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52014XC0122(04)  
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Moreover, the Commission cooperated with a number of Member States with a view to enabling them to adjust 
certain envisaged risk finance measures and bring them in line with the new GBER. This way, aid measures 
could be granted without having to be notified to the Commission, speeding up public support to innovative 
SMEs. 
Regional aid  
Regional aid is an important instrument in the EU's toolbox to promote greater economic and 
social cohesion. The 2014-2020 regional aid framework has been in place since July 2014. 
The GBER has extended the range of regional aid measures, enabling Member States to put in 
place aid schemes and individual aid measures without having to notify them to the 
Commission. Examples of these are ad hoc regional investment aid measures below the 
notification thresholds, transport aid schemes and operating aid schemes for outermost 
regions. In 2016 the Commission continued advising Member States' authorities on how to 
interpret and implement the regional aid provisions of GBER, thus helping them to make a 
success of the reforms introduced under SAM. 
Regional aid measures  
In 2016, the Commission adopted decisions both under the former and under the current 
regional aid rules.  
It endorsed two regional aid measures to support large investment projects under the 
Guidelines on National Regional Aid for 2007-2013: the Commission authorised the aid for 
Euroglas Polska
65
 in the preliminary examination phase and approved the aid for AUDI 
Hungaria Motor Ltd
66 
after having carried out an in-depth assessment in the formal 
investigation phase.  
The Commission also adopted several decisions on regional aid measures under the new 
provisions, on investment aid schemes
67
, on evaluation plans for exempted large regional aid 
schemes
68
, and on individual regional aid measures. In particular, it took two decisions 
authorising individual regional aid: one for an investment relating to new process innovation 
by Hamburger-Rieger in a "c" region in Germany (paper production)
69
 and one for a regional 
investment by STM in an "a" region in Southern Italy (electronics)
70
. In addition it initiated a 
formal investigation into a notified regional aid in support of an investment involving a 
process innovation by REHAU in a "c" region in Germany. Since Germany withdrew this 
                                                            
65 Case SA.36510 Poland - LIP - Euroglas Polska Sp. z o.o., Commission decision of 29 March 2016 available 
at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/index.cfm?fuseaction=dsp_result  
66 Case SA.36754-2014/C (ex 2014/NN and 2013/N) which Hungary has partly implemented and is planning to 
implement in favour of AUDI Hungaria Motor Ltd, Commission decision of 1 February 2016, OJ L 310, 
17.11.2016, p. 24. 
67 Case SA.42225 (2015/N) Regional aid scheme for the promotion of the development of strategic information 
and communication technology (ICT) projects on strategic sites, Commission decision of 18 February 2016 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_42225  
68 Case SA.45184 Evaluation plan of the tax credit scheme for regional investment aid in Southern Italy, 
Commission decision of 23 September 2016 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_45184  
69 Case SA.43624 (2015/N) LIP – Aid to Hamburger Rieger GmbH, Commission decision of 13 June 2016 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases/262014/262014_1770298_115_2.pdf  
70 Case SA.44547 LIP - Aid to STMicroelectronics S.r.l. (M9), Commission decision of 3 October 2016 available 
at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_44547  
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notification after the initiation of a formal investigation, the Commission closed the case 
without taking a position on the aid
71
. 
Further, the Commission adopted eight decisions on the mid-term review of the regional aid 
maps for Italy, Spain, Greece, Portugal, Finland, Germany, Hungary and the United 
Kingdom
72
. 
Finally, further to a judgment of the General Court in 2015
73
, partially annuling a 
Commission decision of 2008, the Commission adopted in 2016 a decision to open the formal 
investigation procedure in order to re-assess the aid element of two public guarantees granted 
by Germany in favour of Abalon Hessen GmbH and to determine whether this aid would be 
compatible with the internal market
74
. 
European Fund for Strategic Investments 
In 2015, the Commission created the European Fund for Strategic Investments (EFSI), with 
the objective to generate EUR 315 billion in investment in Europe. In that context the 
Commission has put in place an accelerated procedure for approving within six weeks 
Member State co-financing constituting notifiable State aid. This accelerated procedure was 
applied in some cases and contributes to the necessary public and private financing to reach 
concrete infrastructure and innovation projects as quickly as possible. 
European Structural and Investment Funds 
In a Special Report on compliance with State aid rules in ESIF operations
75
, the European 
Court of Auditors (ECA) found a number of State aid related errors in projects implemented 
by Member States and co-financed by ESIF in the programming period 2006-2013. ECA 
recognised that the Commission had already taken several measures to remedy the situation in 
the 2014-2020 programming period and called upon the Commission to continue its efforts to 
further increase awareness and knowledge of State aid rules among ESIF stakeholders in the 
Member States, including Managing Authorities and national audit authorities. The 
Commission will therefore continue to implement the recommendations formulated by ECA.  
2. State Aid Modernisation continues 
Notion of aid: comprehensive clarification including public funding of infrastructure 
In 2016 the Commission took several steps to further clarify the notion of State aid with the 
aim of helping public authorities and companies to identify when public support measures can 
be granted outside the remit of State aid control and approval by the European Commission
76
.  
                                                            
71 Case SA.43014 Aid for REHAU AG + Co., Commission decision of 13 June 2016 available at 
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As a first step the Commission continued the State aid Modernisation initiative with the 
publication of one of its last building block, namely the Notice on the notion of State aid
77
. 
This Notice gives guidance on all aspects of the definition of the notion of State aid by 
systematically summarising the case law of the EU Courts and the Commission's decision 
making practice. By doing so it comprehensively clarifies the scope of the EU State aid rules 
and thereby facilitates public funding and investments in the European Union by helping 
Member States and companies to design such public funding in ways which do not distort 
competition. These clarifications were expected, more particularly, in the area of public 
funding of infrastructure following the Leipzig-Halle judgment of the Court of Justice. 
In addition, the Commission, through its decisional practice in individual cases, further 
developed its guidance regarding the question under what circumstances State support granted 
to activities having a purely local impact do not effect intra-EU trade and, therefore, fall 
outside the rules on State aid.  
Generally, State support that distorts competition between companies will, due to the high 
level of economic integration within the EU, also have an impact on intra-EU trade. However, 
if State support is granted to an activity which has a purely local impact, there may not be an 
effect on intra-EU trade, where (i) the beneficiary supplies goods or services to a limited area 
within one Member State and is unlikely to attract customers from other Member States and 
(ii) the measure has no – or at most marginal – foreseeable effects on cross-border 
investments in the sector or the establishment of firms within the EU's internal market. 
In line with several decisions taken already in 2015
78
 and building on the guidance given on 
that matter in the Notice on the notion of State aid, the Commission has concluded in 
September 2016 that five public measures for purely local operations in Spain, Germany and 
Portugal did not involve State aid within the meaning of the EU rules, since they were 
unlikely to have a significant effect on trade between Member States
79
.  
These decisions provide Member States and stakeholders with further guidance to determine 
which cases do not need to be cleared by the Commission under EU State aid rules. They 
thereby complement the Notice on the Notion of State aid, as well as the GBER. 
Lastly, the Commission services have updated the analytical grids on the financing of 
infrastructure projects. The updated grids were presented to and discussed with Member 
States in a dedicated working group on infrastructures in November 2016. They explain 
when, in view of the Commission services, public funding does not involve State aid and 
when a notification for State aid clearance is needed. The grids also contain references to the 
most relevant Commission decisions relating to the sector concerned. 
The Commission services revised these grids, which were last updated very recently in 2015, 
following the publication of the Notice on the notion of State aid, to provide more detailed 
sectorial clarifications which could not have been included in a general and comprehensive 
document such as the Notice on the notion of State aid. 
                                                            
77 Commission Notice on the notion of State aid as referred to in Article 107(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union, C/2016/2946, OJ C 262, 19.7.2016, p. 1–50.  
78 For further information see IP/15/4889 of 29 April 2015 available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-
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Together these different measures taken in 2016 to further clarify the notion of State aid and, 
thus, the scope of EU State aid rules help to stimulate investment by reducing the 
administrative burden for public authorities and companies, avoiding lengthy procedures and 
increasing legal certainty for aid beneficiaries and competitors. They also allow Member 
States to take responsibility for their policy choices for local measures and the Commission to 
focus resources on State aid investigations into measures with the biggest impact on 
competition in the Single Market. 
Further extension of the scope of the GBER 
The scope of the General Block Exemption Regulation (GBER) was extended significantly in 
2014 compared to the previous GBER. It includes provisions for a large variety of aid 
measures in many different sectors. However, the 2014 GBER has not so far covered 
investments in ports and airports because at the time of its adoption in 2014, the Commission 
did not have sufficient case experience in these areas. This said, recital 1 of the GBER 
announced that the Commission planned to propose criteria for exempting port and airport 
infrastructure provided that sufficient case experience was developed.  
In 2016, the Commission adopted a series of State aid decisions in particular relating to 
investment aid to ports
80
. The Commission's experience in this field fully supports the 
extension of the scope of the GBER to facilitate the grant of aid in unproblematic cases. 
To fulfil the commitment announced in recital 1 of the 2014 GBER, on the basis of acquired 
experience, two years later, the Commission launched a first public consultation on the GBER 
extension between March and May 2016 following which more than 200 replies were 
received from Member States and stakeholders. The draft Regulation was revised accordingly 
and a second public consultation was conducted between 13 October and 8 December 2016 
with a view to adopt the new provisions on ports and airports in the first half of 2017.  
This modification will provide a major simplification for unproblematic investments in ports 
and airports. Member States can implement a measure without the need to notify it after they 
have checked that it complies with the conditions of the Regulation. The revision will also 
address some other technical issues beyond ports and airports. In particular it will become 
easier for public authorities to compensate companies for the additional costs they face in the 
EU's outermost regions. 
This targeted revision of the General Block Exemption Regulation further contributes to the 
objectives of the State Aid Modernisation launched by the Commission in 2012, in the sense 
that it minimises administrative burdens and make it easier for national, regional and local 
authorities to grant aid that contributes to a more dynamic and competitive Internal Market.  
In 2016, the Commission adopted a series of State aid decisions in particular relating to 
investment aid to ports
81
. The Commission's experience in this field fully supports the 
extension of the scope of the GBER to facilitate the grant of aid in unproblematic cases. 
                                                            
80 For example, cases SA.44479 Extension of the Rostock Overseas Port, Commission decision of 4 May 2016 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_44479; SA.40680 
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Revision of the Simplified Procedure Notice and Best Practices Code 
In 2016, the Commission launched a review of the Simplified Procedure Notice
82
 and of the 
Best Practices Code
83
 in order to reflect, on the one hand, the amendments brought to the 
State aid framework within the State aid Modernisation initiative and, on the other hand, to 
take account of the experience gained by the Commission with its implementation.  
The Simplified Procedure Notice sets out the conditions under which the Commission usually 
adopts short-form decisions declaring certain types of State support measures compatible with 
the internal market, and provides guidance in respect of the procedure to be followed. The 
Commission launched a public consultation on this notice from January to April 2016. 
The Best Practices Code provides guidance on the day-to-day conduct of State aid procedures 
and exchange of information between the Commission and Member States. In that respect, it 
encourages Member States to engage in informal discussions with Commission services and 
use pre-notification contacts. The Commission launched a public consultation in November in 
order to gather the views of the Member States and stakeholders on the implementation of the 
Best Practices Code over the past seven years.  
In the light of the comments received from the public consultations, the Commission will 
review these texts with the objective to ensure coherence and consistency in the application of 
the various instruments of the State aid framework. 
3. Monitoring, recovery and cooperation with national courts 
Increased monitoring of existing State aid to ensure a level playing field 
Over the years, the architecture of State aid control has evolved. Today, a substantial part of 
aid is granted under block-exempted schemes which are not examined by the Commission 
before entering into force. Overall, roughly four-fifths of aid is granted on the basis of 
previously approved aid schemes or Block Exemption Regulations. In that context, it is 
essential for the Commission to verify that Member States apply State aid rules for the 
schemes correctly and that they only grant aid when all required conditions are met.  
To that end, the Commission introduced in 2006 a regular, ex post, sample-based control of 
existing aid schemes ("monitoring"). After a modest start covering about 20 schemes and ten 
Member States in each monitoring cycle, the Commission has considerably stepped up 
monitoring since 2011. Building on the Court of Auditors recommendations
84
, the 
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Commission has substantially increased the size of the monitoring sample in the last three 
annual cycles to 78 schemes in the 2016 review. It also extended the scope of its control.  
The 2016 cycle covered all Member States and all main types of aid approved as well as 
block-exempted schemes. Furthermore, the sample contained some block-exempted schemes 
implemented under the new GBER
85
. Also, the Commission continued on targeted monitoring 
where it examined whether Member States correctly applied the criterion on aid granted to 
companies in difficulty. Furthermore, the Commission monitored some schemes in which the 
granting of illegal aid could be involved. 
The Commission systematically follows up on irregularities and uses the means at its 
disposal, as appropriate, to address the competition distortions that these may have caused. In 
some cases, Member States offer to voluntarily redress the problems detected, for example to 
amend national legislation or to recover the excess aid granted. In other cases, the 
Commission may need to take formal action.  
Restoring competition through recovery of State aid granted in breach of the rules 
To ensure the integrity of the single market, the Commission has the power and the duty to 
request that Member States recover unlawful and incompatible aid which has unduly distorted 
competition and trade between Member States. In 2016, further progress was made to ensure 
that recovery decisions are enforced effectively and immediately. 
By 31 December, the sum of illegal and incompatible aid recovered from beneficiaries 
amounted to EUR 12.3 billion
86
. At the same time, the outstanding amount pending recovery 
was EUR 19.8 billion.  
In 2016, the Commission adopted eleven new recovery decisions and EUR 18.4 million was 
recovered by the Member States. As of the end of December, the Commission had 52 pending 
recovery cases.  
Recovery decisions adopted in 2016 11 
Amount recovered in 2016 (EUR million) 18.4 
Pending recovery cases on 31 December 2016 52 
As a guardian of the Treaty, the Commission may use all legal means at its disposal to ensure 
that Member States implement their recovery obligations, including launching infringement 
procedures. In 2016, the Commission launched two actions under Article 108(2) TFEU
87
 for 
failure to implement recovery (both instances concerned Greece)
88
.  
                                                            
85 Commission Regulation (EU) No 651/2014 of 17 June 2014 declaring certain categories of aid compatible 
with the internal market in application of Articles 107 and 108 TFEU, OJ L 187, 26.6.2014, p. 1. 
86 The reference period is 1 January 1999 to 31 December 2016. 
87 Consolidated version of the TFEU, OJ C 115, 9.5.2008, p.47. 
88 Cases C-481/16 Commission v Greece, action brought on 2 September 2016, OJ C 383, 17.10.2016, p. 9 and 
C-363/16 Commission v Greece, action brought on 30 June 2016, OJ C 363, 22.8.2016, p. 19. 
 31 
Cooperation with national courts to ensure the effectiveness of State aid rules  
The Commission continued its cooperation with national courts and tribunals under Article 29 
of the Procedural Regulation
89
. This cooperation includes direct case-related assistance to 
national courts when they apply EU State aid law. The courts and tribunals can ask the 
Commission to provide case related information, or to provide an opinion on the application 
of State aid rules. The Commission may also submit amicus curiae observations at its own 
initiative.  
In 2016, the Commission responded to two requests for information. The Commission 
received a request for information and for a legal opinion from the Dutch Trade and Industry 
Appeals Tribunal
90
 related to the aid scheme "Subsidy for the preservation of sheep herds 
consisting of rare breeds". The other request for information was issued by Italy and 
concerned the question whether the Commission was investigating a specific aid measure.  
The Commission's possibility to submit amicus curiae observations on its own initiative 
before national courts is a novelty brought about by the 2013 amendment to the Procedural 
Regulation. In that respect, Article 29 of the Procedural Regulation mirrors Article 15(3) of 
Regulation 1/2003 in the field of antitrust. In 2016, the Commission decided to submit ten 
amicus curiae observations in national courts and tribunals (three in Estonia, one in Latvia, 
one in Greece, two in Belgium, two in Luxembourg and one in the United Kingdom) and 
requested to intervene in one commercial arbitration case, which was rejected. Five of these 
submissions concerned the Micula
91
 case. In this case, the Commission also took part in a 
hearing before the High Court in London.  
The Commission intends to publish its opinions and amicus curiae observations on its website 
as soon as it receives approval from the courts concerned
92
.  
In 2016, the Commission also continued its advocacy efforts. It was actively involved in 
evaluating the financing of training programmes for national judges and in assessing their 
needs. The Commission staff also provided training during workshops and conferences
93
. 
4. Significant judgments by EU Courts in the State aid area 
In 2016, the EU Courts adopted a number of important judgments in the State aid area, in 
particular on the concept of State resources and advantage, and on the compatibility 
assessment. The following overview is based on a selection of court judgments. 
State resources 
In its EEG judgment
94
 the General Court confirmed the Commission's decision that the 
German EEG levy qualifies as State resources. The EEG levy is a levy imposed on electricity 
suppliers per kWh, which is passed-on to the consumers and aimed to support the production 
                                                            
89 Council Regulation (EU) 2015/1589 of 13 July 2015 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 
108 TFEU, OJ L 248 of 24.9.2015, p. 9-29. 
90 College van Beroep voor het bedrijfsleven.  
91 Case T-704/15 Micula and Others v Commission, action brought on 28 November 2015, OJ C 68, 22.2.2016, 
p. 30–32. 
92 Commission notice on the enforcement of State aid law by national courts, OJ C 85, 9.4.2009, p. 22, paragraph 
98. 
93 See also the dedicated section Cooperation with national courts, Antitrust and Cartels Section, item 7. 
94 Case T-47/15 Germany v Commission (EEG), judgment of the General Court of 10 May 2016, 
EU:T:2016:281.  
 32 
of renewable electricity. The EEG levy was introduced by law and managed by the German 
Transmission System Operators (TSO). The TSOs did not have to finance the advantage by 
their own private means, and their management of the EEG levy was monitored by the 
regulator. Reductions of the EEG levy were applicable to energy-intensive users. 
The General Court stated that in order to constitute State resources, an advantage does not 
need to be granted directly by the State from the State budget, but can also be granted by 
bodies designated or established by the State. Next, it confirmed that the body entrusted with 
the management of State resources can be a public or a private body. Looking at the above-
mentioned features, the EEG levy had to be considered as a charge unilaterally imposed by 
the State in the context of its policy to support producers of renewable energy and could be 
assimilated, from the point of view of its effects, to a levy on electricity consumption in 
Germany. As regards the reduction for energy-intensive users, the General Court also 
confirmed that it concerned State resources, because of the fact that the support for the 
production of renewable electricity was financed from State resources, and the reductions 
represented a loss of revenues for the TSOs that had then to be compensated by an increased 
EEG levy on the other consumers. 
The judgment is under appeal
95
. In parallel, a German court has also made a preliminary 
reference. 
Advantage and Market Economy Investor Principle (MEOP) 
Several important judgments were issued as regards the question of advantage. In the IFP
96
 
judgment, which is currently under appeal, the General Court held that the existence of an 
advantage deriving from an unlimited guarantee linked to the EPIC ("Établissement Public à 
caractère Industriel et Commercial", which exempts it from the normal bankruptcy rules) 
status of an undertaking cannot be automatically presumed, but rather that such presumption 
depends on the plausibility of the underlying assumptions on which the Commission relies. 
The General Court's FIH
97
 judgment, also under appeal, concerns a case where the transfer of 
property-related assets followed previous State aid measures (including a capital injection and 
guarantees). It held that the Commission should have applied the market economy creditor 
principle (rather than the market economy investor principle) as the behaviour of the State 
should not be compared to an investor trying to maximise his profits, but rather to that of a 
creditor seeking to minimise the losses to which that creditor would be exposed in the event 
of inaction.  
The Deutsche Post
98
 judgment of the General Court and the Orange (France Télécom)
99
 
judgment of the Court of Justice both concern the question whether a pension relief scheme 
limiting the pension burden inherited by certain enterprises which were created from State 
administrations constituted aid or not. The General Court held that such pension burden 
constituted a structural disadvantage and that freeing an undertaking from a structural 
                                                            
95 Appeal Case before the Court of Justice C-405/16 P. 
96 Joined cases T-479/11 and T-157/12 France and IFP Energies nouvelles v Commission, judgment of the 
General Court of 26 May 2016, EU:T:2016:320. 
97 Case T-386/14 FIH Holding A/S and FIH Erhvervsbank A/S v Commission, judgment of the General Court of 
15 September 2015, EU:T:2016:474. 
98 Case T-143/12 Germany v Commission (Deutsche Post), judgment of the General Court of 14 July 
2016,:EU:T:2016:406. 
99 Case C-211/15P Orange (France Télécom) v Commission, judgment of the Court or 26 October 2016, 
EU:C:2016:798. 
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disadvantage that it has in relation to its competitors, did not constitute State aid, since the 
exceptionally high pension costs for civil servants could not be assumed to form part of the 
normal burden an undertaking has to bear. However, the Court of Justice agreed with the 
Commission and clarified in the Orange (France Télécom) judgment that compensation for a 
structural disadvantage can only be qualified as "no aid" if it fulfils the four Altmark criteria 
regarding the compensation for a service of general economic interest. In all other 
circumstances, even if it merely compensates a so-called structural disadvantage, a 
compensation would provide and an advantage to the beneficiary and can therefore constitute 
State aid. The case of Deutsche Post remains open at this stage and the Commission will 
prepare a new final decision. Indeed, the final Commission decision finding incompatible aid 
for Deutsche Post was annulled in the General Court in July this year, but not the decision to 
open the investigation from 1999, which is not affected by the annulment. 
Existing aid vs new aid 
In its judgment in Greek Aluminium
100
 the Court of Justice clarified that – contrary to what 
the General Court held when annulling the Commission's decision – the provisional extension 
of the duration of existing aid by a judgment rendered in interim proceedings must be 
regarded as an alteration of existing aid and therefore constitutes new aid, which should be 
notified to the Commission. This judgment is of particular significance, because it recalls the 
particular duty of national judges when ruling on measures that may constitute State aid. 
GBER 
In Dilly's Wellnesshotel
101
, the Court of Justice observed that given the general obligation to 
notify State aid to the Commission, the (old) General Block Exemption Regulation (GBER) 
and the conditions laid down therein have to be interpreted strictly. In order for an aid scheme 
to benefit from an exemption under the GBER, it was therefore mandatory – and not a mere 
formality – to include a reference to the GBER. Failure to fulfil that condition precluded an 
exemption under the GBER from being granted. 
Compatibility 
In its preliminary ruling in Kotnik
102
, the Court of Justice confirmed the validity of the 
Commission's Banking Communication
103
 and held that burden sharing by shareholders and 
sub-debtholders as a prerequisite for State aid was not contrary to EU law. 
The preliminary ruling in PGE
104
 contains observations regarding the division of competences 
between the Commission and national authorities and courts. The assessment of compatibility 
of an aid scheme is an exclusive competence of the Commission. This means that national 
authorities and courts cannot review a State aid scheme at the time it is implemented to 
                                                            
100 Case C-590/14P DEI and Commission v Alouminion tis Ellados, judgment of the Court of 28 October 2016, 
EU:2016:797. 
101 Case C-493/14 Dilly's Wellnesshotel GmbH v Finanzamt Linz, judgment of the Court of 21 July 2016, 
EU:C:2016:577. 
102 Case C-526/14 Kotnik and others v Drzavni zbor Republike Slovenije, judgment of the Court of 19 July 2016, 
EU:C:2016:767.  
103 Communication from the Commission on the application, from 1 August 2013, of State aid rules to support 
measures in favour of banks in the context of the financial crisis available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52013XC0730%2801%29&from=EN  
104 Case C-574/14 PGE Górnictwo i Energetyka Konwencjonalna SA v Prezes Urzędu Regulacji Energetyki, 
judgment of the Court of 15 September 2016, EU:2016:C:686. 
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determine whether it is consistent with the Stranded Costs Methodology Communication
105
 if 
the Commission has already assessed that scheme in the light of the Communication as being 
compatible with the internal market before its implementation. However, the Commission 
decision should be interpreted in the light of the conditions of the Communication by the 
national court. 
In Magic Mountain
106
 the General Court established that the conditions of market failure and 
appropriateness of the aid measure are not conditions required under Article 107(3)(c) TFEU 
itself. It furthermore held that contrary to the Commission's guidelines, which are binding on 
it, the "working paper on the more economic approach" merely constituted an internal paper 
not meant to produce any effects outside the Commission and thus not binding on it.  
Finally, in Spanish goodwill
107
 the Court held that the only relevant criterion in order to 
establish the selective character of a tax measure consists in determining whether the effect of 
that measure is such as to favour certain undertakings over others which, in the light of the 
objective pursued by the general tax system concerned, are in a comparable factual and legal 
situation and who accordingly suffer different treatment that can, in essence, be classified as 
discriminatory. 
Developing the international dimension of EU competition policy 
 
The Commission aims a level playing field as regards market access and promotes the values 
of EU competition enforcement across the world. While the EU has progressively integrated 
and opened its markets, EU companies still encounter discrimination and restrictions abroad. 
The progressive globalisation of trade and the spread of competition regulatory systems 
around the world call for convergence of competition rules and the coordinated enforcement 
of these rules. Companies need a transparent, stable and reliable competition enforcement 
wherever they do business. This is why the Commission seeks to reinforce the role of 
competition policy in international negotiations, in international organisations and cooperates 
with competition agencies globally.  
1. Bilateral relations 
At the international level, the Commission is holding negotiations on Free Trade Agreements 
(FTAs) with the aim to include competition and State aid provisions in such agreements. In 
2016, the Commission's international priorities included the negotiations with the United 
States on a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership Agreement (TTIP), launched in 
2013. Significant progress was made on another important agreement currently being 
negotiated, namely the Free Trade Agreement with Japan. During 2016, the Commission also 
started FTA negotiations with Armenia, Mexico, Indonesia and Philippines, and re-opened 
negotiations with Mercosur. The Commission also continued negotiations with the People's 
Republic of China regarding an Investment Agreement. The agreement aims at establishing a 
                                                            
105 Communication from the Commission relating to the methodology for analysing State aid linked to stranded 
costs available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/legislation/stranded_costs_en.pdf  
106 Case T-162/13 Magic Mountain v Commission, judgment of the General Court of 9 June 2016, 
EU:T:2016:341. 
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level playing field between EU and Chinese investors, including State owned enterprises, 
through inter alia enhanced provisions on transparency. 
Negotiations between the Commission and its Canadian counterparts to include provisions on 
the exchange of evidence into the existing EU-Canada Cooperation agreement have been 
completed at working level. The present agreement does not make provision for the 
Commission and the Canadian Competition Bureau to exchange evidence collected in the 
course of their respective proceedings. The possibility to exchange such evidence would 
improve cooperation between both competition authorities in all competition cases which 
affect both markets and would lead to more effective and more efficient competition law 
enforcement. On 26 June, the Commission submitted the draft agreement to the Council and 
proposed to sign and conclude the agreement. 
The cooperation agreement with Japan dates from 2003. In the margin of her visit to Japan in 
March, Commissioner Vestager agreed with Chairman Sugimoto, the Head of the Japan Fair 
Trade Commission, to initiate the respective internal procedures which would allow the start 
of negotiations to upgrade this agreement with provisions for the exchange of evidence. 
Another key area of Commission activity at the international level is technical cooperation 
with main trading partners that are developing their competition policy and enforcement 
regimes and with which the Commission has signed Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs). 
The Commission has signed MoUs with all the BRICS
108
 countries in recent years, of which 
the latest was the MoU signed with South Africa in June, and has engaged in technical 
cooperation with these countries to varying degrees. The Commission's technical cooperation 
activities with the Chinese competition authorities are particularly noteworthy and continued 
throughout 2016 under the management and financing of the Service for Foreign Policy 
Instruments (FPI). Finally, the programme for technical cooperation with the Indian 
competition authorities, CITD
109
, continued in 2016 and will run until the end of 2017. 
The Commission also assists in the implementation of the competition provisions included in 
recent FTAs with neighbouring countries. It is involved in negotiating the necessary 
implementing rules to this effect with Tunisia and Morocco, as well as monitoring the 
implementation of the EU competition acquis, including the State aid rules, in countries such 
as Ukraine and Moldova.  
In the accession negotiations with candidate countries, the Commission's main policy 
objective, in addition to fostering a competition culture, is to further help candidate countries 
and potential candidate countries to build up a proper legislative framework, well-functioning 
competition authorities and an efficient enforcement practice in order for them to meet the 
conditions for EU accession in the competition policy field. The Commission is continuously 
monitoring compliance of candidate countries with their commitments under Stabilisation and 
Association agreements. 
On 25 February, the Council presidency informed Serbia about the opening benchmarks for 
Chapter 8 (Competition). The Stabilisation and Association Agreement that EU had 
concluded with Kosovo in 2015 entered into force on 1 April, and on 15 February Bosnia and 
Herzegovina applied for EU membership.  
                                                            
108 BRICS is the acronym for an association of five major emerging national economies: Brazil, Russia, India, 
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109 Capacity Building Initiative for Trade Development programme, launched in 2014. 
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2. Multilateral cooperation 
The Commission continued its active engagement in competition-related international fora 
such as the Competition Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD), the International Competition Network (ICN), the World Bank and 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).  
The main work stream of the OECD, to which the Commission contributed in 2016, 
concerned disruptive innovation. On the related session of Big Data
110 
the Commission 
provided a comprehensive overview of its current thinking and experience on this matter. 
Other OECD sessions, to which the Commission contributed, included merger related 
discussions on public interest considerations, on jurisdictional thresholds and local nexus, on 
the merger decision making process and on geographic market definition. In relation to the 
latter topic the Commission reported on a recent commissioned study analysing the 
Commission's assessment of the relevant geographic market in large number of merger cases. 
Furthermore, in the field of antitrust, the Commission shared its experience with commitment 
decisions and sanctions in antitrust proceedings and it made a presentation on the issue of 
agency independence.  
In the ICN, following the Singapore Annual Conference which took place in April 2016, the 
Commission took up a three year co-chair role of the Cartel Working Group and will work 
towards updating the ICN 2008 report on "Setting Fines for Cartels in ICN Jurisdictions" and 
carrying out a scoping exercise for new work for the "Anti-Cartel Enforcement Manual".  
The Commission also participated in the 15th meeting of the UNCTAD Intergovernmental 
Group of Experts (IGE) on Competition Law and Policy (CLP), which was held in Geneva in 
October 2016. The conference included discussions on the interface between competition law 
and IP rights, on the vertical distribution chain in the food sector and on competition 
compliance programs.  
  
                                                            
110 Further information available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/big-data-bringing-competition-policy-
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II. SECTORAL OVERVIEW 
The Commission's competition policy actions in 2016 focused on a wide range of policy 
areas, helping make markets work more fairly. At the same time, EU competition policy 
supported several key EU policies and initiatives, including a connected Digital Single 
Market, an integrated and climate friendly Energy Union, a deeper and fairer internal market 
and taking actions against selective tax advantages. This section provides an overview of 
competition policy developments and enforcement activities that the Commission particularly 
focused on in 2016.  
 1. ENERGY & ENVIRONMENT 
Overview of key challenges in the sector  
Competition policy plays a key role in addressing these challenges and making the Energy 
Union function properly by opening markets, avoiding discrimination and creating a level 
playing field between all market players, regardless of their nationality. It ultimately promotes 
fairness and economic growth within the EU.  
Moreover, ensuring that gas and electricity flow freely across borders between Member 
States, promoting interconnectivity and avoiding territorial restrictions or artificial market 
partitioning within the EU contribute to the Energy Union objectives.  
Main policy developments 
On 16 February, the Commission adopted a package of initiatives on security of energy 
supply implementing the Energy Union package
111
. This package is based on three pillars: (i) 
improving security of supply by creating competitive gas markets; (ii) more effective crisis 
prevention and response based on cooperation and solidarity; and (iii) reducing import 
dependency by modernising the heating and cooling sector
112
.  
On 30 November, the Commission adopted another set of initiatives, the Clean Energy for All 
Europeans package
113
. This package comprises the largest set of initiatives made by the 
Commission to implement the Energy Union, as foreseen in the Energy Union Roadmap. It 
includes both legislative proposals as well as non-legislative initiatives. The key priorities for 
this package are energy efficiency, the EU's global leadership in renewables, and a fair deal 
for energy consumers. 
Main issues of concern in relation to competition policy  
The scope of competition law enforcement in the energy sector is to strengthen and integrate 
the principles outlined in sector-specific regulation in order to create a well-functioning 
unified market, where energy can be exchanged freely and securely across Europe and all 
related services are provided at competitive levels. For instance, by making sure that 
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dominant positions by incumbent operators are not abused, that suppliers compete effectively 
and fairly, that State intervention is limited only to those areas in which is really needed and 
that renewables can compete in the market, competition policy helps keeping overall energy 
costs under control and at the same time allows for a sustainable economic growth in the EU.  
Competition policy in 2016 has focused mainly on three areas:  
First, the Commission acted against (privately or State-owned) companies' attempts to 
artificially segment or partition the internal energy market. In particular, the Commission is 
concerned that limiting the free flow of gas and electricity between Member States constitutes 
an obstacle to the Energy Union. For this reason, the Commission has enforced and will 
continue strongly enforcing competition rules against territorial restrictions unduly limiting 
the possibility for customers to deliver or re-deliver energy where needed. Discriminatory 
conduct against foreign energy or any limitations of imports/exports within the EU have also 
been under closer scrutiny.  
The second important focus was on ensuring that competitors could compete on fair terms and 
incumbent operators were not allowed to unduly exploit their dominant position, whether 
gained legitimately on the market, conceded by the State or favoured by national legislation. 
In fact, the Commission has showed that it is ready to intervene when national rules create or 
facilitate an infringement of competition law.  
At the same time, the Commission investigated with particular attention conduct that, besides 
infringing Articles 101 or 102 TFEU, might also have a negative impact on the environment 
and limit consumers' access to clean energy and efficient waste management.  
The third fundamental pillar of competition policy in 2016 was the enforcement of State aid 
rules. A key principle embedded in the Commission's policy is that public support should 
result in a positive balance between the objectives achieved and the potential negative effects 
of State intervention on the European energy market.  
In this context the Commission pays special attention to any market distortions that may arise 
as a result of public financing, such as the crowding out of investment, negative effects on 
upstream or downstream markets and excessive profits which may lead to strengthened 
market positions, deterrence of new entrants and ultimately market foreclosure. 
By the effective enforcement of State aid rules in 2016 the Commission has ensured that the 
risk of such distortions is limited to the minimum. This has been achieved by promoting the 
implementation of more market oriented mechanisms in the energy support measures.  
In 2016, the Commission adopted a number of decisions on forward looking renewable 
support schemes, which grant support on the basis of a competitive bidding process
114
. 
Competitive bidding processes not only foster competition between energy producers but also 
result in achieving objectives of common interest – environmental protection or security of 
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supply – at a lower cost to end consumers. Competitive bidding processes also contribute to 
the creation of a fairer EU economy in general. 
Furthermore, in 2016 the Commission adopted the final decision on the Drax Biomass 
Conversion project
115
, approving the conversion of the coal fired plant into solid biomass 
fired plant after careful assessment of effects of the increase of solid biomass demand on raw 
materials markets outside the EU.  
Contribution of EU competition policy to tackling the challenges 
The ongoing Gazprom case
116
 is a good example of the efforts made by the Commission to 
facilitate the cross-border flows of energy between Member States. More specifically, the 
case aims at removing direct and indirect restrictions to re-sell gas cross-border and at 
allowing the flow of gas to Central and Eastern European gas markets. The Commission also 
wants gas prices in Central and Eastern Europe to reflect competitive benchmarks. It is 
essential for consumers throughout the EU that they can heat their homes and fuel their 
businesses with competitively priced natural gas. Furthermore, the Commission aims to 
ensure that Gazprom cannot act on any rights concerning gas infrastructure, which it obtained 
from customers by having leveraged its market position in gas supply. During the course of 
2016, the Commission and Gazprom discussed the possibility of Gazprom making 
commitments to address, in a forward looking manner, the Commission's competition 
concerns. 
The BEH Gas case provides another example of the Commission's efforts to ensure that 
incumbent companies do not perpetuate their dominant position
117
. State-owned and vertically 
integrated Bulgarian Energy Holding was being investigated for hindering competitors' access 
to key gas infrastructures in Bulgaria. The company is not only active in the gas supply 
market but also owns or controls the Bulgarian gas transmission network, the only gas storage 
facility in Bulgaria and the capacity on the main gas import pipeline into the country. The aim 
of the case is to ensure a competitive gas market in Bulgaria and foster the integration of the 
Bulgarian gas market with neighbouring markets. 
The ARA case 
Waste management is becoming an essential part of our economy. Allowing EU citizens to receive affordable 
and effective recycling services is at the heart of the EU's environmental and energy policies in the same way as 
gas and electricity.  
On 20 September the Commission fined the Austrian waste management incumbent ARA for having abused its 
dominant position by blocking competitors from entering the Austrian market for management of household 
packaging waste118.  
ARA owned a unique collection infrastructure, without access to which no company could provide waste 
management services throughout the country, as the law required. So by preventing other companies from 
accessing this infrastructure, ARA denied them a chance to compete. ARA was the first case where a cooperation 
procedure was used in a non-cartel antitrust prohibition decision. ARA co-operated with the Commission by 
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acknowledging the infringement and ensuring that the decision could benefit from administrative efficiencies, as 
well as by proposing a structural remedy119.  
The ongoing French Hydropower concessions case shows the Commission's strong 
commitment to tackle interventions by Member States that might lead companies to distort 
competition
120
. In 2016, the Commission continued investigating whether granting most of 
the country's hydropower concessions to State-owned EDF at preferential financial 
conditions, without a tendering procedure and for very long periods maintained or 
strengthened EDF's dominance in the French electricity markets counter to Article 106 TFEU 
in conjunction with Article 102 TFEU. During the course of 2016 the Commission and the 
French authorities have discussed the possibility for France jointly with EDF of making 
commitments to address the Commission's competition concerns. 
The Commission's antitrust enforcement is also contributing to the objective of a low carbon 
economy. Over the course of 2016, the Commission has continued the investigation on the 
conduct of ethanol producers, suspected of having colluded to affect ethanol benchmarks 
published by the price reporting agency Platts
121
. Such practices harm competition and 
undermine EU energy objectives by increasing prices for renewable energy, in this case 
biofuels used for transport. 
Security of Supply and State aid 
In the electricity sector, there are increasing concerns about generation adequacy and 
insufficient investment in new capacity due to market uncertainties and regulatory 
interventions. An increasing number of Member States are introducing capacity mechanisms 
to encourage investment in new capacity e.g. power plants or to provide incentives that power 
plants continue to operate, so that the supply of electricity meets demand at all times. At the 
same time, unnecessary and badly designed capacity mechanisms can distort competition, 
hamper necessary market reforms, hinder electricity flows across borders, lead to consumers 
overpaying for electricity and risk contradicting decarbonisation objectives.  
Capacity mechanism sector inquiry - Final Report  
Together with the adoption of the legislative Clean Energy Package, the Commission published on 30 November 
2016 the final Report of its capacity mechanism sector inquiry122. The Report concludes that Member States 
need to better assess the need for such mechanisms and indicates how to improve their design to ensure security 
of supply while minimising competition distortions. The Report also concludes that many Member States have 
yet to implement market reforms that are indispensable to address security of supply issues. In those cases where 
a capacity mechanism is truly necessary, the Report indicates which types of capacity mechanisms may be most 
suitable to solve the identified problem. In particular, the Report concludes that the price paid for capacity must 
be determined by means of a competitive process, to which all types of capacities that can help address the 
security of supply problem (not only existing power plants but also, demand response providers, new capacities, 
storage facilities, interconnectors and foreign capacities) should be allowed to participate.  
The capacity mechanism sector inquiry has provided input to and complements the Clean Energy Package 
adopted by the Commission on the same day to create modern, better working, more integrated electricity 
markets in the European Union. The Commission will continue to work with the Member States to bring their 
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schemes in line with State aid rules. In addition, any new plans of Member States to introduce capacity 
mechanisms will be assessed in light of the insight gained from the sector inquiry. 
In 2016, the Commission also adopted a major capacity mechanism decision in relation to the 
market-wide French de-centralised capacity mechanism
123
 as well as decisions relating to the 
German Network Reserve
124
 and Interruptibility scheme
125
.  
Sustainability, Competitiveness and State aid 
As seen above, promotion of renewable energy and energy efficiency increases the 
sustainability of the EU energy sector and contributes to environmental protection. In 2016 
the Commission adopted 15 decisions on new support schemes to renewable energy 
producers. Currently almost every Member State has an approved renewable energy support 
scheme. That ensures not only that Europe becomes greener, but also provides certainty for 
investors, who receive aid under a clear, transparent and equitable set of rules.  
In 2016, the Commission also approved a number of previously non-notified support schemes 
for energy from renewable sources, among them being the Polish green certificates scheme
126
, 
the Czech renewable support scheme for RES-electricity
127
 and the Bulgarian feed-in tariff 
scheme for RES small installations
128
. Furthermore, the Commission approved a pilot bidding 
process for solar energy in Denmark that was open for producers located in Germany
129
. At 
the same time, Germany opened its bidding process for solar energy producers located in 
Denmark. 
In the area of energy efficiency the Commission adopted a decision in the case on the reform 
of support for cogeneration in Germany
130
 and the case on certificates of origin for Combined 
Heat and Power (CHP) certificates support system
131
 in Poland. It has been established that 
highly efficient combined heat and power generation reduces the primary energy sources 
necessary for energy production. In this way highly efficient CHP technology contributes to 
the increase of energy efficiency.  
Further to the measures focusing on energy policy objectives, the environmental protection 
was promoted through State aid schemes aiming at better air quality. For instance, the 
Portuguese scheme for Clean Buses in Urban Areas supported the acquisition of around 400 
                                                            
123 Case SA.39621 French country-wide capacity mechanism. For further information see IP/16/3620 of 8 
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to 500 clean buses, inter alia including electric buses or electricity hybrid buses
132
. Through 
this measure significant reductions of NOx and particulate matter emissions could be 
expected in full alignment with EU Environmental policies. Scottish Green Bus Fund was 
another scheme adopted in 2016 with similar objectives
133
. In addition, the measures 
approved in the context of environmental protection aid, the schemes promoting intermodal 
shift in the transport sector also aim at improving air quality as the eligible aid corresponds to 
the part of the external costs, which rail transport avoids in comparison with transport by 
road. 
State aid to coal mines 
In 2016, the Commission also adopted three decisions
134
 under the 787/2010 Council 
Decision of 10 December 2010 on State aid to facilitate the closure of uncompetitive coal 
mines
135
. The decisions involve aid to cover production losses and social costs of 
uncompetitive mines in Spain, Poland and Romania. The approved aid alleviates the social 
and environmental impact of the mine closures in the affected regions, but it is conditional on 
the definitive closure of the uncompetitive mines by the end of 2018. The conditionality of the 
aid is aimed at ensuring that only competitive undertakings are fostered to remain on the 
market, thus making the market fairer and more efficient.  
Merger control 
In the field of merger control, the trend for investments in European energy infrastructure by 
investment companies persisted
136
. In 2016, as in the previous years, a number of companies 
invested in development and production from renewable sources, in particular in wind 
parks
137
.  
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In addition, the Commission conducted an in-depth investigation into the proposed acquisition 
of Baker Hughes by Halliburton
138
. The transaction raised competition concerns on a very 
large number of markets related to oilfield services provided to oil and gas exploration and 
production companies in the EEA. The transaction could have had a negative impact on the 
efficient use of available gas resources within the EU, a key element of the Energy Union 
strategy in terms of ensuring security of supply. In view of the competition concerns raised by 
the Commission and other competition agencies across the world, the parties abandoned the 
proposed transaction.  
 2. INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES (ICT) AND MEDIA  
Overview of key challenges in the sector 
In 2016, competition policy and enforcement continued to contribute to the implementation of 
the Digital Single Market Strategy
139
, one of the priorities of the Commission. In particular 
the Commission continued its sector inquiry into e-commerce and carried out a number of 
investigations in the information, communication and media sectors. 
Contribution of EU competition policy to tackling the challenges 
E-commerce sector inquiry 
The ongoing sector inquiry into e-commerce
140
 aims to gather market information in order to 
better understand the nature, prevalence and effects of barriers to online trade erected by 
companies, and to assess them in light of EU competition rules.  
In March, the Commission published its initial findings on geo-blocking
141
. Geo-blocking 
refers to business practices whereby retailers and service providers prevent online shoppers 
from purchasing consumer goods or accessing digital content services because of the 
shopper's location or country of residence. The inquiry shows that geo-blocking is widespread 
in the EU. This is partly due to unilateral decisions by distributors not to sell abroad but also 
due to contractual prohibitions preventing retailers to sell cross-border
142
. Unilateral 
behaviour by non-dominant companies falls outside the scope of the EU competition rules. To 
address these forms of geo-blocking, the Commission adopted in May a proposal for a 
Regulation aiming at addressing geo-blocking and other forms of discrimination based on 
customers' nationality, place of residence or place of establishment
143
, identifying those 
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situations where restrictions of access of customers to goods and services due to their location 
cannot be in any case justified. 
In September, the Commission published its Preliminary Report setting out its initial findings 
of the e-commerce sector inquiry. The Preliminary Report
144 
provides an overview of the 
main competition-relevant market trends identified in the e-commerce sector inquiry and 
points to possible competition concerns. It confirms the growing significance of e-commerce. 
E-commerce is an important driver of price transparency and price competition, increasing 
consumers' choice and their ability to find the best deals. The Preliminary Report identifies 
certain business practices that may limit more intense online competition.  
Manufacturers of consumer goods have responded to the growth of e-commerce by adopting a 
number of business practices in order to better control the distribution of their products and 
the positioning of their brands. Selective distribution systems in which the products can only 
be sold by pre-selected authorized sellers are used more widely and manufacturers 
increasingly sell their products online directly to consumers. Manufacturers also increasingly 
use contractual online sales restrictions in their distribution agreements. These types of 
contractual restrictions may make cross-border shopping or online shopping in general more 
difficult and may ultimately harm consumers by preventing them from benefiting from greater 
choice and lower prices in e-commerce.  
With respect to digital content, the availability of licences from the holders of copyrights in 
content is essential for digital content providers and a key determinant of competition in the 
market. The Preliminary Report finds that copyright licensing agreements are complex and 
often exclusive. The agreements provide for the territories, technologies and release windows 
digital content providers can use. Where appropriate, the Commission will assess whether 
certain licensing practices restrict competition and whether enforcement of the EU 
competition rules by the Commission is necessary in order to ensure effective competition. 
In the autumn, interested stakeholders commented the findings extensively in the framework 
of the public consultation on the Preliminary Report. They also expressed their views at the 
stakeholder conference organised by DG Competition in Brussels on 6 October
145
. The final 
Report is due in the first half of 2017. 
Removing unjustified restrictions on cross-border provision of satellite and online pay-TV 
services 
In April 2016, in the case concerning cross-border provision of pay-TV services across 
Europe, Paramount Pictures, one of the film studios under investigation, offered 
commitments, which the Commission made binding on 26 July 2016
146
. Paramount's 
commitments and the Commission's decision making them binding followed the sending on 
23 July 2015 of a Statement of Objections by the Commission to Sky UK and six major US 
film studios: Disney, NBC Universal, Paramount Pictures, Sony, Twentieth Century Fox and 
Warner Bros. 
                                                            
144 Commission Staff Working Document, Preliminary Report on the E-commerce Sector Inquiry, SWD 
(2016)312 final available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/sector_inquiry_preliminary_report_en.pdf  
145 For further information see the webstream of the stakeholder conference available at 
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Cross-border-access to pay-TV 
The case147 started in January 2014 when the Commission opened a formal investigation to assess certain clauses 
in the licensing agreements between the six film studios and Sky UK which required Sky UK to block access to 
films through its online pay-TV services or through its satellite pay-TV services to consumers outside the United 
Kingdom and Ireland. The Commission considered that such clauses restrict the ability of broadcasters to accept 
unsolicited requests (so-called "passive sales") for their pay-TV services from consumers located outside their 
licensed territory. Further, the Commission considered that these clauses eliminate cross-border competition 
between pay-TV broadcasters and partition the Single Market along national borders. 
In the commitments accepted by the Commission in July, Paramount committed that it will neither act upon nor 
enforce the restrictive clauses existing in the contracts licensing its film output for pay-TV with any broadcaster 
in the European Economic Area (EEA). Furthermore, Paramount also committed to refrain from introducing 
such clauses in the contracts licensing its output for pay-TV with any broadcaster in the EEA. These 
commitments will remain in force for five years and cover both standard pay-TV services and subscription 
video-on-demand services. The Commission will closely monitor Paramount's compliance with its 
commitments. Simultaneously, the Commission's investigation continues regarding the five other studios and 
Sky UK. 
Ensuring pro-competitive telecoms framework 
One of the key actions under the second pillar of the Digital Single Market strategy is the 
review of the telecoms regulatory framework. The Commission adopted on 13 September two 
legislative proposals: a proposal for a Directive establishing the European Electronic 
Communications Code
148
, which recasts the existing directives, and a proposal for a 
Regulation establishing the Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications 
(BEREC), which enhances the role of BEREC and of national regulatory authorities. They are 
accompanied by two Communications: Connectivity for a European Gigabit society: Laying 
the foundations for a competitive Digital Single Market
149
, which establishes a set of 
connectivity objectives for 2025, and 5G for Europe: An Action Plan
150
, which sets out 
targeted actions with the aim of fostering 5G deployment in Europe.  
The Commission proposals introduce a new connectivity (i.e. investment) objective as a new 
additional policy objective, alongside the other objectives of the framework, namely 
safeguarding competition, internal market and consumer protection, as well as ensuring that 
the new rules are pro-competitive. Indeed, stimulating competition not only drives 
investments but also results in lower prices, better quality and more choice.  
Operators with Significant Market Power (SMP) will continue to be obliged to provide access 
to their networks to other operators, where this is necessary for effective retail competition. 
De-regulation is possible only when competition is effective in a given telecoms market. 
Additional measures are proposed to promote further infrastructure competition in a targeted 
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way, but within the same predictable competition law based framework. For example, the new 
proposals incentivize network investment by alternative operators, in particular through 
access to civil infrastructures. A framework rewarding co-investment in very high capacity 
networks is set up, encouraging fibre deployments from both incumbents and alternative 
operators. Telecoms operators which are present only at wholesale level will benefit from a 
simplified regulatory model for wholesale-only networks with SMP.  
Communication services provided by Over-the-Top (OTTs) providers such as Skype, 
Facebook and WhatsApp are now regulated in the new Electronic Communications Code and 
are included in the new definition of electronic communications services (ECS), which 
encompasses services using numbers (e.g. traditional voice and SMS services, as well as 
number-based interpersonal communications services) and those not using numbers 
(interpersonal communications services that do not connect with the public switched 
telephone network). Certain obligations are extended to all OTT communications services 
(e.g. the rules linked to security and confidentiality), while other obligations (e.g. contract and 
transparency-related rules) are only extended to OTTs using numbers. Also, regarding 
spectrum, the Commission proposals contain measures to promote competition (such as 
spectrum caps, spectrum reservation for new entrants or wholesale access obligations).  
Antitrust enforcement in the telecoms sector 
On 27 October, the Commission opened proceedings regarding a mobile network sharing 
agreement between the two largest operators in the Czech Republic
151
. 
In the area of baseband chipsets, which process the core communication functions in 
smartphones, tablets and other mobile broadband devices, the Commission continued the 
investigations in the Qualcomm cases
152
 as regards payments to a major customer conditional 
on exclusivity and potential "predatory pricing" by charging prices below costs with a view to 
forcing its competition out of the market.  
Antitrust enforcement in technology markets 
The Commission's actions in technology markets aim to keep markets competitive, and 
maximise incentives to innovate.  
Search and search advertising are markets of significant importance for a well-functioning 
Internet. Search on mobile devices is of increasing commercial significance.  
In the mobile space, in April, the Commission sent Google and its parent company, Alphabet, 
a Statement of Objections
153
 outlining its preliminary view that Google had abused a 
dominant position by: (1) as a condition to license the Google Play Store, requiring 
smartphone and tablet manufacturers to pre-install Google Search and Google's Chrome 
browser and to set Google Search as default search service on their devices; (2) preventing 
smartphone and tablet manufacturers from selling smart mobile devices running on competing 
operating systems based on the Android open source code; and (3) giving financial incentives 
to smartphone and tablet manufacturers and mobile network operators on condition that they 
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exclusively pre-install Google Search on their devices. The Commission believes that these 
business practices are part of a strategy to maintain and strengthen Google's dominance in 
general internet search, and that they hinder the development of rival mobile operating 
systems, applications and services, to the detriment of consumers and innovation.  
In July, the Commission sent Google and Alphabet a supplementary Statement of Objections 
in the comparison shopping case
154
. This outlines additional evidence reinforcing the 
Commission's preliminary conclusion from the April 2015 Statement of Objections that 
Google has abused its dominant position by systematically favouring its comparison shopping 
service in its search results pages.  
Also in July, the Commission sent Google and Alphabet a Statement of Objections outlining 
its preliminary view that the company has abused a dominant position by artificially 
restricting the possibility of third party websites to display search advertisements from 
Google's competitors
155
. 
Antitrust enforcement in sports markets 
In September, the Commission sent a Statement of Objections to the International Skating 
Union (ISU) to convey its preliminary view that the ISU rules under which athletes face 
severe penalties for participation in unauthorised speed skating events could be in breach of 
Article 101 TFEU
156
. The ISU, made up national ice-skating associations, is the sole body 
recognised by the International Olympic Committee to administer the sports of figure skating 
and speed skating on ice. The Commission's Statement of Objections is the second formal 
step in the formal proceedings opened in October 2015 following a complaint by two Dutch 
professional speed skaters
157
. In its Statement of Objections, the Commission raised concerns 
that the penalties set out in the ISU Eligibility rules restrict the commercial freedom of 
athletes and prevent new organisers of international speed skating events from entering the 
market because they are unable to attract top athletes. The rules concerned have provided, in 
particular, that athletes participating in unauthorised events may face life-time bans from all 
key international speed skating competitions, including the Olympic Games and the World 
and European Championships.  
ICT and media in the context of the Merger Regulation 
Overall, this sector saw an increased merger activity in 2016 compared to 2015. The 
Commission intervened at several occasions in the planned takeovers.  
In the telecommunications sector, the Commission conditionally cleared the acquisition of the 
mobile-only operator BASE by the Belgian subsidiary of Liberty Global, cable operator and 
Mobile Virtual Network Operator (MVNO) Telenet (with a fixed infrastructure of regional 
coverage)
158
 in February. The Commission had concerns that a merger would have 
significantly reduced competition, with a risk of higher prices and less choice and innovation 
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for mobile consumers. The Commission ultimately approved the acquisition, subject to an 
MVNO remedy involving the transfer of part of BASE's customers to the purchaser.  
In May, the Commission prohibited the acquisition of Telefónica UK, operating under the 
brand "O2", by the market challenger Hutchison, operating under the brand "Three", 
combining the first and the fourth players in the market
159
. The Commission was concerned 
that the takeover would have led to higher prices and reduced choice and quality for 
consumers in the United Kingdom. The remedies proposed by Hutchison failed to adequately 
address the serious concerns raised by the takeover. The Commission decided to block the 
merger to protect consumers in the United Kingdom.  
In August, the Commission approved, subject to conditions, the creation of a joint-venture 
combining the Dutch telecommunication business of Liberty Global (cable operator and 
MVNO) and Vodafone (Mobile Network Operator (MNO)) and recent entrant in fixed 
services)
160
. The Commission considered that the merger would have eliminated the benefits 
brought to the Dutch fixed and multi-play telecoms market by the recent entry (and expected 
expansion) of Vodafone. The transaction was cleared, subject to the divestment of Vodafone's 
fixed consumer business (including customer base).  
In September, the Commission conditionally cleared the proposed creation of a joint venture 
combining the Italian operations of Vimpelcom (WIND) and Hutchison (H3G), respectively 
the third and the fourth players in the retail mobile market
161
. The parties undertook to divest 
to a pre-defined buyer, Iliad, all assets needed to create a viable fourth mobile network 
operator in Italy. Only once this transaction is complete, can the parties go ahead with the 
deal.  
In the IT sector, the Commission approved two multi-billion mergers in the data storage 
sector in February: the Commission cleared the acquisition of data storage manufacturer 
SanDisk by rival Western Digital
162
 as well as the acquisition of data storage and software 
provider EMC by computer technology company Dell
163
, after concluding in both cases that 
there would be no adverse effects on customers.  
The Microsoft / LinkedIn case 
In December, the Commission approved, subject to conditions, the acquisition by Microsoft, a global technology 
company, of LinkedIn164, a provider of professional social networking services. The Commission was concerned 
that Microsoft would use its strong market position in operating systems (Windows) for personal computers 
(PCs) and productivity software (including Outlook, Word, Excel and Power Point) to strengthen LinkedIn's 
position. The increase in LinkedIn's user base would make it harder for new players to start providing 
professional social network services in the EEA and it could have tipped the market towards LinkedIn in 
Member States where a competitor of LinkedIn currently operates. The commitments offered by Microsoft 
address the competition concerns identified by the Commission. 
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State aid enforcement in ICT and media 
The achievement of the European broadband targets
165
, despite substantial progress, 
represents a significant challenge, in particular for the deployment of ultrafast networks
166
. 
Reaching the Digital Single Market connectivity objectives for 2020 and 2025 is estimated to 
require an overall investment of around EUR 500 billion over the coming decade, 
representing an additional EUR 155 billion over and above a simple continuation of the trend 
of current network investment and modernisation efforts of the connectivity providers
167
.  
Most of the financing for the upgrade and deployment of next-generation networks in the 
broadband sector comes from private companies. Private companies tend to invest mostly in 
urban, highly populated areas which can assure rapid return on investment. As a result, in 
certain areas - in particular rural - public funds support the deployment of broadband 
networks, within the broader objectives of inclusion and economic development. Such public 
spending alongside private investment continues to be the key to achieving the longer term 
objectives set by the Digital Agenda for Europe up to and beyond 2025
168
. State aid control 
seeks to ensure that where a market failure arises and publicly funded networks are needed, 
these do not crowd out private investments.  
Most Member States have gradually adopted and even updated national and/or regional 
broadband strategies
169
. While their content differs, many of them foresee measures to support 
supply through the use of public funds. Extensive national broadband schemes have been 
approved by the Commission during 2016, in particular for the United Kingdom, Italy and 
France. Over a longer period 2009-2016, the Commission approved State aid for broadband 
totalling EUR 34.9 billion. During the same period, Member States adopted 69 broadband 
State aid measures benefitting from the GBER
170
.  
                                                            
165 In its Communication "Connectivity for a Competitive Digital Single Market - Towards a European Gigabit" 
(COM/2016/587), the Commission confirmed the importance of Internet connectivity for the Digital Single 
Market and, building on the Digital Agenda for Europe goals for 2020, set out a vision for a European Gigabit 
society operationalised through three strategic objectives for 2025. As indicated in the Communication, the 
Commission will reflect the foreseeable evolution of long-term demand when applying the "step change" 
approach of the Broadband State Aid Guidelines in conjunction with the strategic objectives set in this 
Communication, and will consider favourably efficient blended financing that contributes to lower the aid 
intensity and to reduce risks of distorting competition, as part of its assessment of State aid interventions. 
166 According to Europe’s digital progress report 2016, Next Generation Access (NGA) networks coverage 
continues to improve. By mid-2015, NGA networks were available to 71 % of EU homes. However, deployment 
still focus mainly on urban areas and only 28% of rural homes were covered, mainly by VDSL.  
167 Based on the study by Analysys Mason (SMART 2015/0068) and the Commission's estimates.  
168 As defined in the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Connectivity for a Competitive 
Digital Single Market - Towards a European Gigabit Society, 14.9.2016 COM(2016) 587 final: 
- Gigabit connectivity for all main socio-economic drivers such as schools, transport hubs and main providers of 
public services as well as digitally intensive enterprises.  
- All urban areas and all major terrestrial transport paths to have uninterrupted 5G coverage.  
- All European households, rural or urban, will have access to Internet connectivity offering a downlink of at 
least 100 Mbps, upgradable to Gigabit speed.  
169 Even though a few Member States do not yet have a single document that can be regarded as a national 
broadband plan, all of them have at least an overall strategic approach for the deployment of next generation 
access networks that is implemented in practice. 
170 The General Block Exemption Regulation (GBER) frees categories of State aid, deemed to bring benefits to 
society, that outweigh the possible distortions of competition in the Single Market triggered by public funding 
from the requirement of prior notification to the Commission. Consequently, Member States may implement 
measures which fulfil the condition of the GBER without prior scrutiny by the Commission. 
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In assessing notified measures, Member States and selected operators must fulfil a number of 
conditions which include measures to ensure third parties' effective (wholesale) access to the 
subsidised broadband infrastructure as specified in the Broadband State Aid Guidelines
171
. 
Risks of distortion of competition are addressed through requirements, such as using the open 
selection process and the least distortive public financing mechanism. Overall, these 
conditions help to ensure that the positive effects of an aid measure outweigh its potential 
negative effects and minimise any distortive effect.  
 3. FINANCIAL SERVICES 
Overview of the key challenges in the sector 
The financial services sector has become substantially more stable over the last years. While 
anticipating a series of remaining challenges, EU competition policy has ensured a level 
playing field and maintained the integrity of the internal market. In view of the essential 
functions the sector provides for society, effective competition among financial service 
providers is a key component for a stable economy.  
Banks have not only suffered from huge losses during the financial crisis but are also 
confronted with the current low interest environment that squeezes their margin income and 
with structural changes such as increased online banking and growing pressure from non-bank 
financial institutions. Existing business models are put into question and the sector will have 
to restructure, for instance, its costly branch network. Finally, society's call for a fairer use of 
taxpayers' money, namely for a protection from bail-out requests by banks in distress, has 
been reflected in the legislative framework completing the Banking Union, notably in the new 
bail-in rules in the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD)
172
 which entered into 
force in January 2016.  
The insurance sector is also affected by the current low interest rate environment, in particular 
in the life insurance sector. Greater risk-taking by insurers on derivatives markets is one of the 
consequences that need to be monitored. As to non-life insurance, numerous legislative 
initiatives to remove regulatory barriers have unfortunately not resulted in increased cross-
border competition, and the markets remain fragmented along national barriers to the 
detriment of consumers. In contrast, the traditional way to coinsurance unconventional risks 
in wholesale insurance - such as ecological damage, natural catastrophes, terrorism, or nuclear 
risks - is evolving from non-competitive cooperation frameworks like insurer-driven pools 
towards more pro-competitive arrangements like customer-driven ad-hoc agreements and 
broker-led co-insurance. 
As regards capital markets, a substantial set of regulatory technical standards and 
implementing measures were adopted under MiFID II
173
 in 2016 that aim in particular at 
increasing transparency, strengthening the regulation of market infrastructures, and enhancing 
                                                            
171 Communication from the Commission, EU Guidelines for the application of State aid rules in relation to the 
rapid deployment of broadband networks, OJ C 25, 26.1.2013, p.1 available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2013:025:0001:0026:EN:PDF  
172 European Parliament and Council Directive 2014/59/EU of 15 May 2014 establishing a framework for the 
recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms and amending Council Directive 82/891/EEC, 
and Directives 2001/24/EC, 2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC, 2005/56/EC, 2007/36/EC, 2011/35/EU, 2012/30/EU and 
2013/36/EU, and Regulations (EU) No 1093/2010 and (EU) No 648/2012, of the European Parliament and of the 
Council Text with EEA relevance, OJ L 173, 12.6.2014 p. 190–348. 
173 European Parliament and Council Directive 2014/65/EU of 15 May 2014 Directive 2014/65/EU on markets in 
financial instruments and amending Directive 2002/92/EC and Directive 2011/61/EU Text with EEA relevance, 
OJ L 173, 12.6.2014, p. 349–496. 
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competition in capital markets. These measures underpin the Capital Markets Union initiative 
to create a stable, fair and competitive single market and generate sustainable growth for 
Europe. In addition to this regulatory work, enforcement through individual cases such as in 
the Deutsche Börse / LSE merger
174
 remains important to ensure that the objectives of 
regulation are not undermined through anti-competitive mergers or conduct.  
As in previous years, the Commission has remained very active in the financial services 
sector to promote effective and undistorted competition. It continued its role in merger control 
as well as in antitrust enforcement to combat anti-competitive behaviour. The primary aim of 
State aid control was the limitation of competition distortions and of the use of taxpayers' 
money when aided financial institutions were restructured or had to exit the market in an 
orderly way. 
Contribution of EU competition policy to tackling the challenges  
Contribution of EU competition policy to innovation and fairness in payments 
2016 was an important year for the European payments market, as the legislative "payment 
package" with new rules profoundly changing the way payment providers operate in the EU 
gradually being implemented.  
In June, the final part of the Interchange Fee Regulation
175
 was implemented, making payment 
costs more transparent to retailers and consumers and allowing them to make efficient 
choices. The Regulation will generate substantial savings for retailers and consumers, as it is 
expected to reduce hidden fees on card payments by EUR 6 billion annually. It will also make 
business practices fairer and more transparent and allow competition to be more effective
176
.  
2016 also saw extensive technical work on the Regulatory Technical Standards (RTSs) to be 
drafted by the European Banking Authority (EBA) under the revised Payment Services 
Directive (PSD II)
177
, including on the regulated access to the internet payments market by 
non-banks to the benefit of retailers and consumers
178
.  
In most Member States credit cards are the main means of internet payment. But card 
payments over the internet are cumbersome, expensive to merchants (with traditionally very 
                                                            
174 Case M.7995 Deutsche Börse / London Stock Exchange available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/index.cfm?fuseaction=dsp_result  
175 European Parliament and Council Regulation (EU) No 2015/751 of 29 April 2015 on interchange fees for 
card-based payment transactions, OJ L 123, 19.5.2015, p.1 available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.L_.2015.123.01.0001.01.ENG  
176 The Interchange Fee Regulation was preceded by extensive legal action by the Commission challenging the 
interchange fees applied by MasterCard and Visa, including in particular the prohibition of MasterCard's intra-
regional MIFs in 2007 and commitments from Visa Europe in 2010 and 2014 to reduce significantly all the MIFs 
it fixes in the EU. In September 2014 the Court of Justice endorsed the Commission's decision in the MasterCard 
case. For further information see case C-382/12 P MasterCard and Others v Commission, judgment of the Court 
of 11 September 2014, EU:C:2014:2201. 
177 European Parliament and Council Directive (EU) 2015/2366 of 25 November 2015 on payment services in 
the internal market, amending Directives 2002/65/EC, 2009/110/EC and 2013/36/EU and Regulation (EU) No 
1093/2010, and repealing Directive 2007/64/EC, OJ L 337, 23.12.2015, p. 35 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/finance/payments/framework/index_en.htm#151008 
178 The Directive was preceded by competition enforcement action against the European Payments Council 
(EPC), the coordination and decision-making body of the European banking industry for payments. For further 
information see memo for Commission decision of 13 June 2013 available at  
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-553_en.htm The Commission then proposed PSD II which 
provided a clear legal basis for such bank-independent players, who will become Payment Institutions and be 
regulated by financial supervisors. 
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high interchange fees for card transactions over the internet) and insecure with high levels of 
fraud
179
. Moreover, only 60 % of EU citizens possess such cards. The PSD II opens the 
market for (bank-owned and non-bank owned) regulated third-party players who offer 
alternative means of internet payments (e.g. through credit transfers via the consumer's bank's 
website, including most importantly the Single Euro Payment Area (SEPA) Credit Transfer 
system).  
The PSD II also enhances the security of internet payments in general. It will open the market 
to a whole range of other secure and efficient services building on the consumer's bank 
account, including account information services (allowing consumers to keep track on their 
mobile phone of their spending on different bank accounts) and payment instrument issuers 
(who are third parties who can issue cards and other payment instruments to consumers). 
Some of these services are already on the market and many more are expected after the 
transitional period elapses. 
The "payment package" opens the door for competition and innovation in the payments 
sector, to the benefit of consumers and merchants.  
Antitrust and cartel investigations in the financial services sector 
In 2016, the Commission continued its antitrust investigations in the financial sector, one of 
the Commission's priority areas to achieve a fairer and more integrated internal market.  
The investigation in the Credit Default Swaps (CDS) market came to an end on 20 July with 
the adoption of two commitment decisions addressed to the International Swaps and 
Derivatives Association (ISDA) and data provider IHS Markit
180
. The commitments will 
apply for ten years and address the concerns of coordination and entry barriers in the 
intransparent over-the-counter (OTC) credit derivatives market. They aim at stabilising 
derivatives markets and facilitating the emergence of more efficient and less costly forms of 
CDS trading on exchanges. The key obligation is to facilitate entry by licensing industry 
standard inputs for CDS exchange trading purposes.  
In 2016, the Commission continued its antitrust investigations into MasterCard's, Visa Inc.'s 
and Visa International's
181
 multilateral interchange fees ("MIFs") for transactions in the EEA 
made with cards issued outside the EEA ("inter-regional transactions"). Inter-regional MIFs 
are not capped by the Interchange Fee Regulation, but still represent a significant burden to 
European merchants. The Commission has also continued the investigation into MasterCard's 
rules with respect to cross-border acquiring, which allegedly have prevented merchants in 
countries with high prices for acquiring services to seek lower priced services from acquirers 
established in other Member States. In the MasterCard case following the Statement of 
Objections issued to MasterCard in July 2015
182
, an oral hearing was held in May 2016.  
                                                            
179 Estimated by the European Central Bank (ECB) to represent about two-thirds of total card fraud in the EU 
worth EUR 800 million in 2014. 
180 Case AT.39745 CDS - Information market, Commission decision of 20 July 2016 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/39745/39745_14237_7.pdf For further information see 
IP/16/2586 of 20 July 2016 available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-2586_en.htm  
181 These proceedings were closed as regards Visa Europe following its commitments, Case AT.39398 VISA MIF, 
Commission decision of 26 February 2014 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/39398/39398_9728_3.pdf 
182 Case AT.40049 MasterCard II. For further information see IP/15/5323 of 9 July 2015 available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-5323_en.htm 
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As technology allows new services to emerge, such as electronic and mobile payments, with 
huge potential benefits for consumers and businesses notably in the Digital Single Market, the 
Commission has monitored developments. It is important to ensure that new and innovative 
services have a fair chance to develop and that incumbents acting as 'gate keepers' do not 
exclude new market entrants or attempt to secure substantive parts of markets for themselves. 
Review of the Insurance Block Exemption Regulation  
In 2016 the Commission continued its Review of the operation of the Insurance Block 
Exemption Regulation
183
 (IBER). The objective of the Review was to verify whether this 
instrument is still the best approach to strike a balance between the need for effective 
protection of competition, prices and innovation and the needs of the insurance industry to 
continue cooperating by exchanging data and co-insuring and co-reinsuring risks. In March 
the Commission presented to the European Parliament and Council a Report
184
 accompanied 
by a Commission Staff Working Document
185
 evaluating the IBER since its adoption in 2010. 
The Commission's preliminary conclusion was that the strict conditions for the creation of an 
Insurance Block Exemption Regulation no longer seem to be met. In addition, complementary 
studies on issues identified during the Review were carried out, in particular: (1) the role of 
asset-switching in the production of insurance products
186
 and (2) the effects of the different 
forms of co(re)insurance available on the market
187
. The current IBER is in operation until 31 
March 2017 as foreseen in a sunset clause in this Regulation.  
Merger investigations in the financial sector 
The Commission continued to ensure that concentrations in the financial services sector do 
not lead to consumers paying higher prices or being offered less choice. In 2016, the 
consolidation trend in a number of financial services sectors continued, including in the 
payments area and the financial infrastructure space. While this consolidation may also be a 
sign of deeper integration between previously national markets dominated by an incumbent, 
the Commission remained vigilant that these developments do not come at the cost of the 
consumer. For example, it authorised the acquisition of Equens / Paysquare by Worldline
188
 
only after the parties submitted remedies, and has opened an in-depth investigation into the 
merger between Deutsche Börse and London Stock Exchange
189
. 
                                                            
183 Commission Regulation (EU) No 267/2010 of 24 March 2010 on the application of Article 101(3) of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to certain categories of agreements, decisions and concerted 
practices in the insurance sector, OJ L 83, 30.3.2010, p.1.  
184 Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the functioning of Commission 
Regulation (EU) No 267/2010 on the application of Article 101(3) of the Treaty on the functioning of the 
European Union to certain categories of agreements, decisions and concerted practices in the insurance sector, 
COM(2016) 153. 
185 Commission Staff Working Document SWD (2016)62 accompanying the document Report from the 
Commission to the European Parliament and the Council On the functioning of Commission Regulation (EU) 
No 267/2010 on the application of Article 101(3) of the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union to 
certain categories of agreements, decisions and concerted practices in the insurance sector, COM(2016) 153. 
186 For further information see http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/financial_services/KD0216917ENN.pdf 
187 For further information see http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/financial_services/KD0216918ENN.pdf 
188 Case M.7873 Worldline / Equens / Paysquare available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/index.cfm?fuseaction=dsp_result  
189 Case M.7995 Deutsche Börse / London Stock Exchange available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/index.cfm?fuseaction=dsp_result  
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State aid investigations in the financial sector 
Coping with the deep impact the financial and sovereign crisis had on European banks 
continued to be the focus of State aid control also in 2016. Although the crisis years seem to 
be over in some Member States and the overall improvement of the sector at aggregated level 
is obvious, State support is still sought by some banks in difficulty.  
In general, the banking sector is still in need of structural adjustments and investments in view 
of increasing competition from alternative suppliers regarding, for instance, payments. 
Moreover, historically low interest rates and overbanking put significant pressure on the 
profitability of the institutions. These factors, combined with higher regulatory capital 
requirements, question the viability of some business models. An additional aggravating 
element is the recent economic recession which translated into particularly high levels of non-
performing loans in the banking system of some Member States. As a consequence of all this, 
a non-negligible portion of the banks in the EU is structurally weak, burdened by legacy 
losses and incapable of generating sufficient income internally or of raising sufficient capital 
on the market to redress the situation.  
The EU State aid crisis rules, today primarily the Banking Communication of 2013
190
, which 
is in line with the current key building blocks of the Banking Union – the Single Supervisory 
Mechanism (SSM), Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) and the Single 
Resolution Mechanism (SRM) - allows State aid when absolutely necessary and ensures that 
distortions of competition are limited. That latter objective is achieved not only by requiring 
the restructuring of the aid beneficiaries and the repayment or adequate remuneration of the 
State support but also by requiring orderly market exits of banks that are not able to return to 
viability. The most distortive type of support, especially at a time when each and every bank 
has to carry out deep adjustments to ensure that it keeps a profitable business model, is the 
support which keeps artificially alive banks with business models that are not viable anymore 
in the new economic, technological and regulatory environment.  
In addition, to put an end to moral hazard and the unfair burdening of taxpayers when saving 
institutions that are failing or likely to fail, today's rules provide for bail-in tools that require a 
fair contribution from share and debt holders before any State support can kick in.  
This, however, also means that State aid for banks is still possible, both within and outside 
resolution, if it meets all the requirements listed above. As a consequence, State aid control 
will remain an indispensable and permanent component of the day to day operation of the 
Banking Union.  
Ensuring burden sharing of private shareholders and creditors is important to reduce the 
burden for taxpayers. However, there are repeated calls for a continuation of full State 
support, thereby trying to re-impose the entire burden on taxpayers. This also means that 
those banks taking wrong decisions do not have to face the consequences of their decisions 
with the losses being shifted to the taxpayer. In contrast, banks having taken the right and 
prudent decisions are not rewarded in full, as they continue to face artificially supported 
competitors that would have to exit the market under normal conditions of a functioning 
competition undistorted by State aid.  
                                                            
190 Communication from the Commission on the Application of State aid rules to support measures in favour of 
banks in the context of the financial crisis (Banking Communication), OJ C 216, 30.7.2013, p.1 available at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52013XC0730%2801%29&from=EN  
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So far no EU bank has been put into resolution, using the bail-in tool
191
.  
Member States chose to intervene in banks on terms that do not trigger resolution and thereby 
avoid bail-in, for instance by structuring interventions as no aid, as precautionary 
recapitalisation
192
 or under national insolvency regimes. A series of cases can be mentioned 
here, for instance a Hungarian bad bank purchasing Non Performing Loans (NPLs) at market 
price and an Italian scheme for State guarantee on senior debt instruments issued by vehicles 
purchasing NPLs where the guarantee was offered at a market conform fee. Both measures 
were approved as aid-free measures in 2016.  
Therefore, the current situation requires a key role for State aid control to play in close co-
operation with the new authorities created by the Banking Union in order to ensure and 
protect a level playing field within the Union market and equal treatment between Member 
States. In order not to undermine the very core of the Banking Union, this includes the setting 
of limits regarding the increasing creativity in finding solutions outside resolution.  
Early interventions of Deposit Guarantee Schemes outside their pay-out function may or may 
not constitute State aid depending on the individual design and structure of such a scheme. In 
any event, a Deposit Guarantee Scheme's support for an orderly market exit of a bank can be 
easily approved under State aid rules.  
 4. TAXATION AND STATE AID 
Overview of key challenges on tax evasion and avoidance and fiscal aid 
The focus the Commission has put on fighting tax evasion and tax avoidance echoes the 
priorities set by President Juncker in his Political Guidelines and which are also reflected in 
his Mission Letter to Commissioner Vestager. That is also in line with efforts at the 
international level, namely by the OECD, to tackle tax base erosion and profit shifting to 
better align the right to tax with economic activity
193
. State aid investigations into Member 
States' tax ruling practices, which began in 2013, before the Luxleaks revelations, are one of 
the tools the Commission has at its disposal to ensure that companies pay the taxes they owe 
in the Member States where they generate economic value. 
Tax evasion and avoidance can be the result of aggressive tax planning strategies, in so far as 
they shift profits to low or no-tax locations where there is little or no economic activity, 
resulting in little or no overall corporate tax being paid. Aggressive tax planning can be 
pursued by making use of preferential tax schemes, or by requesting individual tax rulings. 
They all have in common that they result in a loss of tax revenue in the Member State where 
economic value is generated but not taxed, and in Europe as a whole because the tax 
eventually paid is less than it would have been if the profits had not been shifted. 
                                                            
191 According to the BRRD the 8% bail-in rule is a contribution to loss absorption and recapitalisation equal to 
an amount not less than 8 % of total liabilities including own funds of the institution under resolution to be made 
by the shareholders and the holders of other instruments of ownership, the holders of relevant capital instruments 
and other eligible liabilities through write down, conversion or otherwise according to (see Articles 37 (10)(a) 
and 43 et seq. BRRD). 
192 Precautionary capitalisation is, according to Article 32(4)(d)(iii) BRRD, an exceptionally allowed public 
injection of own funds or purchase of capital instruments outside resolution of a precautionary and temporary 
nature that can be only granted to remedy a serious disturbance in a Member State and preserve financial 
stability when confined to a solvent institution without conferring an advantage upon the institution and is not 
used to offset losses the institution has incurred or is likely to incur in the near future and which is conditional on 
final approval under State aid rules. 
193 OECD (2013) Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, OECD Publishing, Paris. 
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The side effects of aggressive tax planning for the EU are particularly negative: first, it results 
in undue tax reliefs that distort competition by granting advantages only to selected 
companies; second, it involves an issue of social equity as the revenues foregone from 
untaxed multinationals need to be compensated, which normally shifts the burden to the less 
mobile income of SMEs and labour and third, from the perspective of the dislocation of 
activities, aggressive tax planning can present a threat to the sustainable growth of the internal 
market if some Member States were to offer exit points for European profits of multinationals 
in exchange for creating jobs on their territory and a limited tax payment. 
The Commission's State aid decision of 30 August, requiring Ireland to recover a selective tax 
advantage granted to Apple in Ireland of up to EUR 13 billion, was another step forward in 
the Commission´s overall strategy to ensure fair taxation
194
.  
Both collecting taxes and combating tax avoidance and evasion are normally competences of 
the Member States. However, even in this area where the Member States enjoy fiscal 
autonomy, any national tax measures adopted have to comply with internal market rules and, 
amongst others, abide by competition law
195
. 
Contribution of EU competition policy to tackling the challenges 
State aid investigations and decisions concerning aggressive tax planning 
Since 2013, the Commission has been looking into tax planning practices via its dedicated 
Task Force, which was turned into a regular administrative unit in 2016. 
Throughout 2014-2016, the Commission has continued to gather information on tax planning 
practices, enquiring into the tax rulings practice and possible fiscal aid schemes of all 
Member States. The enquiry is aimed at clarifying allegations that tax rulings may constitute 
State aid and to allow the Commission to take an informed view of the practices of all 
Member States. Overall the Commission has looked into more than 1 000 rulings. 
Specific cases 
Belgian excess profit system 
On 11 January, the Commission adopted a negative decision with recovery
196
, concluding that 
selective tax advantages granted by Belgium under its "excess profit" tax scheme are illegal 
under EU State aid rules. The scheme has benefited at least 35 multinationals mainly from the 
                                                            
194 President Juncker stressed in his State of the Union speech of 14 September 2016 that the decision shows that 
"every company, big or small, has to pay its taxes where it makes its profits. This goes for giants like Apple too, 
even if their market value is higher than the GDP of 165 countries in the world. In Europe we do not accept 
powerful companies getting illegal backroom deals on their taxes" available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/priorities/state-union-2016_en  
195 The Commission work in the area of tax rulings was closely followed by the European Parliament's Special 
Committee on Tax Rulings and Measures Similar in Nature or Effect (TAXE). On 25 November 2016, European 
Parliament adopted a Report on tax rulings and other measures similar in nature or effect prepared by the TAXE 
Committee, which viewed positively the contribution of State aid control to tax fairness in Europe. In fact, it 
"strongly welcomes and supports the key role of the Commission as the competent competition authority in the 
ongoing State aid inquiries dealing with tax rulings" (para. 130). On 25 November 2016, the Committee issued a 
report which broadly endorsed the Commissions approach on State aid available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P8-TA-2015-
0408+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN  
196 For further information see IP/16/42 of 11 January 2016 available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-
16-42_en.htm 
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EU, who must now return unpaid taxes to Belgium. The scheme provides certain Belgian 
entities that are part of a multinational group with a reduction of their tax base. The tax base 
reduction concerns a part of an entity's actually recorded profit which exceeds the alleged 
hypothetical average profit of a stand-alone entity (i.e. not part of a group) deemed to be 
comparable. Belgium deems that part of the profit "excess profit". This unilateral downward 
adjustment of the tax base, is claimed to be granted to prevent double taxation, but it applies 
irrespective of any risk of double taxation. The benefits of the scheme are available subject to 
an advance ruling issued by a Special Ruling Commission.  
Ireland – the Apple decision 
On 30 August, the Commission decided to require Ireland to recover a selective tax advantage granted to Apple by 
way of two tax rulings197. 
The tax rulings endorsed a method to allocate profits within two Apple companies incorporated in Ireland: Apple 
Sales International (ASI) and Apple Operations Europe (AOE). The profits were allocated between the Irish 
branches of ASI and AOE and their "head offices" (that existed only on paper). These head offices were not tax 
resident in any country, had no employees or premises and did not engage in any real activities. The profits 
allocated to the respective head offices were not subject to tax because the head offices were not tax resident in any 
tax jurisdiction. According to the Irish tax rulings given to Apple, virtually all profits of ASI and AOE were 
recorded in Ireland and attributed to these untaxed head offices, rather than to the branches, tax resident in Ireland. 
The Commission found that the profit allocation as approved in the rulings had no factual or economic justification 
as the head offices of both companies had no operational capacity to handle or manage any substantive business of 
the company. Only the branches of ASI and AOE had the capacity to generate any income from trading. Therefore, 
the Commission found that the sales profits of both companies should have been attributed to the branches and 
taxed in Ireland. 
This "incorrect allocation" of the profits, leading to a very low tax base for both Irish companies, ASI and AOE, 
gave Apple a selective advantage over other businesses that are subject to taxation in Ireland. The Commission 
estimated that this unfair tax advantage amounts to up to EUR 13 billion since 2003, which Ireland will have to 
recover from Apple. Both Ireland and Apple has appealed the decision.  
Luxembourg - Engie  
On 19 September, the Commission opened an in-depth investigation into Luxembourg's tax 
treatment of Engie (formerly known as GDF Suez)
198
. The Commission is assessing whether 
the tax authorities have selectively derogated from provisions of national tax law in tax rulings 
issued to GDF Suez. In particular, they appear to misapply certain provisions of their national 
law in several rulings which endorse the treatment of the same financial transaction between 
companies of GDF Suez (two zero-interest convertible loans) in an inconsistent way. The 
borrowers of the convertible loans are allowed to significantly reduce their taxable profits in 
Luxembourg by deducting the (provisioned) interest payments of the convertible loan as 
expenses. At the same time, the lenders avoid paying any tax on the profits the convertible loans 
generate for them, because the ruling considers the income as equity-like remuneration which is 
not subject to taxation. The final result seems to be that a significant proportion of the profits 
recorded by GDF Suez in Luxembourg through the two arrangements are not taxed at all. The 
Commission considers at this stage that the treatment endorsed in the tax rulings resulted in tax 
benefits in favour of GDF Suez, which are not available to other companies subject to the same 
national taxation rules in Luxembourg.  
                                                            
197 For further information see IP/16/2923 of 30 August 2016 available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-16-2923_en.htm  
198 For further information see IP/16/3085 of 19 September 2016 available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-16-3085_en.htm  
 58 
Fight against discriminatory tax schemes and measures sheltering national companies from 
EU competition  
Beyond the cases involving tax rulings, the Commission remains vigilant to ensure that Member 
States do not use fiscal tools to unduly favour certain companies/sectors and shelter national 
companies from EU competition. 
In 2014, Hungary introduced (1) a tax on the turnover derived from the publication of 
advertisements in the media (advertisement tax); (2) a tax on the annual turnover derived from 
the production and trade of tobacco products; and (3) amended an existing tax on the annual 
turnover of food chain operators, introducing a multiple progressive rate structure for retail 
stores selling items of daily consumer goods. These three turnover tax measures had progressive 
rates depending on annual turnover, and placed companies with low turnover in an advantaged 
position compared to others.  
In July and November, the Commission adopted final negative decisions in respect of the 
Hungarian turnover tax measures considering that the progressivity of the tax rates granted a 
selective advantage to undertakings with low turnover (mainly national) and constituted State 
aid, which was not compatible with the internal market
199
. Furthermore, in September the 
Commission opened a formal investigation procedure in respect of a Polish retail tax featuring a 
progressive rate structure similar to the Hungarian taxes
200
.  
With regard to the investigation into fiscal aid to EU ports, in January 2016 the Commission 
adopted a negative decision as regards the corporate tax exemption for Dutch public 
seaports
201
. Furthermore, in July 2016, the Commission opened the formal investigation 
procedure as regards the corporate tax exemptions for ports in Belgium
202
 and France
203
. 
Commission's action is consistent with the need to ensure that all companies pay their fair 
share of taxes and that no sector or company of a certain type is excluded from corporate 
taxation. The Commission does not prevent Member States from providing aid to their ports, 
for instance when this is necessary to develop port infrastructure. However, corporate tax 
exemptions are neither transparent, nor limited or targeted at financing activities which are 
objectively justified in the public interest. The exemptions grant operating aid, which is the 
most distortive type of aid. 
 5. BASIC INDUSTRIES AND MANUFACTURING 
Overview of key challenges in the sector 
Basic industries and manufacturing are key to the European economy. In 2016 the Commission 
spent significant resources on competition policy actions in these sectors, which range widely 
                                                            
199 Cases SA.39235 Hungarian advertisement tax, Commission decision of 4 November 2016 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_39235; SA.40018 Amendment to 
the Hungarian food chain inspection fee, Commission decision of 4 July 2016 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_40018 and SA.41187 
Hungarian health contribution of tobacco industry businesses, Commission decision of 4 July 2016 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/index.cfm?fuseaction=dsp_result  
200 Case SA.44361 Polish tax on retail sector with progressive rates, Commission decision of 19 September 
2016 available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_44351  
201 Case SA.25398 Corporate tax exemption of Dutch public enterprises, Commission decision of 21 January 
2016 available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_25338  
202 Case SA.38393 Ports taxation in Belgium, Commission decision of 8 July 2016 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_38393  
203 Case SA.38398 Ports taxation in France, Commission decision of 8 July 2016 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_38398  
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from consumer products such as toys and musical instruments, to intermediary products such as 
engine parts, lubricants, and solar panels, to industry inputs such as chemicals and outputs such 
as plastics. To ensure an economy and a society where manufacturers, distributors and 
consumers alike reap a fair share of the benefits of a modern specialised economy, the entire 
value chain of such products is subject to scrutiny under EU competition rules. Where unfair 
restrictions on the manufacturing or the distribution of these products to certain customers or in 
certain areas within the EU lead to a reduction in efficiency and to an unfair accrual of the 
benefits to one particular part of the value chain, to the detriment of consumers in particular, the 
role of the Commission is to remove these unfair restrictions to the benefit of all.  
Contribution of EU competition policy to tackling the challenges 
Healthy and vigorous competition is of fundamental importance to a fair EU economy and 
society. Anti-competitive practices stifle innovation, introduce rigidities, push prices up, and 
reduce the competitiveness of EU companies and the real income of EU consumers. The 
Commission must therefore be vigilant to ensure that the fairness of business dealings in 
Europe is not jeopardised by such practices.  
Antitrust investigations in basic industries 
Basic manufacturing and consumer goods industries continue to represent a significant share 
of the Commission's enforcement practice. In 2016, the Commission continued its lines of 
action (including individual case work, market surveillance and advocacy) in these sectors. 
The EU's high value-added manufacturing industry requires access to basic materials at 
affordable prices that reflect international cost conditions. In 2016, the Commission actively 
monitored the markets for these inputs to ensure there is adequate access in a healthy and 
competitive environment.  
Cartel investigations in basic industries 
Breaking cartels remains a priority for the Commission, in particular when they affect 
important consumer goods, such as cars. The collusion in the Alternators and Starters 
settlement case
204  affected component costs for a number of car manufacturers selling cars in 
Europe, and ultimately European consumers buying them.  
The Alternators and Starters case 
The Alternators and Starters settlement case is the fifth cartel case in the automotive sector which brings the total 
amount of fines imposed in cartel cases in the automotive sector to EUR 1.42 billion. 
An alternator is a device which converts mechanical energy to electrical energy and a starter is a motor that starts 
the engine of the car. The cartel was operated by three Japanese automotive suppliers: Denso, Hitachi and 
Mitsubishi Electric. However, Hitachi had a limited participation to the cartel, only with respect to the supply of 
alternators and starters to two out of the 12 groups of car manufacturers.  
The cartel participants fixed prices, allocated customers and exchanged commercially sensitive information. 
Their aim was to avoid a decline in prices and to maintain their market shares within the EEA. Their main 
operating principle was the incumbency principle. 
The cartel lasted for five years and five months from 14 September 2004 until 23 February 2010 and covered the 
supplies of alternators and starters to 12 groups of major car manufacturers across the EEA. 
The Commission's investigation in this case started with an immunity application in 2011. The decision was 
adopted under the settlement procedure concerning all three parties. Denso received full immunity under the 
Commission's Leniency Notice for revealing the existence of the cartel, while the two other undertakings 
                                                            
204 Case AT.40028 Alternators and Starters, Commission decision of 27 January 2016 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=1_40028  
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received fines reductions as leniency applicants. The Commission imposed fines of EUR 137.8 million on the 
three automotive suppliers. 
Merger investigations in basic industries 
Over the past year, there have been several merger investigations in the basic industries and 
manufacturing sectors. The Commission intervened in a number of cases in order to avoid a 
significant loss of competition to the detriment of customers.  
In particular, the Commission investigated further consolidation in the cement sector, after a 
number of transactions which had taken place in the previous years. On 26 May, the 
Commission cleared the acquisition of the Italian building materials group Italcementi by 
German-based HeidelbergCement, subject to the divestment of Italcementi's integrated 
building materials business in Belgium
205
. The Commission also opened an in-depth 
investigation into the joint acquisition of the Croatian assets of Cemex by cement 
manufacturers HeidelbergCement and Schwenk
206
.  
In 2016 the Commission also closed its in-depth investigation into the acquisition of office 
supplies company Office Depot by its rival Staples, both based in the United States. The 
Commission approved the transaction subject to the divestiture of the entire European 
contract distribution business of Office Depot, as well as Office Depot's whole business 
operations in Sweden. The two companies, however, abandoned the transaction after an 
adverse ruling by a US Court on the acquisition
207
.  
The Commission also carried out an in-depth investigation into the acquisition of French train 
equipment supplier Faiveley Transport by its US rival Wabtec. The transaction was cleared on 
4 October 2016 subject to the divestment of the entirety of Faiveley Transport's activities in 
sintered friction materials
208
.  
2016 saw also the acquisition by the number one global brewer AB InBev of its largest global 
competitor SAB Miller. After a preliminary investigation, the Commission found a risk that 
the transaction may have led to higher prices in a number of Member states, and may have 
facilitated tacit price coordination among brewers in the EEA. The acquisition was thus 
approved subject to the divestiture of the whole of SAB Miller's business in a number of 
Member States (France, Italy, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia)
209
.  
As regards further interventions in basic industries and manufacturing without an in-depth 
investigation, the Commission approved the acquisition of the crane and container handling 
business of the United States based Terex by the Finnish lifting equipment supplier 
Konecranes subject to the divestiture of the entire global business for hoists, cranes and 
handling materials Stahl, currently owned by Konecranes, including a production facility 
                                                            
205 Case M.7744 HeidelbergCement / Italcementi. For further information see IP/16/1929 of 26 May 2016 
available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-1929_en.htm  
206 Case M.7878 HeidelbergCement / Schwenk / Cemex Hungary / Cemex Croatia. For further information see 
IP/16/3362 of 10 October 2016 available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-3362_en.htm  
207 Case M.7555 Staples / Office Depot. For further information see IP/16/278 of 10 February 2016 available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-278_en.htm  
208 Case M.7801 Wabtec / Faiveley Transport. For further information see IP/16/3305 of 4 October 2016 
available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-3305_en.htm  
209 Case M.7881 AB InBev / SAB Miller. For further information see IP/16/1900 of 24 May 2016 available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-1900_en.htm  
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based in Germany
210
. Remedies were also required by the Commission for the clearance of 
the acquisition of German laser supplier Rofin-Sinar by US rival Coherent, subject to the 
divestment of Rofin-Sinar's UK based business for the manufacturing of low power CO2 
lasers
211
, and for the clearance of the acquisition of alumina companies Alteo ARC and Alufin 
by French multinational company Imerys, subject to the divestiture of the entire white fused 
alumina business of Alteo
212
.  
State aid investigations in basic industries 
On 20 January, the Commission adopted a decision
213 
finding that a EUR 211 million funding 
granted by the Walloon authorities in Belgium to several steel companies within the Duferco 
group between 2006 and 2011 distorted competition in breach of EU State aid rules. In its 
decision, the Commission concluded that no private investor would have accepted to invest on 
the same terms.  
Further, on 20 January, the European Commission opened an in-depth investigation
214 
to 
assess whether Italian State support for the steel producer Ilva granted in 2014 and 2015 is in 
line with the EU State aid rules. These measures amount to EUR 806 million of publicly 
supported finance already disbursed to support Ilva. In May, the Commission extended the 
proceedings to an additional EUR 300 million State loan
215
. 
The Commission's State aid investigations in the steel sector have to be considered against the 
background that steelmakers across the EU are struggling with overcapacity. State 
interventions should therefore be market driven to avoid a harmful subsidy race between 
Member States, which would increase overcapacity and jeopardise the efforts already made 
by EU steelmakers to remain competitive.  
On 19 July, the Commission opened an in-depth investigation to determine whether the 
French State's contribution to the financing of the Areva group's restructuring gave the 
company a selective advantage not available to its competitors
216
. This investigation was 
concluded with two positive decisions, both adopted on 10 January 2017
217
. Areva is active in 
a range of activities in the nuclear fuel cycle and it is majority-owned by the French State. A 
                                                            
210 Case M.7792 Konecranes / Terex MHPS. For further information see IP/16/2763 of 8 August 2016 available 
at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-2763_en.htm  
211 Case M.8055 Coherent / Rofin-Sinar Technologies. For further information see IP/16/3548 of 26 October 
2016 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-3548_en.htm  
212 Case M.8130 Imerys / Alteo Certain Assets. For further information see IP/16/3572 of 28 October 2016 
available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-3572_en.htm  
213 Cases SA.33926 Interventions de la région wallonne en faveur de Duferco, Commission decision of 20 
January 2016 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_33926, decision under appeal 
and T-254/16 Steel Invest & Finance (Luxembourg) v Commission, OJ C 251, 11.07.2016. 
214 Case SA.38613 Alleged Aid for Ilva in A.S., Commission decision of 20 January 2016, OJ C 142, 22.04.2016 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_38613 
215 Case SA.38613 Alleged Aid for Ilva in A.S., Commission decision of 13 May 2016, OJ C 241, 01.07.2016 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_38613 
216 Case SA.44727 Restructuring aid to Areva, Commission decision of 19 July 2016, OJ C 301, 19.08.2016 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_44727 
217 Cases SA.44727 Restructuring aid to Areva, Commission decisions of 10 January 2017 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_44727 (in the form of a capital 
injection of EUR 4.5 billion by the French State) and SA.46077 Aide au sauvetage en faveur du Groupe Areva, 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_46077 on the rescue 
aid to Areva (regarding a EUR 3.3 billion loan from the French State to two entities in the Areva Group, later 
converted into a capital injection, which is the subject of the restructuring aid decision).  
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significant part of the investigation was to verify whether the long-term viability of Areva is 
ensured to avoid injections of public funds in the future.  
On 26 January, the European Commission has opened an in-depth investigation into whether 
public measures in favour of the Spanish mining company Iberpotash gave it a selective 
advantage over its competitors
218
. Iberpotash owns and operates several potash mines in the 
Catalonia region of Spain. The investigation focuses on the legality of financial State 
guarantees related to environmental protection legislation and to the financing of 
environmental protection measures. 
On 8 April 2016 the Commission opened an in-depth investigation into State support for the 
insolvent Romanian petrochemical company Oltchim
219
. The company, which is controlled by 
the Romanian State, is in a process of reorganisation, with the aim of paying existing debts 
from the proceeds of its privatisation. The main question is whether by accepting debt 
waivers, Oltchim's public creditors granted incompatible State aid. 
The Commission is continuing its investigation into possible restructuring aid to the Greek 
railway company TRAINOSE
220
 and the cancellation of debts incurred prior to Bulgaria's 
accession to the EU by the Bulgarian rail incumbent BDZ
221
.  
 6. AGRI-FOOD INDUSTRY 
Overview of key challenges in the agricultural sector  
The European food sector is facing important challenges at the different levels of the food 
supply chain.  
Specific characteristics of the agricultural sector 
EU farmers face challenges due to the characteristics of the agricultural sector. Unforeseeable 
natural elements (such as adverse weather conditions and diseases) can significantly alter 
production, resulting in volatility of prices and revenues. Farmers also face increased 
demands in terms of quality, variety and traceability by end consumers. In addition, 
agricultural producers form the least concentrated level in the food supply chain. The most 
common situation across sectors and Member States is that agricultural producers remain 
atomised or grouped into small cooperatives and other producer organisations. In contrast, 
their input suppliers and customers (processors, wholesalers and retailers) are often much 
larger and more concentrated. Agricultural producers therefore typically have very little 
bargaining power in their negotiations vis-à-vis large suppliers and buyers. Integration of 
producers in large organisations can improve the management of these challenges 
significantly where these organisations aggregate supply (both in terms of volumes and 
variety of products), offer supporting services and add value through processing. Such 
                                                            
218 Case SA.35818 Iberpotash, Commission decision of 26 January 2016, OJ C 14, 22.04.2016 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_35818 
219 Case SA.36086 Potential aid to Oltchim, Commission decision of 8 April 2016, OJ C 284, 05.08.2016 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_36086 
220 Case SA.32544 Restructuring of the Greek Railway Group – TRAINOSE S.A., Commission decision of 13 
July 2011, OJ C 272, 15.09.2011 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_32544 
221 Case SA.31250 Restructuring aid to BDZ, Commission decision of 9 November 2011, OJ C 10, 12.01.2012 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_31250 
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integration can provide more stability, scale to reach more customers, flexibility, more value 
and more bargaining power. 
Contribution of EU competition policy to tackling the challenges 
Making agricultural markets more competitive 
In order to increase the competitiveness of the EU agricultural sector and to strengthen the 
bargaining power of smaller agricultural producers, the 2013 Common Agricultural Policy 
(CAP) Reform, maintained the application of competition law to agriculture and set out new 
derogations to antitrust rules for certain agricultural sectors (olive oil, beef and veal, and 
arable crops (cereals, oilseeds, etc.))
222
. The new rules aim at creating more efficiencies in the 
EU agricultural sector by promoting and stimulating more integration through joint selling by 
producer organisations provided that the amounts sold remain at moderate levels in the 
relevant market (15% or 20%) or other joint activities such as joint storage or distribution. To 
ensure a coherent application of the new derogations and in order to help farmers to apply 
such derogations and provide guidance on how to obtain efficiencies in joint activities, the 
Commission adopted Guidelines in November 2015
223
.  
Milk Package 
The Commission has prepared a report on the functioning and implementation of the Milk 
Package. There is evidence that the package has improved the position of farmers in the chain 
to some extent, including through various collective actions of producers going beyond the 
milk package. The survey ordered by the Commission for the purpose of drafting the report 
shows notably that producer organisations in the sector do much more than negotiating prices 
and deliveries. Most producer organisations provide one or more services that add value to the 
supply of milk and/or support producers' activities, such as milk collection, quality control, 
technical support, and joint procurement of inputs.  
Agricultural Markets Task Force 
The Agricultural Markets Task Force (AMTF), a task force of experts set up by the 
Commissioner for Agriculture and Rural Development, delivered its report on 15 November. 
The report contains recommendations on various issues, including competition rules. The 
AMTF suggests that the rules of collective organisation and competition law should be clear 
and workable, in order to enhance genuinely the opportunities for farmers to cooperate. The 
Commission will analyse the recommendations and assess any impact that they may have. 
Report on the application of competition rules 
The Commission is mandated by the Common Market Organisation Regulation (CMO 
Regulation
224
)
 
to report to the legislator on the implementation of competition rules in the 
                                                            
222 European Parliament and Council Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 of 17 December 2013 establishing a 
common organisation of the markets in agricultural products (CMO Regulation) and repealing Council 
Regulations (EEC) No 922/72, (EEC) No 234/79, (EC) No 1037/2001 and (EC) No 1234/2007 available at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/ALL/?uri=CELEX:32013R1308  
223 Commission notice Guidelines on the application of the specific rules set out in Articles 169, 170 and 171 of 
the CMO Regulation for the olive oil, beef and veal and arable crops sectors, OJ C 431, 22.12.2015, p. 1. 
224 European Parliament and Council Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 of 17 December 2013 establishing a 
common organisation of the markets in agricultural products (CMO Regulation) and repealing Council 
Regulations (EEC) No 922/72, (EEC) No 234/79, (EC) No 1037/2001 and (EC) No 1234/2007 available at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/ALL/?uri=CELEX:32013R1308 
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agricultural sector in all Member States, in particular, the new specific competition rules 
regarding joint selling by producers in the agricultural sector of olive oil, beef and veal and 
arable crops. In addition, the European Parliament called for a review of competition rules in 
the sector in its opinion on the Annual Competition Report of 2015. It asked the Commission 
to draft a report on the application of competition rules to the agricultural sector in all 
Member States. This report shall be finalised and presented to the European Parliament and 
the Council by the end of 2017 as required by the CMO Regulation
225
.  
Olive sector in Spain 
The Spanish olive oil sector has presented an initiative pursuant to Article 209 of the CMO 
Regulation to stabilise market prices and provide consumers with food at reasonable prices 
through the use of joint facilities for storage. The general derogation contained in this article 
does not provide a basis for a prior authorisation or opinion by any authority. The 
Commission has been working together with the sector and the National Competition 
Authority to examine if this initiative can comply with the conditions of the derogation. 
Preventing market segmentation and parallel trade restrictions by food manufacturers  
On 29 June, the Commission opened formal investigations into practices of AB InBev 
restricting imports of its beer from less expensive Member States, such as the Netherlands and 
France, to the more expensive Belgian market. AB InBev practices may result in a violation 
of Article 102 TFEU
226
. The Commission is investigating, in particular, practices of changing 
the packaging of products to make it more difficult to sell them in other Member States and of 
limiting retailers' access to certain forms of promotion or key products to prevent them from 
importing less expensive products into Belgium.  
Investigating the practices of modern retailers 
In October 2014 the Commission published its study, The Economic Impact of Modern Retail 
on Choice and Innovation in the EU Food Sector (the Study).  
An important part of the follow-up to the Study has been an investigation into the role of 
private labels, given that the Study suggested that private labels may have a strong negative 
relationship with innovation in a given category at the shop level. During 2016, the 
Commission worked with the Consortium who produced the Study to extract some further 
data on private labels and innovation. The Commission used this data to conduct some 
additional analysis into the nature of private labels and published the results at the end of 
2016
227
. Based on the evidence available, it appears that the role and nature of private labels is 
likely to vary depending on specific markets and consumer tastes. It cannot be ruled out that 
in some particular market situations, retailers' practices involving their private labels may 
diminish brands' incentives and ability to innovate but the likelihood of infringements of 
competition rules is low at this stage. 
There are also complaints that increased retailer concentration has led to fewer innovative 
products. The results of the Study did not support those claims. National Competition 
Authorities (in France, Germany, Italy, Norway and Spain) have investigated some national 
buying alliances in the last two years. In Italy and Norway, they ordered the dissolution of 
                                                            
225 Article 225 of the CMO Regulation, see footnote above.  
226 For further information see IP/16/2361 of 30 June 2016 available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-
16-2361_en.htm  
227 For further information see http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/agriculture/overview_en.html  
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two buying alliances because the alliances would severely weaken competition. In France in 
2016, one alliance gave up part of its project following an investigation by the authority under 
merger rules. The Commission is in close contact with the National Competition Authorities 
to follow up on these national initiatives.  
Merger investigations in the agri-food industry  
The year 2016 confirmed the trend of consolidation in the agrochemical industry, which had 
been signalled in 2015 with the failed offer of global seed leader Monsanto to acquire the 
global crop protection leader Syngenta and with the announced merger between the United 
States based Dow and DuPont, both active in seeds and crop protection. In 2016, ChemChina, 
which controls Adama, the largest generic crop protection company, announced plans to 
acquire Syngenta, while Bayer, a German multinational chemical, pharmaceutical and life 
science company, announced an agreement to acquire Monsanto.  
In 2016, the Commission opened in-depth investigations in both the ChemChina / Syngenta 
case
228
 and the Dow / DuPont case
229
. In the latter, in addition to investigating concerns in 
crop protection markets, the Commission also announced an investigation into preliminary 
concerns that the merger may lead to a reduction of innovation in crop protection as a whole.  
At the end of 2016, the Commission cleared the acquisition of WhiteWave, a US 
manufacturer of packaged foods and beverages, by the French Danone group. The overlaps 
concerned mainly plant-based and dairy based yoghurts but also plant-based growing-up milk. 
The Commission's concerns were limited however, so that the transaction could be cleared 
subject only to the divestment of a large part of Danone's growing-up milk business in 
Belgium
230
.  
 7. PHARMACEUTICAL AND HEALTH SERVICES SECTOR  
Overview of key challenges in the sector  
The ongoing key challenge in the pharmaceutical and health care services sector remains the 
balance between, on the one hand, rewarding companies for successful R&D investment 
activities, and, on the other, enabling a competitive environment which promotes access to 
less expensive quality medicines and services
231
. This challenge is further complicated by the 
high degree of regulation at Member State level which leads to significant national variations 
of medicine pricing and wholesale and pharmacy margins. 
On 17 June, the Council of the European Union published conclusions on strengthening the 
balance in the pharmaceutical systems in the EU and its Member States. In particular, it 
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invited Member States to cooperate voluntarily, for example, on exchange of information with 
respect to pricing and reimbursement and it invited the Commission to "continue and where 
possible intensify, including through a report on recent competition cases following the 
pharma sector inquiry of 2008/ 2009, the merger enforcement pursuant to the EC Merger 
Regulation (Regulation 139/2004) and the monitoring, methods development and 
investigation - in cooperation with national competition authorities in the European 
Competition Network (ECN) - of potential cases of market abuse, excessive pricing as well as 
other market restrictions specifically relevant to the pharmaceutical companies operating 
within the EU, such in accordance with Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on Functioning of 
the European Union"
232
.  
The initiative is in line with the Commission's enforcement policy in this sector which has 
contributed and will continue to promote innovation, R&D and growth while providing access 
to cheaper medicines for European citizens.  
Contribution of EU competition policy to tackling the challenges 
In 2016, the Commission welcomed the General Court judgment
233
 upholding its Lundbeck
234
 
decision in the first pharma pay-for-delay case. The Commission's decision found that the 
Danish pharmaceutical company Lundbeck and four generics competitors had concluded 
agreements that harmed patients and health care systems. This allowed Lundbeck to keep the 
price of its blockbuster drug citalopram artificially high, in breach of Article 101 TFEU. The 
decision imposed a fine of EUR 93.8 million on Lundbeck and fines totalling EUR 52.2 
million on the four generics competitors Generics UK, Arrow, Alpharma and Ranbaxy.  
In particular, before the agreements were concluded, Lundbeck's basic patent for the 
blockbuster antidepressant medicine citalopram had expired. Lundbeck still held a number of 
process patents that provided limited protection. Generics producers were preparing for 
market entry with much cheaper generic versions of citalopram. Lundbeck paid the generics 
competitors for their promise to stay out of the citalopram market. As a result, Lundbeck was 
certain to avoid competition from the four companies for the entire duration of the 
agreements. Lundbeck and generics companies appealed the decision to the General Court 
which upheld the Commission's decision.  
In addition, the Commission published a second provisional non-confidential version of the 
Servier decision
235
 which is subject to confidentiality claims before the Hearing Officer.  
In its pay-for-delay investigation in relation to the market entry of generic modafinil (sleeping 
disorder medicine), the Commission's preliminary view is that Cephalon induced Teva to 
abandon its efforts to enter markets worldwide independently with cheaper generic versions 
                                                            
232 Conclusions of the Council of the European Union published on strengthening the balance in the 
pharmaceutical systems in the EU and its Member States available at 
http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-10315-2016-INIT/en/pdf  
233 Cases T-472/13 H. Lundbeck A/S and Lundbeck Ltd v Commission, EU:T:2016:449; T-460/13 Sun 
Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd, formerly Ranbaxy Laboratories Ltd and Ranbaxy (United Kingdom) Ltd v 
Commission, EU:T:2016:453; T-467/13 Arrow Group ApS and Arrow Generics Ltd v Commission, 
EU:T:2016:450; T-469/13 Generics (United Kingdom) Ltd v Commission, EU:T:2016:454; T-470/13 Merck 
KGaA v Commission, EU:T:2016:452 and T-471/13 Xellia Pharmaceuticals ApS and Alpharma, LLC, formerly 
Zoetis Products LLC v Commission, EU:T:2016:460.  
234 Case AT.39226 Lundbeck, Commission decision of 19 June 2013 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/39226/39226_8310_11.pdf  
235 Case AT.39612 Perindopril (Servier), Commission decision of 9 July 2014 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/39612/39612_12422_3.pdf  
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of modafinil and kept the prices for modafinil artificially high during several years. If 
established, such behaviour to agree to deliberately delay the entry of a cheaper generic 
medicine would have caused substantial harm to health systems and patients and breached 
Article 101 TFEU
236
.  
Finally, the Commission continued monitoring patent settlements between originator and 
generic companies. The seventh report published on 13 December, confirmed the continued 
use of settlement agreements which reached 125 in total in 2015, the year covered by the 
seventh monitoring exercise. The portion of B.II settlements (i.e. those containing a limitation 
on generic entry and a value transfer from the originator to the generic company) remained 
low, constituting 10% of all settlements concluded in 2015
237
.  
Recent enforcement trends 
Merger review in the pharmaceutical sector  
The consolidation in the pharmaceutical sector continued in 2016. The main transactions 
concerned the acquisition by Teva of Allergan's generics business
238
, acquisition by Mylan of 
Meda
239
, as well as the asset swap between Boehringer Ingelheim and Sanofi
240
. The 
Commission continued to ensure that consolidation of the industry does not lead to market 
distortions and cleared the cases subject to certain conditions. 
Country-wide concerns in the generics industry 
In view of the unprecedented scale of the Teva / Allergan Generics merger, the Commission had to address novel 
competition issues in the generics pharmaceutical sector. In addition to the traditional product-by-product 
assessment, the Commission considered that the impact of the transaction ought to be assessed also from the 
angle of generics products portfolio competition. The Commission found concerns at country level in the United 
Kingdom, Ireland and Iceland where Teva and Allergan were the two largest generics manufacturers closely 
competing with their portfolio of generics. As a result the commitments included the majority of Allergan 
Generics marketed generics activities and generics activities in development pipeline in Ireland and the United 
Kingdom, covering all the main steps in the manufacture, supply and distribution of these products and a 
manufacturing plant in the United Kingdom. 
Viability and feasibility of a remedy  
The case Boehringer Ingelheim/Sanofi's animal health business (Merial) raised an issue of 
viability and feasibility of a remedy consisting in a production technology transfer for a 
number of animal health vaccines. Production transfer of vaccines poses important challenges 
as to the reproducibility of manufacturing processes in a different environment and in a timely 
manner while complying with strict regulatory requirements. In this case, a remedy evolving 
around the vaccine production technology transfer was ultimately approved following a very 
detailed analysis of production processes and subject to the identification of a buyer having 
suitable facilities and expertise in the relevant production processes. In the decision, the 
Commission approved Ceva Santé Animale (Ceva) as the purchaser of the Divestment 
Businesses. 
                                                            
236 Case AT.39686 Cephalon. For further information see IP/11/511 of 28 April 2011 available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-11-511_en.htm  
237 For further information see http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/pharmaceuticals/inquiry/  
238 Case M.7746 Teva / Allergan Generic. For further information see IP/2016/727 of 10 March 2016 available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-727_en.htm 
239 Case M.7975 Mylan / Meda. For further information see IP/16/2956 of 20 July 2016 available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-2596_en.htm  
240 Case M.7917 Boehringer Ingelheim / Sanofi animal health business. For further information see IP/16/3641 
of 9 November 2016 available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-3641_en.htm  
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Continued merger enforcement practise focused on innovation 
In continuation of its focus on innovation in 2015, the Commission published a competition 
policy brief on "EU merger control and innovation"
241
 in April 2016. This publication 
emphasises that theories of harm involving loss of, or harm to, innovation have been at the 
core of a number of merger cases where the Commission intervened, and that remedies can 
be, and have been, designed with the specific goal of preserving innovation.  
The 2015 enforcement trend on innovation continued in 2016, with cases such as Boehringer 
Ingelheim/Sanofi's animal health business (Merial) where the Commission found concerns on 
a market despite the absence of high market shares due to the merging parties being amongst 
the leading innovators in the industry having promising products just entering the market or in 
the pipeline. In addition, in a decision adopted at the very end of 2015 (Novartis / GSK 
(ofatumumab auto-immmune indications
242
)), the Commission took the view that it had 
jurisdiction (under article 5(2) of EUMR) over an acquisition of a pharmaceutical product still 
under development to prevent companies from artificially splitting marketed and pipeline 
products in different transactions to circumvent the Commission's scrutiny of R&D projects.  
State aid actions in the health services sector 
The Commission's State aid actions in the health services sector mainly concern hospitals, 
related services (e.g., ambulance transport) and health insurance. The Commission decision of 
20 December 2011 (based on Article 106(2) TFEU
243
) specifies the conditions under which 
compensation to companies for providing public services is compatible with the EU State aid 
rules and does not have to be notified to the Commission in advance. Compensation granted 
to hospitals, including emergency services and ancillary services, for services of general 
economic interest, benefits from the decision irrespective of the amounts involved provided 
that the conditions are met. Accordingly, the Commission very rarely takes decisions on 
financing covered by this exemption decision. 
During 2016, the Commission continued examining and/or decided on a number of 
complaints lodged by private health service providers about their allegedly unfair treatment or 
potentially excessive compensation of publicly-owned hospitals. Those complaints usually 
came from operators in Member States with healthcare markets more open to competition 
(e.g. Belgium, France and Germany). In the Brussels hospitals case
244
, the Commission 
concluded after an in-depth investigation that public financing granted to compensate the 
Brussels public IRIS hospitals for deficits incurred for the provision of health and social 
services of general economic interest since 1996 was in line with EU State aid rules.  
                                                            
241 For further information see the Competition Policy Brief 1/2016 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/cpb/2016/2016_001_en.pdf  
242 Case M.7872 Novartis / GSK (ofatumumab autoimmune indications), Commission decision of 18 December 
2015 available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m7872_329_3.pdf  
243 Commission decision of 20 December on the application of Article 106(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union to State aid in the form of public service compensation granted to certain undertakings 
entrusted the with operation of services of general economic interest, OJ L 7, 11.1.2012, p.3. 
244 Case SA.19864 Public financing of Brussels public IRIS hospitals, Commission decision of 5 July.2016 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases/254584/254584_1779214_235_2.pdf  
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 8. TRANSPORT AND POSTAL SERVICES 
Overview of key challenges in the sector 
The transport and postal services sectors account for about 4.9 % of the EU economy245, and 
their performance can have many beneficial effects for other sectors of the European 
economy. Transport is the key to both an integrated internal market and to an open economy 
integrated into the world economy. While some transport sectors have already been 
liberalised and competition is generally fierce to the benefit of customers, such as the air and 
maritime transport sectors, other sectors such as passenger rail transport are still lagging 
behind. Similarly, in the postal sector parcel services are supplied by competitive 
transnational suppliers while other services are mostly in the hands of national postal 
operators often depending on compensation from their government
246
.  
In 2016, the Commission used its competition tools to keep the transport and postal markets 
open and competitive, and to facilitate entry. A continued benevolent focus is on State aid that 
facilitates interoperability between different modes of transport as well as on State aid for 
modern infrastructure.  
Contribution of EU competition policy to tackling the challenges 
Antitrust enforcement in air transport  
On 27 October, the Commission sent a Statement of Objections to Brussels Airlines and TAP 
Portugal
247
 and informed both companies of its preliminary view that their codeshare 
cooperation on passenger services between Brussels and Lisbon restricted competition 
between the two airlines, in breach of EU antitrust rules. The Commission has concerns that 
the two airlines pursued an anti-competitive strategy on the Brussels-Lisbon route by: 
 discussing a capacity reduction and an alignment of their pricing policy on the route; 
 granting each other unlimited rights to sell seats on each other's flights on the route 
where they had previously competed; and 
 implementing these arrangements by actually reducing capacity, completely aligning 
their fare structures as well as their ticket prices on the route. 
The Commission's preliminary conclusion is that these practices eliminated competition on 
prices and capacity between the two airlines on the Brussels-Lisbon route and led to higher 
prices and less choice for consumers. To safeguard their rights of defence, the parties have 
been invited to provide comments. 
Merger review in air transport 
The air transport sector is still very fragmented. In the EU there are more than 150 airlines 
offering scheduled air passenger transport. The five largest airlines in the EU comprising 
                                                            
245 See, EU transport in figures Statistical pocketbook (2015) available at http://ec.europa.eu/transport/facts-
fundings/statistics/doc/2015/pocketbook2015.pdf p.19, prepared by the Commission with around EUR 562 
billion in Gross Value Added (GVA) at basic prices, the transport and storage services sector (including postal 
and courier activities) accounted for about 4.9 % of total GVA in the EU-28 in 2012 (or 4.4 % excluding postal 
and courier services). 
246 It should be noted however, that the third postal Directive (2008/6/EC) introduced full opening of the 
Member States' postal markets, allowing new operators and services. 
247 Case AT.39860 Brussels Airlines / TAP Air Portugal. For further information see IP/16/3563 of 27 October 
2016 available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-3563_en.htm 
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Lufthansa, Air France / KLM and the International Consolidated Airlines Group (i.e. IAG the 
holding company of British Airways and Iberia, Ryanair and EasyJet) account for only 50 % 
of the EU market. In contrast, in the United States, the three legacy carrier groups American 
Airlines, Delta and United together with the low cost carrier Southwest jointly control more 
than 80 % of the United States market. The drive towards further consolidation of the EU 
market in 2016 was lessened by low fuel costs which had a positive impact on airline 
profitability.  
In this context, the Commission reviewed the acquisition of the Irish carrier Aer Lingus by 
IAG
248
. The Commission's investigation indicated that the merger would raise two types of 
competition concerns. Firstly, on certain routes where both airlines operated there would not 
be sufficient competition. Secondly, the choices of airlines available for connecting long-haul 
flights would have decreased if Aer Lingus were to connect only to long-haul flights operated 
by IAG and vice versa. Consequently, the transaction was cleared subject to two types of 
commitments: (1) IAG releasing up to five slots at London Gatwick Airport to entice new 
entrants on the Dublin-London and Belfast-London routes. In 2016, Ryanair started 
operations on both routes; and (2) IAG entering into agreements with competing airlines 
which operate long-haul flights out of London Heathrow, London Gatwick, Manchester, 
Amsterdam, Shannon and Dublin, so that Aer Lingus will continue to provide these airlines 
with connecting passengers. On several of these routes, IAG and Virgin Atlantic Airways 
entered into a special prorate agreement in 2016
249
.  
In 2016, in the framework of the commitments attached to the decision approving the 
acquisition of British Midlands Limited (bmi) by IAG in 2012, the Commission has approved 
Aeroflot as potential entrant on the London Heathrow – Moscow route250 as well as Flybe as 
potential entrant on two routes connecting London Heathrow to Aberdeen and Edinburgh
251
. 
Aeroflot started its operations on the route connecting London Heathrow to Moscow as of the 
IATA Winter Season 2016/2017, broadening passengers' choice on the route. Flybe will start 
operating flights from London Heathrow to Aberdeen and Edinburgh as of the IATA summer 
season 2017
252
. 
                                                            
248 Case M.7541 IAG / AerLingus, Commission decision of 14 July 2015 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=2_M_7541 
249 Case M.7541 IAG / Aer Lingus, Commission decision of 25 May 2016 concerning the approval of the special 
prorate agreement between Aer Lingus and Virgin Atlantic Airways in accordance with the commitments 
annexed to the Commission decision of 14 July 2015 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=2_M_7541 
250 Case M.6447 IAG / bmi, Commission decision of 17 June 2016 concerning the Assessment of the viability of 
Applicants and evaluation of their formal bids pursuant to Clause 1.4.9 of the commitments attached to the 
Commission decision of 30 March 2012 in case M.6447 IAG/bmi available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=2_M_6447 
251 Case M.6447 IAG / bmi, Commission decision of 4 November 2016 concerning the Assessment of the 
viability of the Flybe Group Plc and evaluation of its formal bid pursuant to Clauses 1.4.4 and 1.4.9 of the 
commitments attached to the decision in the above-mentioned case following the Monitoring Trustee's opinion 
of 24 October 2016 – Summer 2017 IATA Season, not yet published at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=2_M_6447  
252 Flybe's announcement available at http://otp.investis.com/clients/uk/flybe1/rns/regulatory-
story.aspx?cid=59&newsid=830572  
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State aid to airports and airlines 
In 2016, several decisions were adopted, closing long-standing investigation into aid to 
airports and airlines. The Commission continued to apply the aviation guidelines adopted in 
2014
253
.  
In the Berlin-Brandenburg airport case, a major public funding package granted for the 
completion of the new single Berlin airport and the upgrade of its capacity compared to the 
initial design was found to be aid free on the basis of an in-depth assessment of the market 
economy investor principle
254
. The decision on Romanian regional airports partially closed a 
formal investigation opened in 2011 into operating aid for eleven small airports
255
. The 
decisions in the Sardinian airports
256
 and Klagenfurt airport cases
257
 imposed recovery on 
airlines, notably low cost carriers, bringing to eight the number of recovery decisions against 
airlines adopted since the entry into force of the Aviation Guidelines. The Commission's 
decision in SEA Handling contained an assessment of economic continuity in a labour-
intensive and asset light sector (ground handling) where the case law and previous decisional 
practice did not provide replies to all the questions that arose
258
.  
The Commission also adopted decisions in cases involving aid to airports and start-up aid to 
airlines
259
.  
The Commission also proposed an extension of the State aid General Block Exemption 
Regulation (GBER) to airports
260
. The extended GBER would cover investment aid to 
airports with less than three million passengers per year under certain conditions, in particular 
the absence of other airports with scheduled traffic within 100 km or 60 minutes by road/train 
("catchment area condition"). The GBER foresees lighter conditions for very small airports. 
Antitrust enforcement in maritime transport  
In July, the Commission adopted a decision that renders legally binding the commitments 
offered by fourteen container liner shipping companies (the Carriers)
261
. The commitments 
addressed the Commission's concerns that the companies' practice of publishing their 
intentions on future price increases may have harmed competition and customers.  
                                                            
253 Communication from the Commission, Guidelines on State aid to airports and airlines, OJ C 99, 4.4.2014, p. 
3 available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.C_.2014.099.01.0003.01. ENG  
254 Case SA.41342 Flughafen Berlin-Brandenburg, Commission decision of 3 August 2016 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases/262544/262544_1846884_138_2.pdf  
255 Case SA.30931 Romanian regional airports, Commission decision of 27 September 2016 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases/240754/240754_1283768_107_3.pdf 
256 Cases SA.33983 Sardinian airports, Commission decision of 29 July 2016 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases/247487/247487_1426436_82_2.pdf  
257 Case SA.24221 Klagenfurt airport, Commission decision of 11 November 2016 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases/243805/243805_1580487_960_2.pdf  
258 Case SA.21420 SEA Handling, Commission decision of 5 July 2016, the public version is not yet available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_21420 
259 Cases SA.43023 Lamezia Terme airport, Commission decision of 28 July 2016 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases/260316/260316_1834868_112_2.pdf and SA.41635 Flughafen 
Heringsdorf Commission decision of 5 July 2016 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases/258231/258231_1777940_193_5.pdf (first decision on individual 
operating aid to an airport since the entry into force of the Aviation Guidelines). 
260 For further information see IP/16/3398 of 13 October 2016 available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-16-3398_en.htm  
261 Case AT.39850 Container Shipping, Commission decision of 7 July 2016 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/39850/39850_3377_3.pdf  
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The Carriers have regularly announced their intended future increases of freight prices on 
their websites, via the press, or in other ways. These price announcements, known as General 
Rate Increases (GRI) announcements, do not indicate the fixed final price for the service 
concerned, but only the amount of the increase in USD per transported container unit 
(Twenty-foot Equivalent Unit, TEU), the affected trade route and the planned date of 
implementation. They generally concern sizable increases of several hundred USD per TEU. 
GRI announcements are made typically three to five weeks before their intended 
implementation date, and during that time some or all of the other carriers announce similar 
intended rate increases for the same or similar route and same or similar implementation 
dates. Carriers are not bound by the announced increases and some carriers have indeed 
postponed or modified announced General rate increases, possibly aligning them with those 
announced by other carriers.  
The Commission had concerns that GRI announcements do not provide full information on 
new prices to customers but merely allow carriers to be aware of each other's pricing 
intentions and may make it possible for them to coordinate their behaviour. Announcing 
future price increases may signal the intended market conduct of carriers and by reducing the 
level of uncertainty about their pricing behaviour, decrease their incentives to compete against 
each other. Because the announcements provide only partial information to customers and 
may not be binding on the carriers, customers may not be able to rely on them and therefore 
carriers may be able to adjust prices without the risk of losing customers. This practice may 
lead to higher prices for container liner shipping services and harm competition and 
customers.  
In order to address the Commission's concerns, the carriers offered to stop making GRI 
announcements. In addition, those Carriers who choose to make public price announcements 
will include in their published price the five main elements of the price representing about 
90% of its full amount thus giving customers a good basis to compare prices
262
. Such 
announcements will be binding on the Carriers as maximum prices allowing customers to rely 
on them (customers could however negotiate lower prices). Price announcements will be 
made no later than 31 days before the sailings to which they apply. This time gap corresponds 
to the period when customers usually start booking in significant volumes. Earlier 
announcements may give competitors insight into each other's future prices while not being 
useful for customers since they are not booking yet, thus possibly leading to a collusive 
outcome. 
Merger review in maritime transport 
The global container shipping industry is undergoing a period of change, in reaction to the 
challenges it has been facing in recent years. The sector is characterised by overcapacity, 
resulting from several carriers' expansion and investment in larger vessels in recent years and 
combined with the gradual recovery of demand following the economic crisis. Also as a 
means to improve their efficiency and reduce their operating costs, container shipping 
companies do not only provide services individually, but they have also put in place 
operational agreements, such as consortia or alliances, with other shipping companies that 
allow them to combine their vessels and offer a joint service.  
Currently, there is a significant change in the alliances landscape, with the termination of 
three of the current four global alliances, namely CKYHE, G6 and the Ocean Alliance, and 
                                                            
262 The remaining elements are charges which are difficult or impossible for the Carriers to publish in advance of 
the sailing.  
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their replacement by three new or enlarged ones, namely 2M, The Alliance and the Ocean 
Alliance by 1 April 2017. Moreover, a wave of consolidation can be observed, with the 
acquisition of Neptun Oriental Lines of Singapore (NOL) by CMA CGM, the acquisition of 
the UASC by Hapag-Lloyd, the combination of Cosco and CSCL and the intended 
combination of activities of the Japanese carriers MOL, NYK and K-Line and the announced 
acquisition of Hamburg Süd by Maersk Line. Last, the Korean carrier Hanjin filed for 
receivership in August 2016 and is in the process of exiting the market.  
The Commission ruled on two major mergers in this industry. Earlier in 2016, the 
Commission cleared the acquisition of NOL by CMA CGM, a French shipping company with 
worldwide activities
263
. As initially notified, the transaction would have created new links 
between previously unconnected consortia to which the two companies belonged (CMA 
CGM is a founding member of the Ocean Three Alliance (O3 Alliance) whereas NOL is 
currently a member of the G6 Alliance). The Commission had concerns that these potential 
new links would have resulted in anti-competitive effects on two trade routes, notably 
between Northern Europe and North America and between Northern Europe and the Middle 
East. On these routes, competition from liner shippers who have no connection with the 
merged entity or its alliance partners would have been insufficient. As a result, the transaction 
could have enabled the merged entity, through the consortia that the two companies belong to, 
to influence capacity and therefore prices to the detriment of shippers and consumers for a 
very large part of those markets. The companies offered to make the transaction contingent 
upon the removal of the link that would have been created between CMA CGM's O3 Alliance 
and NOL's G6 Alliance. Although CMA CGM had previously stated publicly that it intended 
to remove NOL from the G6 alliance, the formal commitment to do so was necessary to 
remove the risk of anti-competitive effects on the two trade routes described above. 
The Commission also cleared the acquisition of the Middle-Eastern UASC, world's number 
eleven, by the German Hapag-Lloyd, which after its merger with CSAV was the sixth largest 
container shipping company
264
. The Commission found that the combination of the Parties' 
activities would raise competition concerns on the two legs of the Northern Europe – North 
America trade. Even though the market position of UASC was rather limited, both Hapag-
Lloyd and the UASC were members to different alliances and consortia on those markets. As 
consortia and alliances members decide jointly on a number of parameters relevant for 
competition, such as capacity, schedules, ports of call, the merged entity would have 
influence over such competition features over a very large part of those markets. In order to 
ensure that the merged entity would face sufficient competition also on those routes, UASC 
undertook terminating its consortium participation on the two legs of the trade. As a result the 
merged entity's position on those markets will be comparable to the current position of 
Hapag-Lloyd.  
State aid enforcement in the maritime transport sector 
In 2016, the Commission continued to ensure compliance with the Maritime State aid 
Guidelines
265
. The aim of those Guidelines is to maintain the European maritime sector's 
competitiveness and to avoid flagging out to "flags of convenience" for which environmental 
                                                            
263 Case M.7908 CMA CGM / NOL, Commission decision of 29 April 2016 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m7908_1366_3.pdf  
264 Case M.8120 Hapag-Lloyd / United Arab Shipping Company (UASC). For further information see IP/16/2942 
of 23 November 2016 available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-3942_en.htm  
265 Communication from the Commission, Community guidelines on State aid to maritime transport, OJ C 13, 
17.01.2004, p. 3. 
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and security standards might be low. The Commission is determined to ensure consistency 
and equal treatment throughout the EU whilst at the same time making sure that the beneficial 
tonnage tax regimes do not contravene internal market rules.  
For example, the Commission adopted decisions concerning the Swedish tonnage tax scheme 
and a prolongation of the German scheme for the reduction of social security contributions for 
seafarers
266
.  
Antitrust enforcement in the rail sector 
Following the inspections carried out in April, the Commission opened an investigation 
against the Czech railway incumbent České dráhy a.s. on 10 November, to assess whether it 
charged prices below costs with the aim of foreclosing competition in rail passenger transport 
services, in breach of EU antitrust rules (Article 102 TFEU). Furthermore, on 28 June the 
Commission carried out inspections in the rail passenger transport sector in several Member 
States since it has concerns that the companies concerned may have entered into anti-
competitive agreements aiming to foreclose new entrants from this market, in breach of EU 
antitrust rules (Article 101 TFEU). The Commission's investigations continue in both cases. 
Rail and intermodal State aid enforcement  
In 2016, the Commission approved a number of schemes supporting rail and intermodal 
transport, which aim to support the transfer of cargo from the road to the safer and more 
environmentally friendly rail transport mode
267
.  
During 2016, the European Parliament and the Council reached an agreement on the so-called 
Fourth Railway Package
268
. This bundle of legislation should help further open up the railway 
sector to competition. 
State aid review in the road sector 
The Commission continued to enforce Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007 on public passenger 
transport services
269
. On 10 June, the Commission took a negative decision with recovery on 
                                                            
266 Cases SA.43642 Tonnage Tax scheme, Commission decision of 18 August 2016 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases/261398/261398_1830463_166_2.pdf and SA.45258 
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labour costs in maritime shipping, Commission decision of 14 November 2016 available at 
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267 Cases SA.41033 Integrated transport scheme in the Province of Trento, Commission decision of 29 April 
2016 available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases/263023/263023_1753823_116_2.pdf; 
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decision of 19 July 2016 available at 
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freight transport support scheme, Commission decision of 19 December 2016 available at 
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268 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the European Economic 
and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, The Fourth Railway Package – Completing the Single 
European railway area to foster European competitiveness and growth, COM(2013) 25 final available at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52013DC0025&from=EN  
269 Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007 of the European Parliament and the Council of 23 October 2007 on public 
passenger transport services by rail and by road and repealing Council Regulations (EEC) Nos. 1191/69 and 
1107/70, OJ L 315, 3.12.2007, p. 1. 
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ex-post public service compensation granted by the Region of Piedmont (Italy) to Arfea
270
. 
The Commission also adopted a decision in the long-standing Emsländische Eisenbahn 
case
271
. 
State aid review in the postal services sector 
The postal sector continues to evolve and traditional letter delivery, against the backdrop of 
electronic substitution, remains on a declining trajectory. Nevertheless, postal services have 
retained a very significant economic and social value. In a shrinking market of traditional 
letter delivery, many postal incumbents are being forced to diversify the portfolio of their 
activities and innovate in order to stay competitive. At the same time, the explosive growth of 
e-commerce necessitates a well-functioning parcel delivery market linking buyers and sellers. 
Efficient postal services are thus a key factor in allowing e-commerce to realise its potential in 
propelling growth and creating jobs.  
Through State aid control in the postal sector, the Commission pursues multiple related goals. 
State aid control ensures that where a postal service provider – typically a postal incumbent – 
is entrusted with a costly public service obligation, any compensation paid to the provider 
does not undermine a level playing field between postal incumbents and new entrants. State 
aid should not shield the recipients from competitive pressures and market developments, but 
should incentivise efficiency, innovation and investment.  
First, on 11 February the Commission opened the formal investigation procedure in order to 
examine whether State measures since 2004 in favour of Correos, the publicly-owned Spanish 
postal operator, were in line with EU State aid rules
272
. Following complaints alleging that 
Correos had benefitted from several illegal and incompatible State aid measures, the 
Commission launched an investigation into whether Correos had been overcompensated 
between 2004 and 2010 for the provision of the universal postal service given that 
profitability levels achieved by Correos with the public funding seemed to exceed the level of 
reasonable profit allowed under EU State aid rules on public service compensation. The 
Commission is also investigating other measures granted by Spain to Correos since 2004, 
notably tax exemptions, capital increases and compensation for the distribution of electoral 
material.  
Second, the Commission found in its decision of 3 June a compensation of EUR 1.3 billion 
granted to the Belgian postal provider Bpost to be compliant with State aid rules
273
. Belgium 
notified to the Commission in spring 2016 its plan to compensate Bpost for the delivery of 
certain postal services over the period 2016-2020. In particular, Belgium intended to 
compensate Bpost for maintaining a post office network throughout Belgium, delivering 
pension payments, providing universal cash at counter services, delivering printed material 
related to elections as well as distributing recognised newspapers and periodicals in Belgium. 
The Commission's assessment showed that the compensation granted to Bpost for the 
                                                            
270 Case SA.38132 PSO compensation to ARFEA, Commission decision of 10 June 2016 available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L:2016:321:FULL&from=EN  
271 Case SA.23216 State aid to Emsländische Eisenbahn, Commission decision of 30 September 2016 available 
at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_C54_2007  
272 Case SA.37977 Complaint regarding unlawful State aid in favour of Sociedad Estatal Correos y Telégrafos, 
S.A. For further information see IP/16/284 of 11 February 2016 available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-16-284_en.htm  
273 Case SA.42366 Compensations accordées par l’État à Bpost pour la fourniture de services publics au cours 
de la période 2016-2020. For further information see IP/16/2034 of 3 June 2016 available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-2034_en.htm  
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provision of these services was based on a robust methodology, which ensured that such 
compensation will not exceed the net cost of the public service mission. The compensation 
mechanism also includes incentives for Bpost to increase the efficiency and quality of its 
public services. As regards the task of delivering recognised newspapers and periodicals, it 
has been entrusted to Bpost following an open, transparent and non-discriminatory 
procurement procedure. This is in line with Belgium's commitment under the Commission's 
May 2013 decision endorsing the public service compensation for Bpost between 2013 and 
2015. 
Merger review in postal services 
Postal services play a crucial role in allowing e-commerce to develop, the promotion of which 
is one of the goals of the Digital Single Market strategy. The Commission's investigation of 
the acquisition of TNT Express by FedEx
274
 focused on ensuring that prices for customers, 
including SMEs active in e-commerce, and ultimately consumers, would not rise for cross-
border small package deliveries, and that the quality of service would not be degraded as a 
result of the merger. 
The in-depth investigation opened by the Commission into FedEx's takeover of TNT 
Express
275
 was prompted by concerns that the proposed acquisition would substantially lessen 
competition in certain markets for international deliveries of small packages up to 31.5 kg 
within the European Economic Area (EEA) or from the EEA to the rest of the world. 
FedEx and TNT are two out of four so-called "integrators" currently operating in the small 
package delivery sector in Europe. Integrators are companies that control a comprehensive air 
and road small package delivery network and are capable of offering a broad portfolio of 
reliable delivery services. The Commission was concerned that following the transaction, the 
merged entity would face insufficient competitive constraints from the only two remaining 
integrators, DHL and UPS. A lack of sufficient competitive constraints could lead to higher 
prices for business customers and consumers. 
The Commission found, based on a market reconstruction, that the combined market position 
of the parties was rather moderate in most markets. The parties were furthermore not 
particularly close competitors and no important competitive force would be removed by the 
merger. This was mirrored in the reaction of customers, the vast majority of who adopted a 
neutral or even positive stance on the merger. The Commission also carried out a price 
concentration analysis that did not establish likely price increases and found that the 
transaction would give rise to efficiencies, due to network cost savings to the benefit of 
customers. The Commission thus cleared the concentration. 
The Commission also thoroughly investigated allegations that the transaction may cause 
particular harm to small and medium enterprises (SMEs). After a comprehensive market 
investigation, the Commission concluded that SMEs will not be more affected by the 
acquisition than other customers. 
  
                                                            
274 Case M.7630 FedEx / TNT, Commission decision of 8 January 2016 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m7630_4582_4.pdf  
275 Case M.7630 FedEx / TNT. For further information see IP/15/5463 of 31 July 2015 available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-5463_en.htm  
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Banking State aid cases: Decisions adopted by the Commission in 2016 
By country 
 
Member 
State 
Case number/Title Type of Decision 
Date of 
adoption 
1.  
Austria 
SA.45940 (2016/N) - Repurchase offer 
for guaranteed liabilities of Heta Asset 
Resolution AG 
no-aid decision 01/09/2016 
2.  
Austria 
SA.43740 (2015/N) - Prolongation of the 
Austrian short-term export credit 
insurance scheme with regard to disaster 
risks 
export credit 
scheme 
15/02/2016 
3.  
Croatia 
SA.46066 (2016/N) - Resolution scheme 
for small credit institutions with total 
assets below EUR 1.5 billion 
no-objection 
decision 
05/10/2016 
4.  
Cyprus 
SA.45004 ( 2016/N) State grant scheme 
to borrowers and micro companies 
no-objection 
decision 
28/06/2016 
5.  
Cyprus 
SA.45598 (2016/N) - Eighth 
Prolongation of Cypriot guarantee 
scheme for banks - H2 2016 
no-objection 
decision 
28/06/2016 
6.  
Cyprus 
SA.45051 (2016/N) – Cyprus - Final 
valuation of the Cooperative Central 
Bank Ltd 
no-objections 
decision 
27/04/2016 
7.  
Estonia 
SA.45282 (2016/N) - Short Term Export 
Credit Insurance Scheme - Estonia 
no-objection 
decision 
20/06/2016 
8.  
France 
SA.37649 (2013/CP); SA.45860 
(2016/PN); SA.45860 (2016/N) – France 
- (i) garantie illimitée octroyée à la Caisse 
Centrale de Réassurance (CCR) pour son 
activité de réassurance des risques de 
catastrophes naturelles en France; (ii) 
transfert d'actifs et passifs liés aux 
activités non garanties de la CCR vers 
une nouvelle filiale, et; (iii) apport en 
capital et souscription d’un prêt 
subordonné par la CCR en faveur de cette 
nouvelle filiale 
no-objection 
decision 
26/09/2016 
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Member 
State 
Case number/Title Type of Decision 
Date of 
adoption 
9.  
Germany 
SA.29338 (2013/C-30), SA.44910 
(2016/N) - HSH Nordbank 
positive final 
decision 
02/05/2016 
10.  
Greece 
SA.46955 (2016/N) – Greece - 
Prolongation of the State Guarantee 
Scheme (Art. 2 law 3723/2008) 
no-objection 
decision 
19/12/2016 
11.  
Greece 
SA.46558(2016/N) - Liquidity support to 
Attica Bank 
no-objection 
decision 
07/10/2016 
12.  
Greece HT.4524 – STEC - 2016 Greece Communication 30/06/2016 
13.  
Greece 
SA.45125 (2016/N) - Methodology to 
calculate the aid element in State 
guarantees to companies 
no-objection 
decision 
29/07/2016 
14.  
Greece 
SA.45629 (2016/N) - Prolongation of the 
Greek financial support measures (Art. 2 
law 3723/2008) 
no-objection 
decision 
29/06/2016 
15.  
Hungary 
SA.38843 (2015/N) – HU - Asset 
purchase program MARK 
no-aid decision 10/02/2016 
16.  
Ireland 
SA.46951 (2016/N) - Ireland - 10th 
prolongation of the Credit Union 
Resolution Scheme H1 2017 
no-objection 
decision 
19/12/2016 
17.  
Ireland 
SA.46437 (2016/N) - Ireland - Fourth 
prolongation of the Credit Union 
restructuring and stabilisation Scheme  
no-objection 
decision 
11/10/2016 
18.  
Ireland 
SA.45522 (2016/N) - Ireland - 9th 
prolongation of the Credit Union 
Resolution Scheme H2 2016  
no-objection 
decision 
20/06/2016 
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Member 
State 
Case number/Title Type of Decision 
Date of 
adoption 
19.  
Ireland 
SA.45129 (2016/N) - Ireland 
Third prolongation of the Credit Union 
restructuring and stabilisation Scheme  
no-objection 
decision 
04/05/2016 
20.  
Italy 
SA.47082(2016/N) - IT - First 
prolongation of the Italian bank guarantee 
scheme 
no-objection 
decision 
29/12/2016 
21.  
Italy 
SA.47081 (2016/N) - Italy -Liquidity 
support to MPS bank 
no-objection 
decision 
29/12/2016 
22.  
Italy 
SA.39543 (2015/N), SA.41134 (2015/N), 
SA.41925 (2015/N), SA.43547 (2015/N) 
– Italy  
Second amendment to the Resolution of 
Banca delle Marche S.p.A., Banca 
Popolare dell'Etruria e del Lazio Soc. 
Coop., Cassa di Risparmio di Ferrara 
S.p.A. and Cassa di Risparmio della 
Provincia di Chieti S.p.A. 
no-objection 
decision 
07/10/2016 
23.  
Italy SA.45753 Italian bank guarantee scheme 
no-objection 
decision 
26/06/2016 
24.  
Italy 
SA.39543 (2015/N), SA.41134 (2015/N), 
SA.41925 (2015/N), SA.43547 (2015/N) 
Amendment to the Resolution of Banca 
delle Marche S.p.A., Banca Popolare 
dell'Etruria e del Lazio Soc. Coop., Cassa 
di Risparmio di Ferrara S.p.A. and Cassa 
di Risparmio della Provincia di Chieti 
S.p.A. 
no-objections 
decision, 
amendment 
29/04/2016 
25.  
Italy 
SA.43296 (2015/N) – Italy - Italian 
methodology to calculate the Gross Grant 
Equivalent for aid in the form of State 
guarantees on loans to "mid-cap" 
companies  
no-objection 
decision 
28/04/2016 
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Member 
State 
Case number/Title Type of Decision 
Date of 
adoption 
26.  
Italy 
SA.43390 (2016/N) – IT - Italian 
Securitisation Scheme 
no-aid decision 10/02/2016 
27.  
Malta 
SA.39793 (2016/N) - Malta Development 
Bank 
no-objection 
decision 
 
Corrigendum 
24/08/2016 
 
18/10/2016 
28.  
Poland 
SA.45857 (2016/N) – Poland - Second 
prolongation of aid-free guarantee 
scheme for export contracts 
no-objection 
decision 
19/12/2016 
29.  
Poland 
SA.46871 (2016/N) – Poland - Fifteenth 
prolongation of the Polish bank guarantee 
scheme – H1 2017 
no-objection 
decision 
19/12/2016 
30.  
Poland 
SA.46575 (2016/N) - Poland - Resolution 
scheme for cooperative banks and small 
commercial banks 
no-objection 
decision 
20/12/2016 
31.  
Poland 
SA.45575 (2016/N) – Poland - 
Fourteenth prolongation of the Polish 
bank guarantee scheme – H2 2016 
no-objection 
decision 
01/07/2016 
32.  
Poland 
SA.45517 (2016/N)  - Fifth Prolongation 
of the Credit Unions Orderly Liquidation 
Scheme – H2 2016 
no-objection 
decision 
29/06/2016 
33.  
Poland 
SA.43924 (2015/N) – Poland - Thirteenth 
prolongation of the Polish bank guarantee 
scheme – H1 2016 
no-objections 
decision 
01/02/2016 
34.  
Portugal 
SA.42665 (2016/N) – Portugal -  
Extension of the remit of the Portuguese 
Development Financial Institution 
no-objection 
decision 
28/11/2016 
35.  
Portugal 
SA.43977 (2015/N) * PT* Decision on 
the impaired asset measure in the 
resolution of Banif 
no-objection 
decision 
21/11/2016 
36.  
Portugal 
SA.45761 (2016/N) - Fourteenth 
Prolongation of the Portuguese Guarantee 
Scheme  
no-objection 
decision 
29/07/2016 
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Member 
State 
Case number/Title Type of Decision 
Date of 
adoption 
37.  
Portugal 
SA.45671 (2016/N) - Sixth prolongation 
of the Portuguese Guarantee Scheme on 
EIB lending 
no-objection 
decision 
28/07/2016 
38.  
Portugal 
SA.44013 (2015/N) – Portugal - Fifth 
prolongation of the Portuguese Guarantee 
Scheme on EIB lending 
no-objections 
decision 
01/02/2016 
39.  
Portugal 
SA.43996 (2015/N) - Thirteenth 
Prolongation of the Portuguese Guarantee 
Scheme 
no-objections 
decision 
13/01/2016 
40.  
United 
Kingdom 
SA.44887(2016/N) - First Prolongation 
and Amendment of The Big Society 
Capital  
no-objection 
decision 
18/11/2016 
 
 
 
